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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3294
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 5760
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHWSMRC/MCF01 SACCS USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/NP//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/NESA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/AP//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/BTF//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/PA&E//
RHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC
RHRMDAB/COMUSNAVCENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 ABU DHABI 000288 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM/SNA AND NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2016 
TAGS: PREL MCAP MARR MASS AE
SUBJECT: 2005/2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ALLIED 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMON DEFENSE: UAE SUBMISSION 
 
REF: 05 STATE 223383 
 
ABU DHABI 00000288  001.2 OF 010 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
 -------------------- 
SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION 
-------------------- 
 
¶1. (U) The UAE in 2004 and 2005 continued its outstanding 
record as a valuable strategic partner in the Global War on 
Terrorism and in supporting key U.S. regional strategic 
policy goals.  Among the highlights of the UAE's 
contributions to the common defense are: 
 
-- (C) Providing basing for USAF aerial refueling, 
intra-theater lift, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance assets in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation 
Horn of Africa (HOA); 
 
-- (U) Providing other logistical and non-combat support for 
OEF, OIF, and HOA; 
 
-- (C) Hosting U.S. Navy logistical operation in support of 
the Fifth Fleet; 
 
-- (C) Hosting the U.S. sea services at Jebel Ali Port 
(Dubai) and at Fujairah, with Jebel Ali being the premier 
naval refurbishment port in the region, perhaps the world. 
Not only are expert repairs and services readily available to 
the fleet, but Dubai offers Marines and Sailors unique 
liberty opportunities rarely found in other locations around 
the world; 
 
-- (C) Providing facilities and forces for direct action 
outside the UAE in support of OEF; 
 
-- (U) Direct sharing in costs of U.S. deployments to the 
amount estimated at approximately $12.6 million; 
 
-- (U) Indirect sharing of costs estimated at approximately 
$532.2 million; 
 
-- (U) Maintaining an important defense sales relationship 
with the USG; 
 
-- (U) Donating $100 million in cash to the U.S. for 
Hurricane Katrina relief and the same amount for tsunami 
relief operations; 
 
-- (U) Providing significant in-kind humanitarian assistance 
to the victims of the Pakistan earthquake as well as $100 
million in cash assistance to the Pakistani government, and 
pledging another $100 million at the Islamabad donors 
conference.  (Note: $5.2 million of the humanitarian 
assistance was designated for repairs to the Pakistan Army's 
MI-17 helicopters.  End note.)  In addition, setting up a 
field hospital in Pakistan and providing an air bridge to 
provide further supplies; providing the use of the Fujairah 
port facility for the USS Pearl Harbor to load over 350 
pallets worth of relief supplies collected by the Pakistan 
Embassy and the UAE Red Crescent Authority (RCA) worth more 
than $350,000; 
 
-- (U) In August 2005, committing $100 million to build 
Sheikh Khalifa City, a new Palestinian housing complex in the 
Gaza Strip; 
 
-- (SBU) Hosting numerous high-level military and civilian 
delegations, including, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Richard Myers; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Peter Pace; USCENTCOM Commander General John 
Abizaid; Air Force Secretary James Roche; Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force General John Jumper; Chief of Staff of the Air 
 
ABU DHABI 00000288  002.2 OF 010 
 
 
Force, General T. Michael Moseley; USNAVCENT Commander, Vice 
Admiral Patrick Walsh; ACC Commander, General Ronald Keys; 
Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International 
Affairs, Bruce Lemkin; and Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs, Peter Rodman (head of the 
first Joint Military Commission in January 2005).  Also, the 
Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for 
Iraq, Ambassador James Jeffrey; U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, 
Zalmay Khalilzad; U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman; 
former Under Secretary for Arms Control and International 
Security John Bolton; Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
International Security, Robert Joseph; former Coordinator for 
Counter Terrorism, Cofer Black; former Assistant Secretary 
for Political-Military Affairs, Lincoln Bloomfield; former 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs William Burns; 
Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism Advisor, Fran 
Townsend. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
GENERAL ASSESSMENT: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (U) Domestic political circumstances in the UAE have seen 
significant changes over the past two years.  The UAEG's 
loose federal structure, under the leadership of President 
Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan, remains stable and there are no 
internal or external opposition groups.  President Khalifa 
succeeded his father, the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan 
al-Nahyan, in November 2004.  Mohammed bin Zayed succeeded 
Khalifa as Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Emirate, while Lt. 
General Hamad Mohamed Thani al-Rumaithy succeeded Mohammed 
bin Zayed as Armed Forces Chief of Staff.  Hamdan bin Zayed 
al-Nahyan remains the de facto Foreign Minister and Deputy 
Prime Minister.  The federal Cabinet of Ministers was 
overhauled in November 2004, including mergers of some 
ministries and the first-ever appointment of a woman (as 
Minister of Economy and Planning).  In November 2005, 
President Khalifa announced that half the members of the 
Federal National Council (FNC) would be elected by persons 
appointed by the rulers.  The President further announced 
that this was a first step toward eventual direct elections 
of a legislative body, and he also promised amendments to the 
constitution that would give the FNC greater powers. 
 
¶3. (U) In regional and international affairs, the UAE 
continued to demonstrate its unequivocal support for the 
Global War on Terrorism.  The UAE played a critical role in 
assisting the continuing investigation into the 9/11 attacks 
and provided financial documents pertaining to the movement 
of terrorist funds.  The UAE Government implemented a law to 
criminalize money laundering, to include terrorist financing, 
in January 2002.  In June 2004, the UAE passed a law to 
combat terrorist crimes, strengthening its legal ability to 
combat the financing of terrorism.  Since 2000, the UAE 
Central Bank has frozen a total of $1,348,381 in 17 accounts 
in response to UN 1267 sanctions.  The UAE implemented the 
anti-terrorism financing regulations passed by the UN 
Security Council.  In December 2005, the Supreme Council, the 
top policy making body in the country, decided to place all 
security agencies under a newly established National Security 
Council.  Cooperation across the board -- from the financial 
realm through to military, security and intelligence -- has 
been strong and sustained.  The UAE provided logistical 
support for non-combat operations related to OEF and OIF. 
The UAE also undertook several security measures along its 
land border and at sea to deter terrorists from reaching UAE 
soil. 
 
¶4. (U) The UAE remains committed to cooperation with other 
GCC States.  The UAE commitment to Peninsula Shield had been 
one full mechanized brigade, until the GCC took the decision 
in late 2005 to dismantle the force.  The UAE has continued 
to back GCC policies on Iran and Iraq.  The UAE's economic 
and trade relations with Iran continued to grow, but there 
 
ABU DHABI 00000288  003.2 OF 010 
 
 
was no change in political relations, which remain strained. 
The UAE's attention remains focused on the contested Abu Musa 
and Tunb Islands, occupied by Iran but claimed by both Iran 
and the UAE.  The UAE continues to take the lead within the 
GCC in expressing concern about Iran's support for terrorism, 
its military build-up, pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction, and interference in the internal affairs of 
other countries in the region.  The UAE publicly condemned 
terrorist attacks in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the 
United Kingdom while offering a strong public show of support 
for Iraq's interim government and political process. 
 
¶5. (C) The UAE permitted the basing of USAF tankers in 
support of OEF, OIF, and HOA. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
GENERAL ASSESSMENT: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) The UAE is a confederation of seven emirates. 
Individual emirates retain considerable control over legal 
and economic matters, most significantly over ownership and 
disposition of oil and other natural resources, and resultant 
revenues.  Oil production and revenues from 
the sale of oil constitute the largest single component of 
GDP, accounting for 39.7 percent of GDP and equaling roughly 
40 percent of exports and 90 percent of government revenue. 
Rising or declining oil prices have a direct effect on GDP 
statistics. 
 
¶7. (U) The great majority of the UAE's oil export income 
comes from Abu Dhabi emirate, though Dubai and Sharjah also 
produce and export a modest amount of oil and gas products. 
The scarcity of oil and gas reserves in the UAE's northern 
emirates has led to continued attempts at economic 
diversification.  The non-oil sector of the UAE's economy 
actually accounts for more than twice the oil sector's direct 
contribution to GDP and this has helped insulate the country 
from the full effect of fluctuating oil prices. 
 
¶8. (U) Traditionally, oil revenues, along with careful 
management of investments, have helped the UAE avoid some of 
the budgetary problems encountered by other GCC states.  The 
UAE has substantial foreign exchange reserves and the 
government has no foreign debt.  There are no figures 
available for the amount of government assets held overseas, 
but many experts believe the Government of Abu Dhabi 
maintains $200 billion to $250 billion under the 
administration of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. 
 
¶9. (U) The Emirate of Abu Dhabi, which finances the UAE's 
military expenditures, continues to build significant 
infrastructure, particularly in the power and water sector, 
where privatization and outsourcing efforts continue. 
Several large-scale projects, including the UAE Offsets 
Group's "Dolphin" project (to pipe Qatari Gas to Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai) and massive greenfield utility developments in 
Fujeirah and Shuweihat in Abu Dhabi Emirate, are moving to 
execution. 
 
---------------------------- 
AID, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) The UAE continued its generous aid program in 2004 
and 2005.  In late 2004/early 2005, the UAE responded by 
providing emergency aid to the victims of the Asian tsunami. 
The UAE Red Crescent Authority (RCA) provided $12 million in 
reconstruction assistance.  The UAE Government gave donations 
of $100 million and other government and semi-governmental 
bodies also provided assistance.  As an example of 
reconstruction assistance, the RCA is currently building 400 
housing units in Sri Lanka in coordination with the UN 
Development Program for victims of the tsunami. 
 
ABU DHABI 00000288  004.2 OF 010 
 
 
 
¶11. (U) In response to the Pakistan earthquake, the UAEG 
provided a $100 million cash donation to the government of 
Pakistan and pledged another $100 million at the Islamabad 
donors conference in November 2005.  UAE organizations, 
including the armed forces, police, and the RCA, also 
provided significant in-kind assistance, including setting up 
field hospitals, sending search-and-rescue teams to both 
Pakistan and India, and treating earthquake survivors in UAE 
hospitals.  The UAE military also provided an air bridge to 
ferry supplies to the victims of the earthquake. 
 
¶12. (U) The UAE responded quickly to Hurricane Katrina by 
donating $100 million in cash to the U.S. Government to help 
finance relief efforts. 
 
¶13. (U) In 2004 and 2005, the UAE continued its support of 
the Palestinian people.  Although comprehensive figures for 
the two years are not available, the UAE opened the $62 
million Sheikh Zayed City in May 2005.  It pledged $100 
million in July 2005 to build Sheikh Khalifa City in the Gaza 
Strip to house 30,000 to 40,000 people.  The UAE is working 
with the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA on this project. 
The UAE also helped rebuild the Jenin refugee camp and funded 
a new township in Rafah at a cost of $29 million. 
 
¶14. (U) UAE reconstruction projects in Afghanistan in 2005 
included starting construction on Sheikh Zayed Ciy in Kabul 
in order to provide basic needs for thusands of displaced 
Afghans, supervising the contruction of a new university in 
the city of Khos, and other health and water supply projects. 
 
------------------ 
DIRECT COST SHARING 
------------------ 
 
¶15. (U) All figures in this report are in U.S. dollars.  All 
UAE Dirham figures were cnverted at the rate of 3.66 Dirhams 
per one U.S. dollar. 
 
RENTS 
 
¶16. (C) The UAEG neither leases nor rents any privately owned 
land or facilities for use by U.S. forces. 
 
LABOR 
 
¶17. (C) The UAE hired laborers and funded construction work 
at al-Dhafra Air Base to upgrade facilities for use by U.S. 
forces.  This included road-building, force protection 
fences, gates, utilities upgrade, and project site 
preparations.  It is not possible to estimate the size of 
this work force or its cost to the UAE. 
 
KATUSA LABOR 
 
¶18. (U) N/A 
 
UTILITIES 
 
¶19. (C) Electricity, water and sewer were provided at no cost 
to the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing at al-Dhafra Air Base. 
 
¶20. (U) The estimated figures are as follows: 
 
For CY04: Electricity: $585,000; Water: $142,500 
For CY05: Electricity: $602,550; Water: $146,775 
 
FACILITIES 
 
¶21. (U) In CY04, the UAE had costs associated with joint use 
of facilities of Gulf Air Warfare Center, including office 
space, ramp and hangar space, support shops, and ranges. 
(Note: The UAE has estimated that the value of what they are 
 
ABU DHABI 00000288  005.2 OF 010 
 
 
providing is approximately $10,000 per pilot, per course. 
The U.S. put three pilots in three classes in both 2004 and 
2005, thus the UAE cost was estimated at $90,000 per year. 
End note.)  The UAE also offered free medical benefits to all 
Air Warfare Center participants, although U.S. personnel did 
not avail themselves of those services. 
 
For CY04: $90,000 
For CY05: $90,000 
 
¶22. (C) In 2005, with land provided by UAE, the 380th Air 
Expeditionary Wing executed a $47 million project 
(U.S.-funded) to build a 168,000-square-meter tank ramp that 
included 12 refueling hydrant pits.  The ramp allows for a 
2.7 million operational fuel storage capacity, significantly 
enhancing wing mission capabilities. 
 
FACILITIES IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM 
 
¶23. (U) In CY05, UAE provided $500,000 in improvements to the 
tanker truck off-load facility compound at al-Dhafra.  The 
improvements included new sunshades, concrete pad, asphalt 
paving and a new office building for fuels workers.  The UAE 
also constructed an Air Defense Site boundary wall at a cost 
of $1.9 million. 
 
For CY05: $2,400,000 
 
RELOCATION CONSTRUCTION 
 
¶24. (C) In CY05, UAE undertook a project at al-Dhafra Air 
Base to connect the temporary cantonment area to commercial 
utilities (electricity, water, and sewage).  The project is 
scheduled for completion in March 2006.  Upon completion, the 
AEW 380th will relocate from expeditionary facilities to more 
enduring modular buildings. 
 
For CY05: $8.5 million 
 
VICINITY IMPROVEMENTS 
 
¶25. (U) N/A 
 
MISCELLANEOUS 
 
¶26. (U) N/A 
 
TOTAL OF DIRECT COST SHARING 
 
¶27. (U) For CY04: $   817,000 (estimated) 
        For CY05: $11,739,325 (estimated) 
 
--------------------- 
INDIRECT COST SHARING 
--------------------- 
 
RENTS 
 
¶28. (C) Using a market value of land of 425 Dirhams/$116 per 
square meter, the total value of land at al-Dhafra is: 
 
Al-Dhafra Tent City:    364,282 sq meters          $42,256,712 
16-Bag Fuel Yard:        68,037 sq meters          $7,892,292 
Munitions Storage Area:  10,031 sq meters          $1,163,596 
Air Transport Ops Ctr:   15,449 sq meters          $1,792,084 
Tanker Town:                      333 sq meters 
$38,628 
East Ramp:              163,471 sq meters          $18,962,636 
Tanker Ramp:                  168,000 sq meters 
$19,000,000 
Air Defense Site:    1,030,046 sq meters  $119,485,336 
 
Total Basis for Rents for CY04: $191,591,284 
Total Basis for Rents for CY05: $210,591,284 (tanker ramp was 
 
ABU DHABI 00000288  006.2 OF 010 
 
 
added in CY05) 
 
FACILITIES 
 
¶29. (C) The U.S. Navy has been provided a dedicated deepwater 
(14 meter) berthing space in the Jebel Ali Port Complex for 
the berthing of its aircraft carriers.  Quay 9 (Piers 57-59) 
dredging was completed in December 2005 and the USS Theodore 
Roosevelt made the first port visit to the new site.  The all 
new Oasis rest and relaxation area has been relocated here 
with significantly improved facilities compared to before. 
The vendor area is paved with asphalt to reduce dust from 
foot traffic.  A new stage has been erected for performances 
and the vendors are all set up.  The Entry Control Point is 
more easily controlled than before. 
 
¶30. (U) As of December 2005, there have been U.S. Navy and 
Military Sealift Command ships in UAE ports for 1,410 total 
days during CY05.  These figures are broken out below: 
 
Jebel Ali:        848 ship days 
128 different vessels 
 
Fujairah:               514 ship days 
51 different vessels 
 
Other UAE ports:  48 ship days 
12 different vessels 
 
¶31. (U) During these visits there have been over 77,500 
personnel enjoying liberty in Dubai.  The UAE also provides 
an excellent range of liberty programs to ship personnel, 
many of whom visit Dubai as their first liberty port after 
completing extended combat duty in Iraq and Afghanistan. into 
and out of the region.  The Port Liaison element has provided 
transportation to 3,200 personnel arriving to meet their ship 
or departing to proceed to their next duty station. 
 
¶32. (C) The UAE has provided other invaluable support for OEF 
and OIF, including the use of facilities in various 
locations.  For example, the U.S. Navy was allowed to use the 
port of Fujairah, strategically situated on the Gulf of Oman, 
to offload supplies for transport by land to Dubai, rather 
than transiting the Straits of Hormuz.  Additionally, 82 of 
the U.S. Navy's inshore boat units personnel are stationed 
here to provide ship escort to and from the pier facility 
prior to and after refueling and re-supply operations have 
been conducted. 
 
¶33. (SBU) Estimated Value of UAE Forward Operation Bases: 
 
For CY04: $20,114,751 (estimated) 
For CY05: $20,114,751 (estimated) 
 
TAX CONCESSIONS/CUSTOMS/TOLLS/DUTIES 
 
¶34. (U) Fees and charges are for each of the reporting years 
(numbers in brackets indicate fees levied): 
 
- Landing and cargo fees levied:           ($900,000) 
- Port fees and cargo handling levied: ($1,500,000) 
- Taxes and customs duties waived:    $8,030,100 
(Note: The number of cargos processed by the United States 
Liaison Office has increased from 1,090 in 2004 to 2,161 in 
2005, and is estimated to exceed 3,000 cargos in 2006.  End 
note.) 
- Visa issuance charges levied:       ($4,000) 
- Overflight authorizations waived:     $2,565,000 
 
Total of waived taxes/customs duties, overflight 
authorizations: 
For CY04: $10,565,000 
For CY05: $10,565,100 
 
 
ABU DHABI 00000288  007.2 OF 010 
 
 
MISCELLANEOUS 
 
¶35. (C) During every U.S. Navy aircraft carrier port visit, 
the Dubai police provide 24-hour police security presence at 
the Navy berth. 
 
¶36. (U) Following the terrorist attack on the USS Cole in 
Yemen in October, 2000, the Dubai authorities increased 
security for U.S. Navy ship visits, providing boat patrols, 
EOD police dogs and UAE Naval and Coast Guard support, as 
well as the use of port facilities to support U.S. security 
detachment personnel observation posts and command center. 
Security requirements were increased at both Jebel Ali and 
Fujairah port and airport.  Cost of security provided by UAE 
at these facilities: 
 
For CY04: $320,000 (estimated) 
For CY05: $350,000 (estimated) 
 
¶37. (U) Note that while costs cannot be assessed, the UAE 
Port Authority provides emergency medical and fire fighting 
services at Fujairah International Airport and Jebel Ali 
Port.  UAE Military Police are also provided at Fujairah 
International Airport. 
 
¶38. (C) The UAE Air Force provided considerable security to 
the forces at the al-Dhafra Air Base through the 
infrastructure of the base, security personnel and U.S. 
manufactured HAWK missile batteries in the area. 
 
¶39. (U) UAE Contributions to the Air Warfare Center (AWC):  A 
joint CENTAF (USAF) and UAE Air Force and Air Defense 
Initiative to initially provide out of CONUS training for 
fighter units in the Gulf.  UAE has contributed the main 
schoolhouse ($8 million) to house the facility at al-Dhafra 
Air Base and is now providing additional funds ($26 million) 
to upgrade other facilities and fill them with necessary 
furnishings and equipment. 
 
Value of AWC Facilities provided: 
For CY04: $34 million 
For CY05: $34 million 
 
TOTAL OF INDIRECT COST SHARING (WHERE CAPTURED) 
 
¶40. (U) For CY04: $ 256,621,135 (estimated) 
   For CY05: $ 275,651,135 (estimated) 
 
------------------------------------------- 
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS, HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS, 
COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
------------------------------------------- 
 
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
 
¶41. (C) The UAE directly supported OEF with a deployment, 
begun in August 2003, of an approximately 200-man Special 
Operations Task Force currently operating out of Bagram Air 
Base, Afghanistan. 
 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
 
¶42. (U) N/A 
 
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS 
 
¶43. (U) There is very little information publicly available 
on UAE spending, and only very general categories of spending 
are published by the UAE Central Bank.  International 
humanitarian assistance is generally provided through one of 
three quasi-governmental charitable organizations:  the Red 
Crescent Authority (RCA), the Zayed Charitable Foundation, or 
the Mohammed bin Rashid Charitable Trust.  In 2004, RCA 
provided humanitarian assistance of approximately $57 million 
 
ABU DHABI 00000288  008.2 OF 010 
 
 
to 300 countries.  In the first half of 2005, the RCA 
provided about $29 million in aid worldwide.  Although total 
figures for the other two organizations are not available, 
the Zayed Charitable Foundation in May 2005 signed an 
agreement with the UNDP to provide $1.5 million to fund the 
drilling of water wells in Niger.  This was part of a $15 
million project to drill water wells in 10 African countries. 
 
¶44. (U) One of the primary vehicles for administering the 
UAE's foreign aid program is the Abu Dhabi Fund for 
Development (ADFD), which was established in 1971 as an 
autonomous national development institution of the Government 
of Abu Dhabi.  The ADFD had funded nearly 250 projects in a 
total of 56 countries since its inception.  The ADFD also 
administers development assistance extended directly by the 
government of Abu Dhabi.  The bulk of the assistance has been 
given to support the development of infrastructure, in the 
form of concessionary loans, grants, and direct investments. 
In 2005, the ADFD made two new loans: one to Jordan for 
approximately $8 million to build a pediatric hospital in 
Amman, and one to Lebanon for approximately $30 million to 
finance three water and drainage projects.  Overall, the ADFD 
has provided about $20 billion in development assistance 
since 1971. 
 
CAPACITY-BUILDING 
 
¶45. (U) N/A 
 
COUNTERPROLIFERATION CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
¶46. (U) During the first ever U.S./UAE Joint Military 
Commission in Abu Dhabi in January 2005, Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Rodman urged the UAEG to endorse the principles of 
President Bush,s Proliferation Security Initiative and to 
consider participation in future PSI activities.  He said the 
UAE is a natural participant given its geography and 
strategic security concerns.  Recalling that the U.S. already 
has suggested to the UAE that the two countries conclude a 
PSI Shipboarding Agreement, Rodman said that such an 
agreement would be a way to cooperate on WMD proliferation. 
The UAE is studying whether to endorse PSI. 
 
¶47. (U) In March 2005, the Container Security Initiative 
(CSI), became operational at Port Rashid and Jebel Ali in the 
Emirate of Dubai.  CSI is aimed at screening shipping 
containers that pass through Dubai ports that are destined 
for the United States that pose a security threat.  These 
examinations are conducted jointly with Dubai Customs 
officers.  In addition, Dubai Customs has requested that each 
and every container that originates in Iran be designated for 
inspection by the CSI team. 
 
¶48. (U) The U.S. and UAE agreed in October 2005 to establish 
a Counterproliferation Task Force that will permit a 
deepening and broadening of cooperative efforts o fight 
proliferation.  The Task Force will meetannually, beginning 
in February 2006. 
 
--------------------- 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
--------------------- 
 
¶49. (U) UAE nominal GDP in 2004 wa $104 billion and 
preliminary reports for 2005 project a GDP of $127 billion. 
The UAE Ministry of Planning projects a growth rate of 7 
percent in 2005.  This reflects a robust growth in oil prices 
and the non-oil sector. 
 
------------------------------- 
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES: 2004-2005 
------------------------------- 
 
¶50. (U) There has been no information published on the CY05 
 
ABU DHABI 00000288  009.2 OF 010 
 
 
defense budget.  However, UAEG defense expenditures for 
salaries and fixed costs average $2 billion per year, and 
procurement varies according to program requirements and oil 
prices, according to informed sources. 
 
¶51. (U) As part of the $8 billion F-16 deal, the UAE is 
purchasing (via FMS) training, weapons and associated support 
amounting to $1.5 billion.  The first aircraft was delivered 
to the U.S. training base in December 2004 and then to the 
UAE base in May 2005.  As of January 2006 they have taken 
delivery of 50 of the 80 F-16 Block 60 aircraft; 
 
¶52. (C) The UAE completed upgrading its French Mirage fighter 
fleet and has purchased 32 additional 2000 Mirage-9 fighters. 
 Most of the 32 Mirage 2000-9's were delivered in CY03.  The 
contract for the new Mirages, unveiled in CY98, was $3.2 
billion.  The deal to upgrade the 30 Mirage 2000-5 aircraft 
already in service is worth $6 billion. 
 
-------------------------- 
PROJECT OUTLAYS: 2005-2008 
-------------------------- 
 
¶53. (U) The following are expected defense outlays for 
2005-2008: 
 
-- 8 Bell Agusta AB 139 helicopters, at an estimated cost of 
$83 million; 
 
-- Remanufacture of 30 Apache AH-64A helicopters to the 
AH-64D Longbow model, at an estimated cost of $725 million; 
 
-- 26 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters for UAE Special 
Operations Command, at a value to be determined; 
 
-- 1000 Javelin anti-armor missiles, at an estimated cost of 
$118 million; 
 
-- ATACMS (1000 rounds) and HIMARS (20 launchers), at an 
estimated cost of $850 million; 
 
-- Negotiations are under way for the French to sell six 
patrol boats worth $600 million; 
 
-- 12 68-meter Baynunah Class Guided Missile Boats built in 
the UAE from a French design, programmed for delivery 
starting in 2007, and equipped with U.S. missile defense 
systems at an estimated cost of over $200 million; 
 
-- 6 CH-47A twin rotor heavy lift helicopters that could be 
used in special operations roles were acquired from Libya. 
The UAE Armed Forces is currently evaluating the upgrade of 
these air frames to CH-47F, at an estimated cost of $180 
million; 
 
-- 1 130-meter ex-Kortenouaer Class Frigate currently under 
negotiation with the Netherlands; 
 
-- As a follow-on to the F-16 case, the UAE is considering 
purchasing aerial refueling tankers, cargo aircraft, and 
airborne command and control platforms; 
 
-- The UAE already is an extensive user of U.S. military 
training programs;  most U.S. military training is paid via 
FMS cases worth over $333 million. 
 
----------------- 
DEFENSE PERSONNEL 
----------------- 
 
¶54. (U) 62,000 active duty (no projections available for next 
five years); negligible numbers of committed reserves and 
civilians. 
 
 
ABU DHABI 00000288  010.2 OF 010 
 
 
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POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
¶55. (U) Embassy Point of Contact is Joel Maybury, Political 
Officer 
 
Voice:   971/2/414-2490 
Fax:     971/2/414-2639 
E-mail:  MayburyJF@state.gov 
Class:   MayburyJF2@state.sgov.gov 
SISON