This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000176 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, A/S ISN SRADEMAKER, ISN/ECC KCROUCH AND 
CRUSSEL 
COMMERCE FOR DOC/BIS MOBRIEN 
DHS FOR IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
NSC FOR DHOOKS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2015 
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL AE
SUBJECT: TEXTBOOK CASE: DUBAI CUSTOMS; RE-DELIVERY AND 
DUAL-USE ISSUES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  On January 17, Dubai Customs allowed 
Iranian vessel M/V Iran Baluchestan, suspected of 
transporting dual-use items, to leave Port Rashid for Iran. 
Despite requests from the Embassy and Consulate, Dubai did 
not authorize the inspection of the container, claiming that 
it had no legal authority for doing so.  Dubai's refusal to 
inspect this container is an example of the challenges we 
face as we prepare to launch the Counterproliferation Task 
Force (CTF) with the UAEG.  The USG should use points from 
this case at the February 11 CTF meeting as a way to advance 
our nonproliferation priorities with the UAEG. End summary. 
 
¶2. (S) On January 16, DHS/ICE attach received information 
from DHS Headquarters indicating that a container onboard 
Iranian-flagged vessel M/V Iran Baluchestan contained 
aluminum sheeting that had potential dual use in nuclear and 
missile programs.  The information stated that the vessel 
would be docking in Dubai on January 17, in transit to Iran. 
The ship is owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping 
Lines.  The aluminum sheeting is of U.S. origin, but there is 
no information about the U.S company involved.  According to 
information developed by the ICE Attach, the suspect 
container was loaded in Port Klang, Malaysia on December 19, 
2005, and the manifest indicated the container was empty. 
After stopping in Singapore on Jan 5 and Karachi on Jan 13, 
the Iran Baluchestan arrived at Port Rashid in Dubai at 0845 
am Jan 17. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) ICE Attach contacted Dubai Customs and Dubai's 
State Security Organization (SSO) to secure permission to 
have the container inspected.  SIMO Chief in Dubai also 
contacted SSO to reiterate the importance of the request. 
Neither Dubai Customs nor SSO would allow the search, 
claiming that since the container was in transit and not 
bound for the UAE, there were no grounds under UAE or 
international law to allow the search.  ICE attach pointed 
out that since the container was in UAE territory, 
international law would allow a search for contraband. 
Furthermore, he noted that the UAE Counter Terror Law of 2004 
(Law #1/2004) obligated the UAE to conduct the search. 
Article 14 of the law states, "Whoever manufactures, 
prepares, furnishes, imports, obtains, possesses, or gets 
non-traditional weapons or parts used in their manufacturing, 
preparing, furnishing or carrying, or attempts to carry them 
through mail, any public or private means of transport or any 
other means intending to be used committing of any terrorist 
acts provided in this law, shall be punished with life or 
provisional imprisonment."  Ahmed Butti, Director General of 
Dubai Customs told ICE Attach that allowing searches like 
the one being proposed would be, "bad for business."  (Note: 
While he did not state is explicitly, it is likely that Butti 
and other UAE officials do not view materials bound for the 
Iranian Government as meeting the definition of "parts to be 
used in the committing of terrorist acts."  End note.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) Later on January 17, at the request of ICE attach, 
Consul General reached Chairman of Dubai Ports, Customs, and 
Free Zones, Sultan Bin Sulayem (SBS), who was in Kuwait for 
the funeral of the late Emir, and requested his intervention. 
 After consulting with Dubai Ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin 
Rashed and Dubai SSO Chief Mohammed Al-Qamzi, SBS called back 
to say that because the container in question was on board a 
ship that had only stopped to load additional cargo, Dubai 
Customs had no legal grounds for unloading the ship in search 
of the offending container.  "The minute a container touches 
to dock, it is ours," Sultan claimed, "but not before that." 
CG reiterated the importance to U.S. and UAE security of not 
allowing the materials to reach the Iranians, but SBS held 
firm, saying "If it is important material you can use your 
ships in the Gulf to intercept it -- we will work closely 
with you to ensure that you have the information you need for 
the intercept."  In the long term, he suggested, the U.S. 
should "work with the UN to get a Security Council resolution 
banning all such materials bound for Iran's programs. That 
would give us, and every other port in the world, the 
justification we need for pulling containers off of Iranian 
ships in our ports."  After five hours at Port Rashid, the 
Iran Baluchestan departed for Bandar Abbas. 
 
¶5. (C) Comment: In the past Dubai Customs has been willing to 
work with us to stop shipments of internationally banned 
components bound for Iran, even when doing so has required 
extra-judicial measures.  The sticking point in this case 
appeared to be the "potential dual use" nature of the 
U.S.-produced aluminum.  Since the container was listed on 
the manifest as "empty" there was nothing that the U.S. could 
request be returned to the United States.  Although Embassy 
believes the UAE would have been clearly within its legal 
right to inspect the container, if the UAE were a party to 
the Proliferation Security Initiative, the UAE would have 
been obligated to allow the inspection. Despite USG-provided 
training on what constitutes dual-use technology, Dubai 
Customs, SSO -- and even Dubai's senior leaders -- were 
unwilling to allow the container to be inspected.  (Note: 
Although this case did not have a positive outcome, there 
have been other instances where Dubai Customs was more 
cooperative.  In two cases, where the vessel came from the 
U.S. directly to the UAE, Dubai Customs redelivered the 
suspect cargo to U.S. custody.) 
 
¶6. (C) Comment continued: This case is an example of the 
challenges we have faced with the UAEG in trying to tighten 
its export control efforts, and it is illustrative of the 
type of case we should work to address during the upcoming 
Counterproliferation Task Force (CTF) meeting.  Embassy notes 
that both SSO and Dubai Customs will participate in the 
upcoming February 11 inaugural meeting of the CTF.  Embassy 
recommends drawing from the following points at the CTF: 
 
-- It was disappointing that Dubai allowed the Iran 
Baluchestan to depart Port Rashid without an inspection of 
the suspect cargo container; 
 
-- We had hoped that Dubai authorities would use this case to 
take the opportunity to demonstrate their resolve in 
preventing potential dual-use items from reaching Iran; 
 
-- What can the we do to ensure a positive outcome next time? 
SISON