This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000138 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR IS, NEA/ARPI 
DOD FOR JCS, OSD/NII, AND NRO 
COMMERCE FOR NOAA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015 
TAGS: ETTC KSTC PARM PREL AE
SUBJECT: UAE: SATELLITE REMOTE SENSING COOPERATION 
 
REF: A. 04 STATE 136451 
     ¶B. 03 ABU DHABI 5312 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Two years after a USG interagency team 
visited the UAE to discuss an agreement on remote sensing, 
the UAE's chief proponent of acquiring a remote sensing 
system, UAE Chairman of Space Reconnaissance Programs Colonel 
Mahash al-Hameli, says there is still a strong desire to work 
with the USG to procure a satellite from a U.S. supplier.  On 
January 15, al-Hameli told J. Christian Kessler, director of 
the Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction in the 
International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau, that he 
wants to be able to speak with U.S. suppliers about technical 
details of the satellite.  He also cleared up a 
misunderstanding within the USG and among some U.S. vendors 
about the UAE's interest in remote sensing, stressing that 
the bilateral remote sensing program was entirely separate 
from the "Hudhud Remote Sensing System" involving the UAE, 
Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.  End Summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2. (C) On January 15, J. Christian Kessler, director of the 
Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction in the 
International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau, met with 
UAE Chairman of Space Reconnaissance Programs Colonel Mahash 
al-Hameli at the Space Reconnaissance Center located at 
al-Dhafra Air Base.  Col. al-Hameli was accompanied by Major 
Sultan al-Ketbi, who was introduced as the head of Air Force 
intelligence.  Kessler was accompanied by Embassy Abu Dhabi 
political officer and Deputy DATT. 
 
¶3. (C) The meeting was the first between Col. al-Hameli and 
Kessler since November 18, 2003, when Kessler led a 
six-person USG interagency team to Abu Dhabi to discuss a 
draft Government*to-Government Agreement (GTGA) that the USG 
had presented to the UAE in May 2003 (ref A).  At that 
meeting, the UAE provided a counter-draft to the original 
U.S. draft, dropping certain provisions from the U.S. text, 
and adding some provisions to address additional types of 
remote sensing technologies not included in the original U.S. 
proposal, and to establish an option for the UAE to lease 
rather than purchase a satellite or satellites.  The USG 
developed a new draft text of the agreement which sought to 
address new UAE proposals (ref B).  Embassy delivered the new 
U.S. draft on June 29, 2004 to the MFA, and on June 30, 2004 
to Col. al-Hameli.  For the next 18 months, al-Hameli did not 
respond to the USG's invitation to come to Washington to 
further discuss the text.  In the meantime, the UAE began, as 
Col. Al-Hameli had privately informed Kessler would be 
necessary for political reasons, consulting with its Gulf 
Cooperation Council partners on a collective program pursuing 
a remote sensing system.  This latter program became known as 
"Hudhud," and as it reached formal consultations with 
vendors, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman dropped out, leaving the 
UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.  As Hudhud was actively 
soliciting tenders from U.S. and other satellite vendors, 
while the UAE remained silent on the bilateral agreement, USG 
and some U.S. vendors interested in selling a remote sensing 
system to the UAE were under the impression that the Emiratis 
were only talking about one program. 
 
Bilateral Remote Sensing Agreement 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Col. al-Hameli stressed to Kessler that the U.S.-UAE 
bilateral remote sensing agreement was separate from the 
Hudhud program it was pursuing under the aegis of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council.  Al-Hameli said the UAE has had a 
"strong desire" to proceed bilaterally on an agreement to 
procure a remote sensing system from the U.S. since 2002. 
When Kessler attempted to learn more about Hudhud, al-Hameli 
said he was not empowered to discuss it.  "I cannot discuss 
it legally.  You will have to discuss it with the GCC." 
Kessler explained his concern that if the Emiratis were 
partnering with the Saudis and Qataris on a remote sensing 
agreement involving U.S. satellite technology, then the U.S. 
would have to reach an agreement that included all three 
countries.  The USG did not want to initiate discussions with 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar unless this was the course the USE 
desired for its remote sensing program. (Note: Raytheon Vice 
President in the Middle East Robert Lunday (PLEASE PROTECT) 
provided Embassy with a white paper for the "Hudhud Remote 
Sensing System for the Cooperation Council of the Arab States 
of the Gulf ) UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar."  To our knowledge, 
the Raytheon-led team is the only U.S. vendor to bid in the 
GCC Hudhud process.  End note.) 
 
¶5. (C) Col. al-Hameli said that as far as he was concerned, 
the draft GTGA required a single amendment before being 
signed.  The UAE would like to add a clause under Article 3.1 
of the agreement stating that the UAE could purchase an 
Electro Optical System with a 0.5-meter resolution.  Col. 
al-Hameli seemed to interpret the absence of any 
specification of resolution in this Article as possibly 
implying that the USG would limit the UAE a system with a 
1-meter resolution.  Kessler emphasized to al-Hameli that 
such was not the case, and that in fact we were prepared to 
consider such a clause but wanted to ensure that doing so 
would not foreclose the UAE obtaining a higher resolution 
(such as 0.25-meter) in the future.  Col. al-Hameli responded 
to the effect that for now they want a 0.5-meter system to 
start their program. 
 
¶6. (C) Col. al-Hameli added that he was keen on meeting with 
U.S. vendors to discuss technical aspects of the satellite, 
but said the companies told him they could not talk about a 
system with a half-meter resolution until they obtained the 
necessary clearances from the State Department.  Kessler said 
that if the UAE alone is planning to purchase a satellite, 
then there is a basis for an agreement, and U.S. vendors can 
then discuss the system's technical aspects.  Kessler said 
that when he returned to the United States, he would convene 
all the interested vendors in one meeting to explain that the 
bilateral and Hudhud remote sensing programs were separate 
and that they could proceed with obtaining the necessary 
marketing licenses enabling them to hold technical 
discussions with the UAE.  That process can take place before 
the GTGA is signed, Kessler added.  The GTGA will need to be 
signed before any sales occur. 
 
Comment: 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) Col. al-Hameli appeared to favor the bilateral 
agreement with the U.S, but some in the UAE leadership may be 
pursuing the Hudhud remote sensing program for GCC-related 
political reasons.  Ambassador will discreetly raise this 
issue with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme 
Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed 
upon his return from his trip abroad later this month. 
 
¶8. (U) Towards the end of the discussion, Col. al-Hameli 
asked whether the U.S. might provide a "consultant" on export 
controls to help them develop an effective national system. 
Kessler responded that there were mechanisms by which the USG 
could provide assistance, and promised to have the Embassy 
pursue this matter separately. 
 
¶9. (U) Kessler has cleared this cable. 
SISON