VZCZCXRO7416
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0060/01 0201634
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201634Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0837
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1255

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000060 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: THIRD MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
WORKING GROUP 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The subject that came in for the most 
discussion at the January 15 meeting of the International 
Working Group (IWG) was the future of the National Assembly, 
whose mandate expired December 16.  Heads of delegation 
reached an initial consensus to recommend that the Assembly 
remain on only as a consultative body, with no legislative 
powers.  However, the co-chairmen subsequently proposed, and 
the IWG accepted, to recommend only that the Prime Minister 
could call on individual former members of parliament for 
specific tasks as needed.  At the request of the UN High 
Representative for Elections (HRE), the IWG also made clear 
its expectation that the HRE will issue an arbitration ruling 
on the deadlock in the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) 
in time for the CEI to be up and running by the next IWG 
meeting.  The UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Nigeria, 
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
pressed hard for the IWG to recommend that the Security 
Council agree to the Secretary General's request for a 50 
percent troop increase for UNOCI, but after the United States 
objected, compromise language was accepted paralleling UNSCR 
¶1633.  In retrospect, in light of the four days of unrest 
that followed the IWG meeting, it would have been better if 
the Nigerians had kept to the consensus language recommending 
that the National Assembly remain on as a collective, 
consultative body.  The IWG's communique may only have been a 
pretext for the unrest, but more conciliatory language on the 
Assembly might have removed any such pretext.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (U) The Third meeting of the IWG was held January 15. 
There were more high-level attendees than usual, perhaps 
because people were en route to the inauguration of the new 
president of Liberia the following day.  The meeting was 
co-chaired as usual by Nigerian Foreign Minister Oluyemi 
Adenji and Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG) Pierre Schori.  Also in attendance were Baroness Amos, 
the leader of the UK House of Lords (which carries cabinet 
minister status); Louis Michel, Commissioner for Development 
and Humanitarian Assistance at the European Commission; 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Foreign Minister of South Africa; 
Nana Akufo-Addo, Foreign Minister of Ghana; Aichatou Daoudou, 
Foreign Minister of Niger; Brigitte Girardin, Minister 
Delegate for Cooperation, Development and the French Speaking 
Countries of France; Mohamed Ibn Chambras, Executive 
Secretary of ECOWAS; Said Djinnit, Commissioner for Peace and 
 
SIPDIS 
Security of the African Union; and representatives from the 
United States, Guinea, Benin, the International Organization 
of French Speaking Countries, the World Bank, and the UN High 
Representative for Elections in Cote d'Ivoire. 
 
¶3. (C) The subject that came in for the most discussion was 
the future of the National Assembly.  The co-chairs hosted a 
breakfast before the meeting for heads of delegation to 
discuss how to respond to the Constitutional Court's ruling 
that President Gbagbo could extend the mandate of the 
Assembly, which expired December 16.  The IWG had previously 
decided at its December 6 meeting that the mandate should not 
be extended.  At the breakfast, consensus was quickly reached 
to recommend that the Assembly continue on only as a 
consultative body, without legislative powers.  Even South 
African Foreign Minister Zuma, who at the last meeting argued 
that President Gbagbo should extend the Assembly's full 
mandate, agreed to this formulation.  However, when the 
subject came up during the IWG meeting, Nigerian Foreign 
Minister Adenji, backed by SRSG Schori, instead proposed that 
the group recommend only that the Prime Minister could call 
upon individual former members of parliament for specific 
tasks.  Minister Zuma argued strongly that the Assembly 
should be kept on as a collective, consultative body, but in 
the end she agreed to Adenji's formulation.  There was then 
extensive discussion over whether the communique from the 
meeting should say that the mandate of the Assembly "can not" 
be extended (France), or "should not" be extended (most other 
delegations).  Underlying this debate was the question of 
whether the IWG has authority to decide on this issue or 
whether it can only make a recommendation.  In the end, 
compromise language proposed by EC Commissioner Michel was 
accepted, that the mandate "is not to be" extended. 
 
¶4. (C) There was also considerable discussion about the 
current deadlock in the Independent Electoral Commission 
(CEI).  At the last meeting, France pushed hard for the IWG 
to strongly urge UN High Representative for Elections Antonio 
Monteiro to use his arbitration authority to break the 
deadlock.  However, South Africa, Nigeria and others 
expressed concern about Monteiro overruling a decision of the 
Supreme Court.  (President Gbagbo's Ivoirian Popular Front 
(FPI) party boycotted the election of the executive board of 
the CEI because they insisted that non-voting members of the 
 
ABIDJAN 00000060  002 OF 002 
 
 
commission must be allowed to vote on this particular 
occasion.  The Supreme Court, which President Gbagbo 
controls, ruled that the election was invalid.  The IWG wants 
Monteiro to rule that the election was valid and the CEI 
should begin its work immediately.)  This time even stronger 
concerns were expressed.  Monteiro's deputy informed the IWG 
that Monteiro wants ten more working days after he returns 
from New York to search for a political compromise.  If that 
fails, he will immediately make his ruling.  Monteiro's 
representative asked that language committing him to this 
course of action be inserted into the communique, and this 
was done -- the communique notes the IWG's expectation that 
Monteiro will make a ruling in time for the CEI to be 
operational by the text IWG meeting. 
 
¶5. (C) It is noteworthy that on both of these issues, Prime 
Minister Banny, who arrived around noon to address the 
meeting, asked for the IWG's support. On the National 
Assembly he said there is no basis for elected 
parliamentarians to remain on after their mandate has 
expired.  On the CEI he asked for a quick ruling by Monteiro 
to allow the commission to get on with the task of organizing 
elections. 
 
¶6. (C) SRSG Schori spoke strongly in favor of the Secretary 
General's request for a 50 percent increase in troops for the 
UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI).  ECOWAS Executive 
Director Chambas, and UNOCI commander General Fall also spoke 
strongly in favor.  Nigerian Foreign Minister Adenji proposed 
that the IWG in its communique recommend that the Security 
Council agree to the Secretary General's request.  The United 
States objected that this would be prejudging the decision of 
the Security Council, but was told by Adenji that the 
recommendation would remain because there is no veto in the 
IWG.  Ambasador Hooks made it clear that he objected to the 
language and would not join the consensus on this point. 
South African Foreign Minister Zuma then proposed compromise 
language paralleling paragraph 22 of UNSCR, recommending only 
that the Security Council review UNOCI force levels, and this 
matter was resolved. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment: In retrospect, in light of the four days of 
unrest in Abidjan and western Cote d'Ivoire that followed the 
issuing of the IWG communique, it would have been better if 
Adenji had kept to the consensus language from the breakfast, 
recommending that the National Assembly remain on as a 
collective, consultative body.  That said, we believe that 
the IWG communique was only a pretext for the unrest, and 
that in reality President Gbagbo deliberately called out the 
protesters to undermine Prime Minister Banny.  Still, more 
conciliatory language on the Assembly might have removed any 
such pretext.  As it is, the IWG has now also been 
undermined, especially after Nigerian President Obasanjo 
issued a joint communique agreeing with President Gbagbo that 
the IWG in effect has no power to determine the future of the 
National Assembly.   End Comment. 
 
Hooks