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Viewing cable 05TELAVIV7030, NNSA ADMINISTRATOR BROOKS' DECEMBER 6-9 VISIT TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TELAVIV7030 2005-12-21 13:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tel Aviv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 007030 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T (U/S JOSEPH), NP/RA (ODLUM) AND NEA/IPA (MAHER) 
USDOE FOR NNSA ADMINISTRATOR AMB. LINTON BROOKS, NA-20, 
NA-24 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL OTRA ENRG KNNP PARM PINR PGOV PTER EAID TRGY TSPL IR IS ISRAEL RELATIONS GOI EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SUBJECT: NNSA ADMINISTRATOR BROOKS' DECEMBER 6-9 VISIT TO 
ISRAEL FOCUSES ON CURRENT AND FUTURE COOPERATION, IRAN 
 
REF: A. TEL AVIV 6765 
     B. TEL AVIV 6751 
     C. STATE 216108 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Gene A. Cretz.  Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (U) Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear 
Security/Administrator of the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) Linton Brooks visited Israel December 
6-9 for a series of discussions of ongoing cooperation 
between NNSA and the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). 
 IAEC Director General Gideon Frank hosted the visit.  In 
addition to a review of on-going cooperation in 
nonproliferation, the two sides discussed Iran, Advanced Fuel 
Cycles, recent changes in leadership of the Russian Federal 
Atomic Energy Agency, the new IAEA Committee on Safeguards 
and Verification, and general scientific cooperation.  The 
visit included a courtesy call on Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
ONGOING COOPERATION REVIEW 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Brooks and Frank reviewed the status of U.S.-Israeli 
cooperation under the September 16, 2004, Letter of Intent 
(LOI) on Cooperation in the Fields of Nonproliferation, Arms 
Control, Regional Security, and Combating Terrorism.  They 
covered the following: 
 
A. Both sides agreed that in principle it would be desirable 
to convert the SOREQ Reactor to use low enriched uranium, 
although the exact legal mechanism remains unclear.  Brooks 
and Frank agreed that the next step was a technical study to 
verify that conversion was feasible.  Frank noted that there 
had been press interest on this in Israel and proposed the 
two sides agree on a common press line (for use only if 
asked) saying that the sides thought conversion was a good 
idea and were discussing it but that there were no immediate 
security concerns.  Brooks agreed. 
 
B. The Israelis proposed to expand Megaports cooperation 
beyond the Port of Haifa to the Port of Ashdod.  Of greater 
urgency, however, the Israelis would like Second Line of 
Defense equipment installed at Ben Gurion Airport.  Brooks 
said he would consider this last suggestion and respond as 
soon as possible. 
 
C. The sides agreed on three next steps in their ongoing 
seismic cooperation:  regional array procedures for data 
processing, using the Israel Seismic Network as an array, and 
computing travel time profiles and earth structure.  Frank 
noted that Jordan "was on board" with this cooperation. 
Brooks promised to provide Frank with a new NNSA point of 
contact in this area. 
 
D. Frank reviewed progress in Israel on improving export 
control, said the Israelis were looking forward to 
forthcoming Commodity Identification Training to be provided 
by NNSA, acknowledged that the United States was waiting for 
a proposed date, but did not provide such a date. 
 
E. Responding to informal staff discussions, Frank proposed 
expanding the LOI to include technical exchanges on the new 
IAEA Committee on Safeguards and Verification and on 
Generation IV Reactors Proliferation Resistance.  He offered 
to provide a draft document documenting such an expansion. 
 
F. Frank noted that the recent emergency management 
discussion team headed by retired Rear Admiral Joe Krol had 
been among the most valuable interchanges the Israelis have 
had with the United States.  He said he looked forward to 
additional steps, possibly to include modeling and a larger 
tabletop exercise.  Brooks agreed on the value of the 
exchange. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
IAEA COMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND VERIFICATION 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Frank recalled his suggestion from a previous meeting 
that the new IAEA Committee on Safeguards and Verification 
receive field reports directly and without editing.  Brooks 
said that the United States would be willing to discuss this 
topic at the forthcoming U.S.- Israel nonproliferation 
discussions in Washington, but that there was reluctance to 
embrace the idea because (a) the committee would not be 
properly staffed to manage such reports and (b) discussion of 
these specifics was premature since the basic structure and 
procedures of the committee had yet to be determined.  Frank 
noted that the real issue was finding a way to insure that 
the committee had access to unfiltered information.  Frank 
feared that the IAEA staff would filter or otherwise distort 
field reports in order to preserve a particular IAEA policy 
position.  Brooks agreed that such an outcome would be 
undesirable and should be prevented.  Frank noted that his 
suggestion on unfiltered access to field reports was only one 
approach.  It would not be necessary for the committee 
actually to receive field reports in all cases.  The 
knowledge that they could do so would reduce the chance of 
distortion -- whether deliberate or inadvertent -- on the 
part of the IAEA staff. 
 
4. (SBU) In a subsequent meeting, Frank discussed the 
importance of having specific criteria for which states 
should be referred to the Committee on Safeguards and 
Verification and what additional requirements should be 
imposed on such states.  Frank suggested that the special 
requirements should apply "until the IAEA Board of Governors 
determines otherwise."  He provided a brief paper entitled 
"Additional Transparency and Safeguards Measures." 
 
BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: 
 
After a state is found in breach of its commitments or in 
non-compliance (and as long as the Agency cannot conclude 
that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and 
activities), special requirements should apply:  better 
detection capabilities (more comprehensive access to sites, 
people and documents with no advance notice, provision of 
additional information with shorter defined response time, 
more effective use of technological means -- on line remote 
sensing, etc.) and special reporting requirements (inspection 
field reports to the BOG (chairman plus...); full, immediate 
and factual reports to every BOG meeting (any denial of 
access, all unanswered questions) in addition to the 
comprehensive format used in September 2005; special BOG 
meeting in case of anomaly (Chair,s call, not the 
secretariat)). 
 
SIPDIS 
 
END TEXT OF PAPER. 
 
------------------------------- 
INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION 
------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Frank noted that security conditions had heretofore 
limited Israel's interest in commercial nuclear power.  If, 
as Frank hoped, the peace process prevailed, then within five 
to ten years it would clearly be in Israel's interest to move 
to develop commercial nuclear power in order to reduce 
dependence on energy imports.  In view of this, Frank 
wondered whether it would be possible for the United States 
to structure the changes in legal regimes that would be 
needed for civil nuclear cooperation with India in a way that 
would subsequently allow them to apply to Israel.  Brooks 
responded that it would be extremely unhelpful for Israel to 
pursue this issue at this time.  The U.S. strategy is to 
carve out a specific exemption for India rather than create a 
new regime.  The United States distinguishes India from 
Pakistan on the basis of nonproliferation performance and 
India from Israel on the basis of an immediate need for 
growth of civil nuclear power. 
 
6. (SBU) In a subsequent separate conversation, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Director General Ron Prosor raised the issue 
of providing criteria that could ultimately apply to Israel. 
Prosor assured Brooks that the Government of Israel 
understood the message previously conveyed by Under Secretary 
of State Joseph that now was not the time to raise the issue 
formally.  Still, he hoped that the United States would 
consider specific criteria, especially in domestic 
legislation, which would make it easier to approve similar 
cooperation with Israel in the future. 
 
7. (SBU) Frank returned to this subject a third time at a 
subsequent meeting at which he provided a paper entitled 
"Generic Eligibility Criteria for Peaceful Nuclear Technology 
Cooperation with the U.S.," containing what he characterized 
as personal suggestions of what appropriate criteria might be. 
 
BEGIN TEXT OF ISRAELI PAPER: 
 
General orientation.  The country: 
a. Is a U.S. ally. 
b. Is generally willing to accommodate U.S. foreign policy 
interests. 
c. Has a stable democratic regime. 
d. Recognizes the existence of its neighbors, and does not 
threaten to destroy any other country. 
e. Has a credible energy requirement for nuclear generation 
of electricity, and for civilian nuclear applications such as 
radio-pharmaceutical. 
 
Non-Proliferation.  The country: 
a. Has a solid non-proliferation record (it is neither 
suspected nor was it caught in violation of its IAEA 
safeguards obligations), it does not constitute a 
proliferation risk and it could be a useful ally of the U.S. 
in the non-proliferation domain. 
b. Has advanced nuclear technology (it has both nuclear 
reactors and the scientific-technological infrastructure to 
support them), which it handles in a responsible and 
accountable manner. 
c. Is willing to apply full safeguards on all nuclear power 
plants for electricity production, as well as on the 
scientific-technological infrastructure that supports them. 
d. Is an adherent to the NSG and MTCR. 
e. Has an effective system of nuclear and dual-use export 
controls that includes an enforcement mechanism, including on 
the export of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, and 
is supporting international efforts to limit their spread. 
f. Is committed to a moratorium on nuclear testing. 
g. Implements physical security, as well as accountancy and 
control measures based on the highest international standards 
on any fissile material and sensitive nuclear facilities in 
its territory (including being a party to the CPPNM) and 
endorses relevant IAEA codes of conduct on the safety and 
security of research reactors and radioactive sources. 
h. Has taken steps to implement UNSC resolution 1540. 
i. Has endorsed the PSI. 
 
END TEXT OF ISRAELI PAPER. 
 
-------------------- 
RUSSIAN DEVELOPMENTS 
-------------------- 
 
8. (C) Brooks and Frank exchanged impressions of the new head 
of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom), Sergei 
Kiriyenko.  Brooks noted that the Secretary of Energy had 
spoken to him and that Kiriyenko said the right things about 
nonproliferation cooperation.  Nonetheless, both agreed that 
his appointment signaled a desire to focus on improving 
Rosatom's commercial business and that this could make it 
more difficult to gain cooperation on Iran, where Rosatom had 
been somewhat helpful in the past.  Frank was particularly 
concerned by this because of the importance he attached to 
referring Iran to the UN Security Council and imposing 
sanctions as soon as possible.  Frank said he had been 
directed by the Prime Minister to visit Russia as soon as 
possible.  Brooks said he also hoped to visit Moscow shortly. 
 They agreed to keep each other informed of any new insights. 
 
 
-------------------- 
ADVANCED FUEL CYCLES 
-------------------- 
 
9. (U) Brooks noted the growing U.S. belief that the global 
economy would require significant growth in commercial 
nuclear power.  The waste disposal aspects of that growth 
might well require some form of reprocessing that did not 
entail separating plutonium but permitted greater extraction 
of energy content (probably in fast burner reactors) and 
significant reduction in waste requiring disposal.  Frank 
agreed with the importance of this area and said the Israelis 
had discussed the topic with the French (no details were 
provided).  He suggested that the United States consider 
packaging the approach differently.  Instead of 
"reprocessing" we should speak of waste recycling and 
separation.  Instead of advanced burners, we should speak of 
waste burners.  Frank felt that this terminology would help 
defuse the (erroneous) implication that the expansion of 
nuclear power presented nonproliferation issues. 
 
10. (U) While agreeing with Frank, IEAC Chief Scientist Dov 
Shvarts also noted that global expansion of nuclear power 
would require many reactors in non-fuel cycle states.  He 
argued that these should be developed with lifetime cores (to 
minimize the need for refueling and thus for potential 
diversion of fuel) and that they should be fast reactors (so 
that if a state attempted to use them for weapons purposes 
the plutonium 239/plutonium 240 ration would be unfavorable). 
 
 
---------------------------- 
VISA PROBLEMS FOR SCIENTISTS 
---------------------------- 
 
11. (U) Shvarts provided Brooks with a copy of a June 20, 
2005 letter to the U.S. Embassy expressing concerns over U.S. 
visa policy.  He and Frank said that scientific cooperation 
was being significantly hampered by new U.S. practices.  The 
greatest concerns were excessive delays in granting visas and 
a new U.S. policy of invalidating long-term visas if a 
short-term visa of another category was issued.  Shvarts gave 
personal example.  He holds a two-year "B" visa allowing for 
multiple trips to the United States for conferences.  He is 
shortly to take a three-month sabbatical and has been invited 
to spend it at the University of Rochester.  He has been 
advised, however, that a pre-condition for issuing him a 
three-month "J" visa would be the cancellation of his 
existing "B" visa.  As a result, he anticipates that he will 
spend his sabbatical doing research within the European 
Union.  He asserted that this problem (and result) was 
widespread.  Brooks promised to pass on these concerns to the 
Department (copy of letter provided separately). 
 
------------------------------------------ 
ADDITIONAL AREAS OF SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION 
------------------------------------------ 
 
12. (U) Frank and Shvarts said they would be interested in 
discussions of how the Department of Energy self-regulates 
facilities, especially research reactors, and would like to 
exchange best practices in this area.  They also expressed 
interest in technical exchange on wet fuel storage and 
corrosion issues.  Finally, the Israelis asked for assistance 
with regard to access to Monte Carlo codes relevant to 
safeguards that are maintained by the Radiation Safety 
Information Computational Center at Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory.  Shvarts noted that they had access to earlier 
versions of the codes but that after 9/11 they had been 
denied access to updates.  Brooks noted that all of these 
areas were the responsibility of other officials within the 
Department of Energy, but that he would see what could be 
done. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
COURTESY CALL ON PM SHARON - ISRAELI VIEWS ON IRAN 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
13. (C) Accompanied by Frank, Brooks met for 25 minutes with 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.  The meeting was an 
Israeli initiative and was billed as a combination courtesy 
call and indication of the importance of the strategic 
relationship.  After a brief discussion of the cooperation in 
nonproliferation that had brought Brooks to Israel, Sharon 
turned to Iran.  He cited his long relationship with 
President Bush extending back to the President's days as 
Governor.  He said throughout this period he had consistently 
told the President that he was willing to take risks for 
peace.  He was not, however, willing to take risks with the 
survival of the Jewish State.  Iran posed a threat to that 
survival.  It was imperative that Iran be dealt with.  The 
Prime Minister did not believe that Israel needed to be the 
"sharp end of the spear" in dealing with Iran, but the 
problem could not be allowed to continue.  It was imperative 
that Iran be referred to the Security Council and that 
sanctions be imposed.  Sharon noted that he had tasked Frank 
with preparing a recommended list of sanctions that would 
have maximum effect on the Iranian weapons program and that 
Frank was in the process of doing so.  (Comment:  Frank had 
not mentioned this fact to Brooks previously despite some 
earlier discussion between them on Iran and the importance of 
sanctions.)   Sharon did not mention military options, but 
repeatedly characterized the existing situation as 
unacceptable and stressed his unwillingness to take risks 
with the survival of Israel. 
 
14. (SBU) Frank made similar points to Brooks in earlier 
discussions.  In discussing the general political situation 
Frank agreed that a secular Iranian government was equally 
likely to pursue nuclear weapons but still felt a secular 
government would be preferable because it would be more 
susceptible to pressure from the application of sanctions. 
Frank expressed frustration with the failure of the IAEA 
process to lead to a referral to the Security Council.  He 
noted that while there were no technical problems with the 
recent EU3/Russian proposal to allow uranium conversion in 
Iran for enrichment in Russia, the effort was a perfect 
example of Iran's thus-far-successful salami slice approach 
to the negotiations. 
 
----------------------- 
NON-SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS 
----------------------- 
 
15. (U) In addition to the substantive discussions noted 
above, Under Secretary Brooks signed a memorandum of 
understanding on Megaports with the Israel Ministry of 
Transport, laid a wreath commemorating Holocaust Victims at 
Yad Vashem, delivered a closed lecture at the Jaffee Center 
at Tel Aviv University (interagency cleared text available on 
both the Jaffee and NNSA web sites), visited the SOREQ 
Nuclear Research Center for a series of briefings, primarily 
focused on laser research, and embarked for four hours on the 
Israeli submarine INS Dolphin, where he observed various 
training exercises.  The submarine ride, where Brooks was 
accompanied by his Executive Staff Director, a Navy Submarine 
Captain, was suggested by the Israelis based on Brooks' past 
career as a U.S. submarine officer.  Impressions of Dolphin 
and her crew have been provided separately to the U.S. Naval 
Attache. 
 
16. (U) Under Secretary Brooks has cleared this cable. 
 
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