This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 006797 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE; NEA/IPA FOR GREENE/LOGERFO/WATERS; 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/MUSTAFA; TREASURY FOR NUGENT AND ADKINS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2015 
TAGS: ECON ELTN ETRD PREL KWBG IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: GOI-PA CONTACTS ON CONVOYS FROZEN 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H.Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: In a December 5 meeting with the Ambassador, 
Major General Yossef Mishlev, Coordinator of Government 
Activities in the Territories (COGAT) advised that the GOI 
has a plan for re-establishing bus convoys between the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank.  The "pilot plan" proposes a single 
convoy of five buses a day carrying up to 250 passengers from 
Erez Crossing in Gaza to Turkumiya in the West Bank.  Only 
Palestinian ID card holders resident in Gaza would be allowed 
to travel, possibly with additional restrictions on males 
between 16 and 35 year old.  West Bank residents initially 
would not be granted access to the convoy.  Mishlev asserted 
that PA Minister of Civil Affairs Mohammed Dahlan had agreed 
to most of the plan, but questions remained on such issues as 
who would own and drive the buses and the number of 
destinations in the West Bank.  Mishlev said that his PA 
interlocutors' preoccupation with upcoming elections was 
hindering progress.  During the meeting, Mishlev called 
Dahlan who explained that he had officially resigned his 
position and would no longer engage on convoy issues. 
Mishlev pressed hard for a meeting, and Dahlan eventually 
said he and PA Minister of Planning Ghassan Khatib would meet 
with Mishlev on December 8.  Mishlev expressed doubts that 
Dahlan would show.  Mishlev said he hoped the GOI's convoy 
plan would be in place by the December 15 deadline set in the 
November 15 Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA), but only 
if the PA engaged on remaining differences.  Subsequent to 
the meeting we learned that Mishlev has received instructions 
to freeze contact with the PA on convoys as a result of the 
Netanya bombing earlier in the day.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In response to Ambassador's question about the 
December 15 deadline for the convoys to begin, COGAT Major 
General Mishlev replied that, although confident the target 
date could be met, he was concerned that senior officials in 
both the GOI and the PA were becoming increasingly 
preoccupied with elections.  He said this had been evident in 
his last discussion with his PA counterpart, Mohammed Dahlan, 
on December 1.  Mishlev said Dahlan had raised "obstacles," 
such as insisting that convoy buses be Palestinian-owned, and 
GOI/PA positions on this and other issues appeared far apart. 
 Mishlev asserted "I need a counterpart" to move beyond the 
GOI's existing plans for a December 15 bus convoy startup. 
 
¶3.  (C) According to Mishlev, the GOI "pilot program" for 
convoys involves the following: 
 
-- one convoy of five buses, Israeli owned/Israeli drivers 
-- up to 250 passengers a day 
-- one trip a day:  Erez - Turkumiya 
-- Gaza Palestinian ID holders only, possibly with 
restrictions on males age 16 to 35. 
-- West Bank residents initially will not be eligible 
-- Maximum stay 10 days before return trip to Gaza 
-- Israeli police to provide security 
-- buses would depart at 10 a.m., after Palestinian laborers 
had been processed through Erez 
 
 
¶4.  (C) In response to additional questions from the 
Ambassador and other meeting participants on the status of 
contacts with the PA on convoy issues, Mishlev called Dahlan. 
 In the ensuing conversation (conducted in Arabic), Dahlan 
advised a visibly surprised Mishlev that, as he was no longer 
a minister, he would no longer be the PA lead on convoy 
issues, according to Mishlev.  Dahlan reportedly told Mishlev 
to discuss convoys with Ghassan Khatib.  He also mentioned 
Sa'eb Erakat as a possible interlocutor.   Mishlev invited 
Dahlan to meet on December 8, but Dahlan initially declined. 
Mishlev later advised that even though Dahlan eventually 
agreed to meet (along with Khatib), he doubted he would show. 
 "I'm chasing him," Mishlev exclaimed. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador suggested that Mishlev proceed with 
planning to implement the existing plan while working out 
areas of disagreement with the PA.  It was imperative that 
the GOI honor the December 15 date in the November 15 
Agreement on Movement and Access for the beginning of bus 
convoys.  He volunteered to convey Mishlev's concerns to 
ConGen Jerusalem and asked that Mishlev keep him informed of 
any problems. 
 
¶6.  (C) Mishlev began the meeting by mentioning the bombing 
that had occurred earlier that same day in Netanya, 29 miles 
north of Tel Aviv.  He said that the security situation was 
not in parallel with the humanitarian steps the GOI proposed 
to take to improve the lives of the Palestinians.  In a 
meeting on the evening of December 5, the GOI security 
cabinet decided, among other steps, to freeze contacts with 
the PA on the convoy issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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JONES