VZCZCXYZ0033
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSG #2521/01 3501816
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161816Z DEC 05
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEAWJL/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8061
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SANTIAGO 002521 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR INL, EB/ESC/TFS; JUSTICE FOR OIA AND AFMLS; 
TREASURY FOR FINCEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KTFR PTER CI
SUBJECT: CHILE: 2005 INCSR PART II: MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
REF: STATE 210351 
 
¶1.  Please find below the 2005-2006 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report (INCSR) Part II: Financial Crimes and 
Money Laundering for Chile. 
 
¶2.  SUMMARY.  Chile's large, well-developed banking and 
financial sector stands out as the strongest in the region. 
With rapidly increasing trade and currency flows, the 
government is actively seeking to turn Chile into a global 
financial center.  However, the Chilean government continues 
to believe money laundering is not a significant threat. 
Stringent bank secrecy laws emphasizing privacy rights have 
been broadly interpreted and hamper Chilean efforts to 
identify money laundering.  Chile's Financial Intelligence 
Unit, operating under a narrow and limited interpretation of 
law, has become a hindrance in efforts to combat money 
laundering and terrorist finance.  No regulatory framework to 
oversee the non-banking sector exists.  There is strong 
evidence that Chile's favorable reputation and incomplete 
regulatory oversight is attracting an increasing number of 
money launderers, particularly in the northern free trade 
zone and in the money exchange house sector. 
 
¶3.  Money laundering appears to be primarily 
narcotics-related.  Until December 2003, money laundering was 
only a crime when direct proceeds of drug offenses were 
involved.  Criminal proceeds laundered through Chile 
generally appear to be derived from foreign criminal 
activity.  A significant amount of the funds derived from 
illegal activity are laundered through the United States. 
Chile is not considered to be an offshore financial center, 
and offshore banking-type operations are not permitted.   END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶4.  Money laundering in Chile is criminalized under Law 
19.366 of January 1995 and Law 19.913 of December 2003. 
Prior to the approval of Law 19.913, Chile's anti-money 
laundering program was based solely on Law 19.366, which 
criminalized only narcotics-related money laundering 
activities.  The law required only voluntary reporting of 
suspicious or unusual financial transactions by banks and 
offered no "safe harbor" provisions protecting banks from 
civil liability; as a result, the reporting of such 
transactions was extremely low.  Law 19.366 gave only the 
Council for the Defense of the State (Consejo de Defensa del 
Estado, or CDE) authority to conduct narcotics-related money 
laundering investigations.  The Department for the Control of 
Illicit Drugs (Departmento de Control de Trafico Ilicito de 
Estupefacientes) within the CDE functioned as Chile's 
financial intelligence unit ("Unidad de Analisis Financiero" 
or UAF) until a new UAF with broader powers was created under 
Law 19.913. 
 
¶5.  Law 19.913 went into effect on December 18, 2003.  Under 
this law, predicate offenses for money laundering are 
expanded to include terrorism in any form (including the 
financing of terrorist acts or groups), illegal arms 
trafficking, fraud, corruption, child prostitution and 
pornography, and adult prostitution.  The law also created 
the new financial intelligence unit, the Unidad de Analisis 
Financiero (UAF), within the Ministry of Finance, which 
replaced the CDE as Chile's UAF. 
 
¶6.  Law 19.913 requires mandatory reporting of suspicious 
transactions by banks, non-banks and any entity handling 
financial transactions.  The law also requires that obligated 
entities maintain registries of cash transactions that exceed 
450 unidades de fomento (approximately $12,000) and imposes 
record keeping requirements (five years).  All cash 
transaction reports contained in the internal registries are 
sent to the UAF at least once per year, or more frequently at 
the request of the UAF.  However, the law does not impart any 
consequences on an entity for non- or partial compliance. 
The law also does not specify under what parameters 
information should be reported; each financial entity 
independently decides what constitutes irregularities in 
financial transactions.  This means that in effect there is 
still only voluntary, not compulsory, reporting of suspicious 
or unusual financial transactions.  The law also dictates 
that the movement of funds exceeding 450 unidades de fomento 
into or out of Chile must be reported to Customs, which then 
files a report with the UAF.  However, Customs and other law 
enforcement agencies are not permitted to seize or otherwise 
stop the movement of funds, and the entry or exit of these 
funds are not subject to taxation. 
 
¶7.  Notably, the December version of Law 19.913 was a 
significant modification of the orginal Law 19.913 drafted 
and passed by Chile's congress in September 2003.  The 
earlier version allowed the UAF to gather information, impose 
sanctions, and lift bank secrecy protections under limited 
circumstances.  These provisions were deemed unconstitutional 
by Chile's constitutional tribunal, which held that these 
powers granted to the UAF violated privacy rights guaranteed 
by the constitution.  The tribunal's decision therefore 
eliminated the ability of the UAF to request background 
information from government databases or from obligated 
entities on the reports they submitted.  Gone also were the 
UAF's power to impose sanctions on entities for failure to 
file or maintain reports or to lift bank secrecy protections 
easily.  A new bill has been drafted to restore some of these 
powers to the UAF, but it has been stalled in Congress for 
over eighteen months. 
 
¶8.  The Unidad de Analisis Financiero began operating in 
April 2004, and began receiving suspicious transaction 
reports (STRs) from obligated entities the following month. 
In 2005, the UAF received approximately 10 STRs from the 
banking sector per month.  Suspicious transaction reports 
from financial institutions are received electronically, via 
a system known as SINACOFI (Sistema Nacional de 
Comunicaciones Financieras) that is used by banks to send 
information amongst themselves and the Superintendence of 
Banks in an encrypted format.  The UAF has not yet developed 
a suspicious transaction disclosure form for entities other 
than banks and financial institutions, and therefore does not 
receive regular STRs from non-financial institutions.  Cash 
transaction reports (CTRs) are only reported upon request. 
Customs sends reports on the transportation of currency and 
monetary instruments into or out of Chile to the UAF on a 
daily basis. 
 
¶9.  After receiving a suspicious transaction report, the UAF 
may request account information on the subject of the STR 
from the institution that filed the report.  The UAF can also 
request CTRs from obligated entities at any time, but is 
required by law to request at least once per year all CTRs 
filed from each institution.  If the draft bill is passed, 
the UAF would then be able to request information from any 
entity that is obligated to file suspicious transaction 
reports.  The draft law would also permit the UAF to request 
information from any entity if that information is necessary 
to complete the analysis of an STR.  The draft law would also 
allow the UAF access to government databases. These functions 
would require authorization from the Santiago Appeals Court, 
although the draft bill stipulates that access to government 
databases would only require court authorization for 
protected information, such as tax information. 
 
¶10.  Banks are supervised formally by the Superintendent of 
Banks and informally by the Association of Banks and 
Financial Institutions.  Banks are obligated to abide by 
"know your customer" standards and other money laundering 
controls for checking accounts.  However, savings accounts 
are not subject to the same compliance standards; only a 
limited number of banks rigorously apply money laundering 
controls to non-current accounts.  A significant gap in 
Chile's efforts to combat money laundering is that non-bank 
financial institutions, such as money exchange houses, 
currently do not fall under the supervision of any regulatory 
body. 
 
¶11.  Chile's gaming industry consists of the Superintendent 
of Casinos, which is a supervisory body without law 
enforcement or regulatory authority, and seven casinos 
located throughout the country.  However, Chile is engaged in 
sorting through international and domestic bids for 17 
additional casinos legislated by the Chilean congress.  There 
is currently no legal framework for regulating the money 
moving through the gaming industry. 
 
¶12.  One free trade zone exists in the northern region of 
Chile at Arica.  The borders within the free trade zone are 
pourous and largely unregulated.  Strong indications suggest 
money laundering schemes are rampant in the free trade zone, 
and Chilean resources to combat this issue are extremely 
limited. 
 
¶13.  The CDE continues to analyze and investigate any cases 
opened prior to the establishment of the UAF.  Following 
completion of a judicial reform in June 2005, all cases 
deemed by the UAF to require further investigation are sent 
to the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Publico or MP). 
 In effect, the UAF operates as a warehouse of information 
which is internally analyzed, investigated and judged without 
external input.  To date, only two reports have been 
submitted to the MP, both of which contained inadequate 
information for future investigation.  The Public 
Prosecutor's Office has the ability to request that a judge 
issue an order to freeze assets under investigation and can 
also, with the authorization of a judge, lift bank secrecy 
provisions to gain account information.  The Pubic Ministry 
has up to two years to complete an investigation and 
prosecution. 
 
¶14.  Given the above legislative restrictions and the narrow 
interpretation of the law under which the UAF currently 
operates, it is no surprise that no money laundering cases 
have been prosecuted since the inception of the UAF.  At the 
same time, the Chilean investigative police (PICH) and the 
Public Prosecutor's Office continue to cooperate with U.S. 
and regional law enforcement in money laundering 
investigations. 
 
¶15.  Terrorist financing in Chile is criminailized under Law 
18.314 and Law 19.906.  Law 19.906 went into effect in 
November 2003 and modified Law 18.314 in order to sanction 
more efficiently terrorist financing in conformity with the 
UN International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism.  Under Law 19.906, the financing of a 
terrorist act and the provision (directly or indirectly) of 
funds to a terrorist organization are punishable.  The 
Superintendent of Banks circulates UNSCR 1267 consolidated 
list to banks and financial institutions. 
 
¶16.  No terrorist assets belonging to individuals or groups 
named on the list have been identified to date in Chile.  If 
assets were found, the legal process to freeze and seize them 
remains unclear.  Law 19.913 contains provisions that would 
allow prosecutors to request that assets be frozen based on a 
suspected connection to criminal activity.  Government 
officials have stated that Chilean law is currently 
sufficient to freeze and seize terrorist assets; however, the 
provisions for freezing assets are based on the drug law, 
which at times has itself been interpreted narrowly by the 
courts.  While assets have been frozen during two drug 
investigations, it is unclear the new system would operate 
for a terrorism financing case.  The Ministry of National 
Property currently oversees forfeited assets and proceeds 
from the sale of such assets are passed directly to the 
national regional development fund to pay for drug abuse 
prevention and rehabilitation programs.  Under the present 
law, forfeiture is possible for real property and financial 
assets.  Civil forfeiture is not allowed by current law. 
 
¶17.  Chile is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and has 
signed, but not yet ratified, the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime.  In November 2001, the GOC 
became a party of the UN International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.  On December 11, 
2003, the GOC signed the UN Convention Against Corruption. 
Chile is a member of the OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse 
Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money 
Laundering.  Chile is a member of the South American 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (GAFISUD) and 
is currently considered in compliance with the organization's 
recommendations.  The CDE became a member of the Egmont Group 
of financial intelligence units in 1997, and the UAF was 
vetted by the Egmont Group in October 2004. 
 
¶18.  In the establishment of the UAF, Chile created an entity 
that meets the Egmont Group's definition of a Financial 
Intelligence Unit.  However, the UAF is hindered by its 
inability to sanction obligated entities for non-compliance; 
its lack of access to information from other government 
agencies; and, by a very narrow interpretation of how the UAF 
operates and coordinates with law enforcement and other 
government agencies.  This interpretation directly impacts 
the effectiveness and accountability of the UAF. 
 
¶19.  The continuation of these limitations will be a step 
backward, reversing the steps Chile has taken over the past 
years to create a regime capable of investigating, punishing, 
and deterring financial crimes.  With signs of growing money 
laundering and with it also terrorist financing, Chile lacks 
the legal ability to obtain necessary information and 
coordinate efforts to address these issues.  To compete in 
the global financial sector, the current operating procedures 
of the UAF, in terms of both legislation and interpretation 
of current law, need to evolve in order for Chile to be able 
effectively to combat money laundering and terrorist finance. 
 
KELLY