VZCZCXRO9572
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #2511/01 3501356
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161356Z DEC 05
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2309
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 3612
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2691
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 5285
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 2897
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3915
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 8523
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 0979
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0056

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 002511 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG, AF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2010 
TAGS: MO PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: DEPUTY FM ON VISIT OF MAURITANIAN JUNTA LEADER FAL 
 
REF: A. RABAT 2475 
 
     ¶B. RABAT 2425 
     ¶C. NOUAKCHOTT 1320 AND PREVIOUS 
 
RABAT 00002511  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Pol/C Timothy Lenderking for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) During a wide-ranging meeting on December 1 (Refs A 
and B), Ambassador asked Deputy FM Fassi Fihri for a read-out 
of Mauritanian junta leader Fal's November 20-21 visit to 
Morocco.  Colonel Fal met with King Mohammed in Marrakech on 
November 21, and the visit was widely covered in the Moroccan 
press.  The two countries signed agreements in the field of 
agriculture, fisheries, and drinking water.  Most importantly 
for the Moroccans, Colonel Fal publicly underscored 
Mauritanian support for a solution to the Western Sahara 
issue agreed to by all parties under the auspices of the 
United Nations. 
 
¶2.  (C) Fassi Fihri told the Ambassador that Morocco was 
interested in Mauritania for strategic reasons.  While 
Morocco did not appreciate "for legal and political reasons" 
the method in which the junta had seized power, the situation 
in Mauritania was better now than it was a year ago.  There 
was a new dynamic in the country.  Morocco believed Colonel 
Fal was delivering; there was no contradiction between what 
he promised to do and what he was doing.  In fact, Fal had 
advanced the transition period toward elections to March 
2007, Fassi Fihri pointed out. 
 
¶3.  (C) Fassi Fihri said Fal sought King Mohammed's advice on 
the transition to democracy.  The King told him to stay on 
the track he is on and not disappoint the expectations he had 
created. 
 
¶4.  (C) According to Fassi Fihri, there is strong competition 
between political parties in Mauritania in light of the 
upcoming elections, and some parties were reaching out to 
Moroccan political parties for dialogue and support.  Fassi 
Fihri said Morocco did not want to encourage such contacts 
without discussing the issue first with Fal.  During his 
visit, Fal assured Morocco such contacts were not a problem. 
 
¶5.  (C) Fassi Fihri noted the political season would start 
heating up in earnest in Mauritania in the spring, and the 
competition would be intense, perhaps creating "tension," 
especially as individual candidates were announced.  What 
would happen to ex-President Taya's party, for example, of 
which current Mauritanian Ambassador to Morocco Cheyakh Ould 
Ely was a member, Fassi Fihri wondered?  Ambassador Ould Ely 
tried to impress upon the GOM the importance of his party as 
a counterweight to the Islamists.  "Don't forget about us," 
he says.  Fassi Fihri said Fal did not believe he could open 
the political space for the Islamists.  Some groups were 
establishing links with the Islamists and presenting 
themselves as having foreign support.  He said as far as the 
GOM could tell "no one" in Mauritania was talking about 
ex-President Taya. 
 
¶6.  (C) Fassi Fihri said the important thing was to avoid 
surprises in Mauritania.  One area of concern was the 
participation of the "Black Moors" in the political process. 
Taya had pushed many of them into Senegal; Morocco intervened 
to bring them back, more than 10,000 people.  Fal had told 
the Moroccans the reintegration needed to happen slowly. 
 
¶7.  (C) Fassi Fihri said Morocco understood US concerns about 
the regime in Nouakchott, but on the whole Mauritania was 
better off now than before; it was more open, more 
democratic.  Fal had advanced the timetable for elections as 
far as he could.  March 2007 was less than 18 months away. 
It could not be sooner than that.  The economic situation in 
Mauritania was bad, though Mauritania was "anticipating" the 
revenue from oil, even making sales before production.  The 
US should be pragmatic about Mauritania, Fassi Fihri advised, 
welcoming further discussion between the US and Morocco on 
this subject. 
 
¶8.  (C) Fassi Fihri added that Mauritania is a frequent topic 
of discussion between Morocco and Libya. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) As this meeting suggests, Morocco takes a keen 
 
RABAT 00002511  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
interest in Mauritania.  Morocco's primary equities are 
maintaining Mauritanian support for Morocco's position on the 
Western Sahara issue, ensuring stability on its southern 
flank, and maintaining a hospitable climate in Nouakchott for 
Moroccan economic interests.  Maroc Telecom owns a majority 
stake in Mauritanian telephone company Mauritel, and several 
Moroccan banks and insurance companies are represented there. 
 In recent years the Government of Morocco has provided 
assistance to Mauritania in the areas of education and 
military leadership training (Colonel Fal attended a military 
training school in Morocco), and provided substantial in-kind 
and monetary assistance during the desert locust invasion in 
¶2004.  Morocco moved quickly to establish positive contact 
with the Fal junta following the coup, dispatching security 
chief Yassine Mansouri with a message from the King in 
August.  The GOM has wasted little time in sizing up and 
making known its support for the new regime in Nouakchott. 
 
Bush