This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 003059 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR 
DRL 
S/CRS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR 
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) 
TREASURY FOR MAUREEN WAFER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2010 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM HA
SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS OF A PREVAL PRESIDENCY 
 
REF: A. PAUP 2994 
 
     ¶B. FBIS 12/14/2005 
     ¶C. "HAITI PREVAL CAMPAIGNS IN JACMEL..." 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Timothy M. Carney for reasons 1.4(b). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Former President Rene Preval is the 
acknowledged front-runner in the Haitian presidential race, 
and his past association with Aristide and Lavalas the 
central issue of the campaign.  His victory is not a foregone 
conclusion: his rivals have only begun to expend significant 
campaign resources, and may still form a united-front to 
oppose him (ref A).  Several aspects of Preval's personality 
and previous performance as President cause concern, however, 
a second Preval presidency could be more stable and 
productive than his first.  Most importantly, and taking 
Preval's December 13 statement on Aristide into account (ref 
B), we accept Preval's private renunciation of Aristide and 
Lavalas and see no credible evidence that Preval is preparing 
to reconcile with Aristide or reconstitute a regime based on 
violent intimidation.  Additionally, unlike the case during 
either Preval's or Aristide's administrations (and for most 
of Haitian history), we expect the parliament and the cabinet 
to play a semblance of its constitutional role in balancing 
the power of the presidency.   We believe that no matter who 
ultimately wins, our ability to promote our interests and 
foster Haitian democracy will hinge on the development of the 
broad range of Haitian institutions that should serve as 
checks and balances on the presidency.  End Summary. 
 
The Horse Race 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Every other candidate in the presidential race 
acknowledges Rene Preval is the man to beat.  His strong 
showing has, however, energized his opposition, though the 
egos of his main rivals hinder efforts to form an anti-Preval 
front.  Post's CID/Gallup poll, conducted in early November 
confirms Preval's wide lead.  Preval polled 32% percent 
support, now-disqualified candidate Dumarsais Simeus 20%, 
with no other candidate higher than 5%.   These results 
should be viewed with some caution.  Polling occurred at a 
time when elections preparations remained uncertain and 
serious campaigning had yet to begin, and the relatively high 
support for Simeus reflects at least in part his dominance of 
the news coverage during the debate over his eligibility.   A 
poll conducted by the Haitian organizer of post's 
presidential debates in early December (with less certain 
methodology) shows Preval with 42% and independent candidate 
Charles Henri Baker with 15%. (Baker polled less than 2% with 
CID/GALLUP: December pollsters did not include Simeus.) 
 
¶3. (C)  Simeus has consistently mentioned Preval as his most 
likely ally in meetings with Emboffs over the past several 
weeks, but it is doubtful that Simeus could deliver the 
entirety of his personal support to whichever candidate he 
chooses to endorse.  Finally, Preval is the best known of the 
candidates about whom nearly all Haitians have strong, if not 
polarized, feelings.  It is unlikely that Preval can garner 
additional significant support from undecided or loosely 
committed voters.  Preval will, on the other hand, enjoy the 
benefits of perceived momentum and bandwagon support if the 
perception remains that he is the prohibitive favorite.  In 
any case, as reported in ref A, if he does not achieve an 
outright victory in the first round, it seems certain that he 
will proceed to the second round against a candidate 
representing some kind of coalition united in opposition to 
him. 
 
Cause for Concern 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Preval's defects are well-known and still apparent. 
While he appears to be in good health and has been sharp and 
focused in his meetings with Emboffs, a variety of sources 
state that he continues to drink -- he will join the Charge 
d'Affairs in a whiskey.  Preval is noticeably reserved and 
reticent, and this reticence seems a piece of his notorious 
past failings as an executive and his inability or 
unwillingness to stand up to Aristide during his first term, 
even after Aristide's henchmen targeted Preval's family and 
friends.  Many close to Preval praise his character but admit 
he lacks force of will in many respects.  When the DCM gently 
took him to task several weeks ago for failing to condemn 
violence in the wake of vandalism at his first campaign 
event, Preval lamely replied that he saw no need to start "a 
debate with the other side they won't let me win." 
 
¶5. (C) Preval has tempered his doctrinaire socialist views, 
both as a result of the disintegration of the Lavalas 
movement and changes in Haiti and the region, though he 
continues to frame Haitian politics in discussions with 
Emboffs in terms of class conflict.  Preval tinkered with 
economic liberalization and privatization during his first 
term, but allowed Aristide to brazenly exploit the most 
important parastatals, most notably the phone and electricity 
companies, as sources of patronage (as well as illegal 
payments and kickbacks, as alleged by a complaint in federal 
court in Miami).  In conversations with us, he has voiced 
support for further privatization, including port operations. 
 
 
Cause for Hope 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) We see no credible evidence that Preval is prepared to 
reconcile with Aristide or Lavalas leaders.  In all his 
private dealings, Preval has consistently rejected any 
further association with Aristide and Lavalas, and bitterly 
denounced Aristide in conversations with the Charge and other 
Embassy officers.  In building a national slate for his 
L'Espwa coalition, Preval assiduously recruited candidates 
not connected to Lavalas.  Preval firmly rejected Lavalas 
party leaders, offer to become the Lavalas candidate in 
early September -- they struck their alliance with Marc Bazin 
only days afterward -- causing acrimony to reverberate among 
Lavalas leaders for weeks afterward.  Preval told Polcouns 
during their first meeting in October meeting that he wanted 
to "put an end to Lavalas, chimeres, and the violence." 
According to another source, he refuses to take overseas 
phone calls in order to ensure that neither Aristide nor his 
supporters cannot talk to him.  Preval persuaded his former 
State Secretary for Security, Robert Manuel, to return as 
campaign manager: Manuel had fled Haiti to Guatemala in 1999 
under threat from chimeres. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  During Preval's first public campaign appearance in 
the southern city of Jacmel on December 13, Preval broke his 
silence, stating that "President Aristide, like any other 
exiled political person, can return to the country whenever 
he wants."  Pressed by journalists to elaborate on his 
position, Preval insisted that the Haitian constitution 
guaranteed that all Haitians "in exile" had the right to 
return home at any time, and that the President had no 
further role. 
 
¶8. (C) Preval reiterated to Polcouns on December 12 that his 
opponents' attacks against him amounted to defamation and 
that he continued to assiduously reach out to the business 
classes.  He stated that he had ongoing discussions with 
Haitian Chamber of Commerce President Reginald Boulos and 
other business people even as they continue to attack him 
publicly.  He had the previous week met with the members of 
the Center for Free Enterprise and Democracy (CLED), a 
free-market institute, and reassured them that he favors 
economic liberalization and privatization.  In response to a 
query about Simeus, Preval readily admitted that he hoped he 
could conclude an alliance, stating that Simeus would provide 
credibility on economic issues and that Simeus could 
hopefully foster his reconciliation with the business class. 
Pressed by Polcouns on the importance of publicly disavowing 
political violence, Preval answered that he planned to make a 
statement later in the day to the media that covered his 
meeting with visiting Dominican President Leonel Fernandez. 
Preval wryly added that he would denounce "verbal" violence 
(presumably directed at him) as well.  (Note: Demonstrations 
and rioting during Fernandez' visit led to cancellation of 
his meeting with presidential candidates.  Preval did 
denounce "all forms of violence"  in his public remarks in 
Jacmel on December 13.  End Note.) 
 
Comment 
------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Rumor swirls around Preval.  Whether or not Haitians 
believe that Preval has broken with Aristide and Lavalas, 
many remain convinced that he is prepared to foment violence 
as a political tool.  In either case, his opponents are 
finding it politically irresistible to tar him with the 
Aristide brush, further polarizing the campaign debate. 
Preval essentially dodged the issue of his relationship with 
Aristide in his public remarks in Jacmel, but we can expect 
that his opponents to seize on the remark that Aristide is 
free to return.  On the other side, we sense that many 
Lavalas candidates, recognizing their party's weakness, now 
seek to create the impression of a reconciliation with 
Preval, and thus ride on his coattails.  Preval's supporters 
among the masses seem to have a surprisingly forgiving 
opinion.  They view him is an honest committed advocate for 
the poor, whom Aristide undermined and victimized.  Unlike 
Aristide, they argue, Preval did not make extravagant 
promises he did not keep.   For example, Preval's detractors 
still cite with outrage Preval's famous "swim to get out (of 
your difficult situation)" statement made near the end of his 
term in 2000, as a cynical admission of his failure as 
president.  For his supporters, however, it is an 
illustration of Preval's willingness to make an honest 
assessment of the condition of Haiti's poor, in typically 
bleak Creole fashion. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment continued.  No matter who wins the 
presidency, the complexion of the next government is as 
likely to be determined by the prime minister and the 
parliament.  Most observers assume that no single party will 
dominate the next parliament, and that the prime minister 
(elected by parliamentary majority and approved by the 
president) will be a compromise candidate.  We can expect the 
quality of parliamentarians in the next government to be 
mixed, and the effectiveness of the prime minister and other 
cabinet ministers limited by an extreme dearth of 
administrative resources.  Nevertheless, we will best serve 
our own interests and the long-term development of Haitian 
democracy by reinforcing the constitutional role of all three 
branches of Haitian government, and mitigating the Haitian 
tradition of an all-powerful president through a policy of 
energetic cultivation of parliament and the cabinet. 
 
CARNEY