Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05NICOSIA2024, AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALLS ON THE TURKISH

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05NICOSIA2024.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05NICOSIA2024 2005-12-28 15:06 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Nicosia
VZCZCXYZ0015
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #2024/01 3621506
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281506Z DEC 05
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5323
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4465
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3428
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1096
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0380
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0428
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 002024 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALLS ON THE TURKISH 
CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  On December 27, Ambassador Schlicher paid 
introductory calls on key players in the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership --"President" Mehmet Ali Talat, "Prime Minister" 
Ferdi Sabit Soyer, and "Foreign Minister" Serdar Denktash -- 
to discuss the current state of play on the Cyprus issue and 
prospects for restarting UN-led negotiations.  All three were 
clearly downbeat with respect to prospects for new 
negotiations.  ROC President Papadopoulos was comfortable in 
his political position and was intent on keeping the Turkish 
Cypriot side under intense pressure.  His ultimate goal, 
Talat maintained, was to absorb the Turkish Cypriot community 
by "osmosis."  All agreed that only a major shock to the 
Greek Cypriots -- in particular direct flights into Ercan 
airport -- would bring Papadopoulos back to the negotiating 
table. At the same time, Talat identified Turkey's excessive 
influence in the north as the most serious problem facing his 
administration.  Both Talat and Serdar stressed that, without 
parallel moves to ease Turkish Cypriot isolation, they would 
not endorse Ankara's opening ports and airports to 
ROC-registered ships and planes.  Ambassador Schlicher 
underscored our appreciation for Turkish Cypriot efforts in 
support a settlement and our sympathy for Turkish Cypriot 
frustrations.  It was essential, however, for the Turkish 
Cypriot side to stay the course.  Backsliding on pro-solution 
policies would make it impossible for the United States to 
continue our efforts to alleviate the isolation of the north. 
 End Summary. 
 
Talat:  On The Horns of a Dilemma 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Ambassador told "President" Talat that the United 
States recognized and appreciated Turkish Cypriot efforts in 
support of a settlement to the Cyprus problem.  This is why 
we had put in place a range of new programs and policies 
aimed at easing the isolation of Turkish Cypriots, including: 
a sizable assistance effort, more flexibility in issuing 
visas, and high-profile meetings with senior USG officials. 
We understood Turkish Cypriot frustration, but the leadership 
was making the right decisions and it was important to hold 
firm to the current course.  Moderate rhetoric would help 
ensure that the Turkish Cypriot side retained both the moral 
high ground and the sympathy of the international community. 
 
3.  (C) Talat stressed his dissatisfaction with the European 
Union's clumsy handling of the aid and trade package.  By 
bending over backwards to accommodate the Greek Cypriots, the 
Commission had made it impossible for the Turkish Cypriot 
side to accept the aid.  If the Commission ended up losing 
the 120 million Euros, it would be the Greek Cypriot side 
that was to blame.  Papadopoulos' objective was to keep the 
Turkish Cypriots under economic and political pressure in 
order to weaken their position at the negotiating table. The 
economic situation in the north had improved considerably in 
the last few years, but frustration was growing and the 
Turkish Cypriot public could see no light at the end of the 
tunnel.  Greek Cypriots believed they would eventually 
succeed in absorbing the Turkish Cypriots through "osmosis." 
This was just another word for assimilation and second-class 
status.  The Turkish Cypriots, Talat insisted, were actually 
more "European" and democratic in their mindset than the 
Greek Cypriots.  The political system in the south, he 
declared, was essentially "totalitarian" and the Greek 
Cypriot media tightly-controlled. 
 
4.  (C) Talat noted that, although Papadopoulos had defied 
the will of the international community in rejecting the 
Annan Plan, he had paid no price for his rejectionism and, 
among international actors, only the United States seemed 
concerned at the lack of progress towards a Cyprus 
settlement.  The Greek Cypriots would need to be "shocked 
back to the negotiating table" through serious efforts at 
lifting Turkish Cypriot isolation, including most importantly 
direct flights to Ercan airport.  Talat stressed that, 
without real progress on this front, he "would not consent" 
to Turkey's opening its ports and airports to Cypriot ships 
and planes.  Ankara could not take this step without covering 
support from the Turkish Cypriot leadership and this would 
not be forthcoming as long as the ports in the north remained 
under embargo.  Talat anticipated that this would lead to a 
new crisis between Turkey and the EU sometime in 2006, but 
the ports issue was an absolute "redline" for the Turkish 
Cypriots. 
 
5.  (C) When the Ambassador asked the Turkish Cypriot leader 
what he considered the most difficult problem he faced in his 
administration, Talat replied with absolute candor that it 
was the excessive influence of Ankara.  The ECHR had assigned 
responsibility for the property issue to Turkey rather than 
to the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara's contribution to the 
"TRNC" budget ensured Turkey had a say in every decision of 
consequence.  Talat hurried to clarify that his relationship 
with the GOT was not a bad one and he recognized that Turkish 
influence could be helpful in pushing difficult legislation 
-- like the new property law -- through a reluctant 
parliament. 
 
Soyer:  Papadopoulos Looking to Kill Annan 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) In his charmingly fractured English, "Prime Minister" 
Soyer reaffirmed for the Ambassador Turkish Cypriot support 
for a solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of the 
Annan Plan.  It was clear, however, that Tassos Papadopoulos 
and the Greek Cypriot side were uninterested in sharing power 
with Turkish Cypriots on an equal basis.  Papadopoulos wanted 
to kill the Annan Plan and replace it with something more to 
his liking.  Only by taking significant steps to ease Turkish 
Cypriot isolation could the international community force 
Papadopoulos to engage in talks on the basis of the Annan 
Plan.  As with Talat, the Ambassador stressed our 
appreciation for the frustrating and difficult position in 
which the Turkish Cypriots found themselves.  We were doing 
what we could to ease the isolation of the north, but it was 
vital that the Turkish Cypriot leadership maintain its 
pro-solution orientation. 
 
7.  (C) Soyer believed that the Turkish Cypriot "government" 
would hold true to its support for a fair settlement.  It 
took two to tango, however, and Greek Cypriot "paranoia" made 
it impossible to cooperate with authorities in the south even 
in areas of clear mutual interest.  The Turkish Cypriot side 
had reached out to Greek Cypriots to coordinate on problems 
like avian flu, narcotics trafficking and people smuggling 
that required a comprehensive, island-wide approach.  The 
Greek Cypriot authorities had repeatedly rejected any 
cooperation with Turkish Cypriot institutions.  Rather, the 
Greek Cypriot side was always looking for ways to block 
progress.  The Astromeritis/Zodhia crossing had only opened 
because the Turkish Cypriot side ultimately forced the issue 
through unilateral action by declaring their side open for 
business.  The Turkish Cypriots had tried this approach again 
with the Ledra/Lokmaci crossing, although here the results 
had been more disappointing.  The Ambassador underscored the 
importance of reaching agreement on the Ledra crossing and 
urged Soyer work closely with UNFICYP on some kind of 
compromise. 
 
8.  (C) Ambassador noted the importance of promoting 
commercial ties between the Turkish Cypriots and the wider 
world, including the United States.  A U.S. company was 
bidding on a public tender for a desalination plant in the 
north and we hoped the tender process would be fair and 
transparent.  It was also important to resolve the issue of 
tariff treatment.  U.S. goods entered the north on less 
favorable terms than European products, which was a 
disincentive to trade with the United States.  Soyer agreed 
that this tariff issue could and should be rectified and 
stressed that the "government" had plans to amend the customs 
law to give U.S. goods equal treatment. 
 
 
Serdar:  Pessimistic Revisionist 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C)  In a characteristically pessimistic mood, "Foreign 
Minister" Serdar Denktash told the Ambassador that 2006 would 
be a difficult year for both the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. 
 The world had turned its back on the Turkish Cypriots and 
Papadopoulos had "gotten away with" his "no" vote on the 
Annan Plan.  (Comment:  This was a bit brazen on Serdar's 
part, as he himself voted "no" in the referendum and publicly 
denigrated the agreement).  A "win-win solution," Serdar 
maintained, was simply not achievable in the Cyprus context. 
Someone was going to lose, and at this point it looked like 
the Turkish Cypriots had been earmarked for that role.  The 
Ambassador urged that Serdar take the long view.  Current 
circumstances were frustrating and unfair, but the Turkish 
Cypriot side had made the right choices and was moving in the 
right direction.  Serdar suggested that impatience among 
 
Turkish Cypriots was building to the point where the current 
approach was no longer sustainable.  Support for Talat's CTP 
(Serdar himself is DP) was dropping fast and the public had 
little hope that things would improve.  Meanwhile, confidence 
levels on the island were low and prospects for a new UN-led 
negotiating effort lower still.  "We don't trust the Greek 
Cypriots, and they don't trust Turkey," Serdar explained 
succinctly.  Papadopoulos' goal was to drag the Cyprus issue 
out from under the UN umbrella and into the EU.  This was 
something Turkish Cypriots could never accept. 
 
10.  (C) Serdar insisted that the Turkish Cypriot side would 
not wait indefinitely for a solution to the Cyprus problem. 
As he has in the past, he warned that Turkish Cypriots would 
hold onto their pro-solution approach only through the ROC 
presidential elections in 2008.  After that -- and assuming 
no progress toward a solution -- they would have to explore 
"other options."  The Ambassador cautioned Serdar that these 
"other options" were illusory.  We had been able to reshape 
fundamentally our engagement with the north only because of 
the Turkish Cypriot side's commitment to reunification and 
reconciliation.  If that changed, our policy would almost 
certainly have to change as well.  It was not in the 
interests of Turkish Cypriots to adopt a separatist or 
rejectionist approach to the Cyprus issue.  In the meantime, 
demonstrations of magnanimity and moderation would help keep 
Papadopoulos on the defensive. 
 
11.  (C) Like Talat, Serdar insisted that the Turkish 
Cypriots would fight against Turkey's opening its ports and 
airports to ROC-registered traffic without a parallel easing 
of restrictions on the use of ports in the north.  Without 
our agreement, he bragged, the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly would never approve opening Turkish ports.  Serdar 
also made a pitch for direct flights, arguing that an 
Ankara-Ercan-Washington route would be commercially viable. 
The Greek Cypriots had proven adept at walking back whatever 
gains Turkish Cypriot diplomacy produced, including most 
notably with Azerbaijan and The Gambia.  ROC officials 
followed Serdar wherever he went, assiduously undoing 
whatever he accomplished on his missions abroad. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
12. (C) The message from the Turkish Cypriot leadership was 
consistent and predictably downbeat.  Blue skies 
notwithstanding, it always seems to be raining in the north. 
Some of this is affected for our benefit.  Even the hard-core 
pessimists recognize that the Turkish Cypriot standard of 
living has been on a sustained upswing.  But the sentiments 
behind the argument are real enough.  Across the board, the 
Turkish Cypriots feel themselves abandoned and betrayed by 
the international community, particularly the European Union. 
 They see little prospect for a settlement, or for much of 
anything else.  While the status quo may be unacceptable, it 
is almost certainly sustainable.  We will continue to stress 
with our Turkish Cypriot interlocutors the importance of a 
long-term view and the risks that backsliding on pro-solution 
policies would pose to the very real gains they have made 
since the welcome end of the Denktash era. 
SCHLICHER