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C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 002007 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CY
SUBJECT: KIDS THESE DAYS:  WHAT DO GREEK CYPRIOT YOUNG 
PEOPLE REALLY WANT? 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schilcher; 
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  In the April 2004 referendum on the Annan 
Plan for a Cyprus settlement, Greek Cypriots in the 18-24 age 
group voted "No" by a margin of nine-to-one.  Both anecdotal 
impressions and polling data lead to the conclusion that, on 
balance, young Greek Cypriots take a harder line on the 
Cyprus issue than do their parents.  They are also less 
flexible than their Turkish Cypriot counterparts and less 
willing to compromise on the terms of a settlement.  Young 
people in the south are also generally more conservative. 
Why this is and what can be done about it are critical 
questions to answer in considering the future of the Cyprus 
question.  A big part of the problem is undoubtedly the 
education system, which is highly politicized and presents a 
distinctly one-sided view of recent Cypriot history. 
Moreover, young people in Cyprus have no memories of a 
unified island with mixed communities.  Few have friends on 
the other side or a personal connection to the old family 
home in the north.  We have been speaking to a large number 
of young people, educators, academics and journalists about 
the attitudes and political inclinations of young people in 
Cyprus -- particularly on the Greek Cypriot side -- and what 
can be done to ensure that this generation remains committed 
to an achievable Cyprus settlement.  End Summary. 
 
 
From the Cradle 
--------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  In our extensive embassy outreach efforts, we have 
learned, to our chagrin, that young audiences are the most 
difficult.  Greek Cypriot high school and college students 
generally take a hard line on the Cyprus issue and have 
adopted and built on their parents' anti-American attitudes 
to the point of willful ignorance.  Available polling data, 
including some polls commissioned by us, bear this out.  In 
the April 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan, more than 90% of 
Greek Cypriots in the 18-24 age group voted "NO" to a 
settlement package that would have reunified the island and 
enabled the majority of refugees to return to their homes. 
What comes through most clearly in our conversations with 
Greek Cypriot young people is the sense of "injustice" that 
colors their perception of the Cyprus dispute and limits 
their willingness to compromise.  As one student told 
Polchief succinctly during a presentation to a political 
science class at the University of Cyprus, "we have 
international law on our side.  We're right.  They're wrong. 
Justice must be done."  If the youth are in fact the future, 
there is cause to fear for the future of the Cyprus issue. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) The politicization of Greek Cypriot youth begins 
early.  While family attitudes are the most important forces 
shaping the political attitudes of the young, the education 
system also plays a significant role.  School teachers in the 
south are notoriously political and largely Greek-nationalist 
in orientation.  Most of the teachers have studied at 
universities in Cyprus or Greece rather than in the UK or the 
United States.  The available teaching materials are largely 
out of date, even by Greek standards, and reflect nationalist 
and intolerant sentiments that were more mainstream half a 
century ago.  Impressionable students are instructed to 
prepare projects documenting Turkish atrocities dating back 
to the Ottoman period, but with particular attention to the 
events of 1974.  Greek Cypriot students can recite a list of 
Turkish crimes in Cyprus with the ease of an American 8th 
grader offering a list of the world's longest rivers.  The 
school parking lot may be full of BMWs and students may be 
dressed in the latest fashions, but a strong streak of 
victimization nevertheless runs through the curriculum.  A 
recent circular from the Ministry of Education instructed 
teachers to give special emphasis to "Greek nationalism and 
the strengthening of the historical memory of the loss and 
enslavement of patriarchal land." 
 
¶4.  (C) Moreover, students are taught that the roots of 
Hellenic civilization lie in Periclean Athens rather than 
Byzantium and that the Greek ideal represents all that is 
great and good in western civilization.  One recent 
university graduate, Andreas, explained that this ancient 
tradition was presented as both an honor and a burden, 
something he should strive to live up to, but with the 
understanding that he will necessarily fail.  This is 
obviously not a recipe for compromise and goes a long way 
towards explaining the Greek Cypriot sense of residing 
precariously at the point of the spear in a Huntington-esque 
clash of civilizations.  One middle-aged teacher explained 
his thinking to us in the following way.  "Atilla cannot be 
trusted.  The Turks inevitably will move south -- either 
through war or a Cyprus solution.  It is our responsibility 
as educators (sic) to ensure our students are prepared." 
There is, however, some room for self-criticism.  In a recent 
Embassy-sponsored poll, 31% of Greek Cypriots agreed with the 
statement that the education system plays a negative role in 
efforts to reach a Cyprus settlement. 
 
 
Study War No More 
----------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) For Greek Cypriot men, 25 months of mandatory 
military service is the norm and, for most, represents a 
significant formative experience.  There are no student 
deferments.  Even foreign-born men of Cypriot origin are 
subject to induction if they visit Cyprus.  Learning to hate 
the enemy is a part of the Greek Cypriot National Guard 
(GCNG) training program, and time in the army clearly hardens 
attitudes toward Turkey, Turkish Cypriots, and settlement 
efforts.  One young man who had recently completed his tour 
of service told us that his time in the GCNG was like an 
out-of-body experience.  He clearly understood that his 
emotions were being manipulated by his officers, but it 
worked nevertheless, and at least during his military service 
he was alienated from his own (progressive) political 
beliefs.  One factor that might help account for the 
extraordinarily high percentage of "no" voters in the 18-24 
age group is that many of the men were either current GCNG 
soldiers or had recently completed their tour of duty. 
Meanwhile, many of the Greek Cypriot students at universities 
abroad -- who could reasonably be expected to be on the more 
progressive end of the political spectrum -- did not return 
to the island to participate in the referendum vote. 
 
¶6.  (C) There is a real question as to the carry-over effect 
of military service.  For some -- and this is strictly 
anecdotal -- two years carrying a rifle in the GCNG seems to 
generate a permanent change of attitude with respect to the 
other side and the future of a Cyprus settlement.  Some, of 
course, remain unchanged by the experience.  Most young men 
seem to experience at least some change in their attitude 
towards Turkish Cypriots, but the harder or more negative of 
these new emotional leanings seem to lose their edge over 
time.  In other words, their military service is 
transformative, but not necessarily permanent. 
 
 
The Role of the Church 
---------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) There is little doubt that Greek Cypriot young people 
are considerably more religious and observant than their 
Turkish Cypriot counterparts.  Moreover, the Cypriot Orthodox 
Church is significantly more political than religious 
institutions in the north.  Even the Greek Cypriot communist 
party goes out of its way to establish and maintain close 
relations with the Church.  AKEL leader Demetris Christofias, 
for example, has two portraits on the wall of his party 
office -- Vladimir Lenin and an icon of St. George.  With a 
few exceptions (i.e., the Bishop of Morphou), church leaders 
made no secret of their opposition to the Annan Plan.  The 
Bishop of Kyrenia infamously warned his flock that "yes" 
voters were traitors to Cypriot Hellenism and "would not 
inherit the kingdom of heaven."  Thanassis Tsokkos, leader of 
the youth wing of the opposition DISY party, told us that he 
saw a clear correlation between "religiosity" and views 
toward the Annan Plan, with the more religious members of his 
organization being most willing to reject the settlement on 
"principle."  Ioannis Paifakos, chair of the Classics 
Department at the University of Cyprus, believed that the 
current incapacity of the Archbishop has further limited the 
ability of the Church to compromise and accept less than 
absolute victory.  History and doctrine predisposed the 
Church to hard-line attitudes on the Cyprus issue and only a 
strong Archbishop -- notably lacking at this particular 
moment -- could push the Church in a different direction. 
 
 
Don't Go There:  Why Bicommunalism Isn't Cool 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) With the opening of the crossings in April 2003, it 
became possible for many young Cypriots to visit the other 
side for the first time in their life.  As many as half of 
those in our key 18-24 demographic have done so, but half of 
those again have done so only once or twice.  Chrystalleni, a 
23-year-old aspiring teacher, told us that she would never 
cross north until she could do so "as a free Cypriot" to 
reclaim her family home in a village near Morphou.  In social 
-- if not legal terms -- refugee status is inheritable and 
spreads through the population as a dominant gene.  In one 
recent poll, nearly 60% of young respondents indicated they 
were "from refugee families."  While it is considered "cool" 
among young Turkish Cypriots to go south for a night on the 
town, few Greek Cypriots return the favor.  The opening of 
the crossings has allowed older Cypriots to re-establish 
relationships with friends and former neighbors from the 
other side, but their children seem to have little interest 
in building new ones. 
 
¶9.  (C) The exception to this seems to be those young people 
have made an affirmative choice to participate in bicommunal 
activities, including those supported by U.S. funding. 
Participants are universally positive about their 
experiences, and we have clear evidence of lasting ties being 
forged between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot young 
people.  Committed bicommunalists represent a very small 
percentage of the population, and program implementers must 
be careful to avoid drawing repeatedly from the same well. 
 
Attitudes in the North 
---------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Turkish Cypriot youth are, in general, less rigid and 
less doctrinal than Greek Cypriot youth. It is difficult, 
however, to identify the reasons why this so.  A professor at 
Eastern Mediterranean University described Turkish Cypriot 
young people as "lost," trapped between Turkish and Cypriot 
identities without the ability to accept association with 
either one as a natural fit.  Turkish Cypriot youth simply do 
not feel "Turkish" the way that Greek Cypriot young people 
feel "Greek."  Like it or not (and they clearly do not), 
Turkish Cypriot young people also understand that they are 
the ones most disadvantaged by the status quo.  More than one 
young person in the north has told us that he or she voted 
"yes" to the plan not because it would reunify the island but 
because it represented change.  One young academic, Dr. Aysel 
Yontar, told us she supported the Annan Plan even as she 
expected it would ultimately fall apart.  Cyprus' entry into 
the EU has brought the outside world tantalizingly close, but 
there is still a Greek Cypriot bouncer controlling the velvet 
rope at the entrance.  Most of all, young people in the north 
are acutely conscious of the attitudes of Greek Cypriots, and 
bristle at the breezy dismissal of their aspirations. 
Turkish Cypriot young people are largely of the view that 
Greek Cypriots are looking, selfishly, to protect their 
privileged position and do not want to share the fruits of 
sovereignty with their poor cousins in the north. 
 
 
Burying the Past 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Nearly everyone working for a solution of the Cyprus 
problem is concerned about the attitudes of the young, 
particularly on the Greek Cypriot side.  The nature of the 
problem seems clear enough.  The $64,000 question (CYP 30,976 
at today's rate of exchange) is:  "What can be done about 
it?"  Embassy-supported bicommunal activities are a start and 
seem to be making a difference, but reach only a limited 
segment of the population.  Reforming the education systems 
on both sides of the Green Line remains a high priority.  We 
have heard from more than one conflict resolution expert who 
has visited the island that, while the attitudes of the young 
are often more hard-line than those of their elders, they are 
typically easier to change.  We have put considerable thought 
and energy into programs aimed specifically at the teaching 
of history and we intend to reinforce those efforts. 
Changing the attitudes of even a single teacher has important 
ripple effects through an entire community, particularly in 
terms of efforts to reach young people outside of the major 
urban centers.  The same could be said of programs aimed at 
improving the quality of teaching materials.  There is no 
escaping the fact that this generation of young people will 
one day grow up and take the reins of power in Cyprus. 
Whether or not the Cyprus problem is resolved by that point, 
the attitudes of today's youth will go a long way toward 
shaping the realities of the island's future. 
SCHLICHER