This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 009771 
 
SIPDIS 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2015 
TAGS: PTER PREL EAID EPET ELTN MOPS KDEM KNNP IN PK AF IR INDO PAK
SUBJECT: MEA LOOKS AHEAD TO PAKISTAN TALKS, SEEKS 
REASSURANCE ON US PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI DECEMBER 21 O/I 
     ¶B. STATE 226670 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Speaking on December 27, MEA Joint Secretary 
(Pakistan/Afghanistan/Iran) Dilip Sinha judged that the GOP 
is dragging its feet in implementing agreed-upon 
confidence-building measures and presenting its own ideas in 
a "half-baked" manner, but was confident that relations would 
muddle through incrementally.  Sinha's thoughts on 
Afghanistan were centered on protecting Indian nationals from 
terrorism and confirming that the USG (and the US military) 
would remain in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future; he 
also provided an update on Indian assistance to Afghanistan 
in the field of democracy-building.  On Iran, he reiterated 
the Indian formula that energy, regional stability (including 
keeping Iran as a non-nuclear weapons state), and land access 
to Afghanistan and Central Asia continue to govern 
Delhi-Tehran relations.  Despite ongoing GOI meetings with 
Iran pipeline negotiators, Sinha suggested that progress 
would be slow noting Pakistan's failure to appoint a project 
consultant.  End Summary. 
 
Muddling Through with GOP on CBMs and "Half-Baked Ideas" 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Sinha gave an evenhanded assessment of GOI-GOP 
relations going into the New Year.  He was upbeat on 
operationalizing the Amritsar-Lahore and Amritsar-Nankana 
Sahib buses to link Indian and Pakistani Punjab (Ref A), and 
especially Sikh holy places, in January.  His attitude was 
tempered by Indian press reports -- which Sinha corroborated 
-- that the Pakistani negotiators for the Munnabao-Khokhrapar 
rail link to connect Sindh and Rajasthan were demanding the 
service run the same way the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus does 
-- that is, each train would stop at the border, passengers 
would cross on foot and board the opposite train to reach 
their final destination.  Sinha reported that this was the 
first time he knew of a Pakistani team objecting to a vehicle 
crossing the border from India, as usually the Indian team 
objected to the prospect of Pakistani vehicles crossing as a 
potential ingress for terrorists.  He also pointed out that 
whereas there is a Pakistani train platform approximately 100 
feet from the border, the closest Indian platform was two 
kilometers away, which would greatly complicate 
embarkation/disembarkation.  The GOI assumed that the 
Rajasthan train -- like the Delhi-Lahore bus -- would 
physically cross the border.  Neither the GOI nor the 
Rajasthani government foresees building a new platform in the 
Rajasthan wilderness -- the closest city, Barmer, is 100 km 
away -- and Sinha was concerned that lining up temporary 
staffing for customs and immigration even at the existing 
platform may be problematic.  He concluded that this may not 
be insurmountable, and may be resolved during the next round 
of Munnabao-Khokhrapar talks on January 4-7 in India. 
 
¶3.  (C) Sinha also flagged the January 17-18 Foreign 
Secretaries' talks in New Delhi to inaugurate the Third Round 
 
SIPDIS 
of the Composite Dialogue (NOTE: The Foreign Secretaries will 
address the Composite Dialogue topics of Peace and Security 
including Confidence-Building Measures, and Kashmir.  End 
Note.) He added that in March cross-LoC truck (i.e. trade) 
service should begin in Kashmir.  To a question on Siachen 
glacier, Sinha held to the GOI requirement for the 
demarcation of the Actual Ground Position Line of the troops 
on both sides before any troop withdrawal goes forward. 
Noting the current lack of an Indian Foreign Minister, he 
confirmed that the Composite Dialogue can just as easily 
proceed under the PM's foreign policy stewardship. 
 
¶4.  (C) On back-channel negotiations, Sinha reported that the 
talks between NSA Narayanan and Pakistani NSA Tariq Aziz 
remain outside the Foreign Ministry's orbit.  More broadly, 
he characterized the ideas flowing from Islamabad as 
frequently "half-baked": "they are not concrete, no 
specifics, no contours ... what exactly do they mean when 
they use words like 'autonomous,' 'self-governance,' 
'demilitarize' ... we are not sure what we are supposed to 
respond to."  He refused to be drawn out on NSA Narayanan's 
comments in a December 24 TV interview that the Indo-Pak 
back-channel was discussing Pakistan President Musharraf's 
proposal for "self-governance in divided Kashmir." 
 
Terror Concern Amid Afghan Assistance, Democracy Building 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Turning to Afghanistan, A/DCM passed Ref B demarche 
and asked that the GOI continue its robust involvement in 
Afghan reconstruction.  Sinha responded that he expected to 
attend the conference himself, along with a Minister of State 
to provide political representation. 
 
¶6.  (C) On terrorism within Afghanistan, Sinha stated that 
"Pakistan-based sources" reported direct Pakistani 
involvement, "especially in Peshawar," in planning attacks on 
Indians working in Afghanistan.  (NOTE: Sinha did not specify 
GOP involvement.  End Note.)  He said that terrorists were 
targeting Indians working on the roads projects in Jalalabad 
and Kandahar, prompting the GOI to review security protocols 
for both GOI projects and privately contracted roads using 
numerous Indian workers.  When the transmission towers for 
the Kabul-Pul-e-Khumri power lines are erected, Indian 
security will ramp up to protect those workers as well. 
Sinha underlined that many Indian nationals are working on 
non-GOI projects, including for the USG, and their protection 
will have to be reevaluated.  The Indo-Tibetan Border Police 
are currently providing security for GOI projects in 
Afghanistan, and project managers are trying to speed up the 
completion of their assignments to reduce India's footprint 
in Afghanistan. 
 
¶7.  (C) To A/DCM's query on how to expand Indo-US cooperation 
on democracy-building in Afghanistan, Sinha reported that the 
Indian Parliamentary Secretariat had hosted and trained 
members of the Afghan Parliamentary Secretariat in Delhi, and 
Indian Parliamentarians hope to conduct a 10-day training 
session for their Afghan counterparts in either Delhi or 
Kabul.  He noted that the Indian Parliament is in recess, an 
ideal opportunity for such training.  Sinha gave a positive 
assessment of the new Afghan Parliament leadership, saying 
that the elected officials are proving they are "adaptable, 
able to share power, and capable of co-existing." 
 
¶8.  (C) Sinha then asked if the USG withdrawal of 3,000 
troops "would be all" or if further withdrawals were planned. 
 A/DCM reassured Sinha that the USG would "see things 
through," adding that it was in everyone's interest to share 
the burden among allies beyond the original Coalition 
partners.  A/DCM also noted that terrorists in Afghanistan 
may be tempted to test incoming ISAF troops, and that we must 
work together to counter any suggestion that the USG might 
"cut and run."  Sinha welcomed these assurances, reflecting 
Indian support for a sustained US military presence in 
Afghanistan. 
 
Trying to Make Sense Out of Ahmadinejad 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Sinha told A/DCM that the GOI is still trying to 
"make sense out of" Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's 
actions and statements.  He judged Ahmadinejad is playing to 
domestic hardliners as he tries to consolidate his own 
political power, particularly in supporting his allies for 
membership in the Council of Experts who will select the next 
Supreme Leader.  Sinha was uncertain if Ahmadinejad could 
carry the whole country, however. 
 
¶10.  (C) On Indo-Iran, Sinha reiterated that multiple 
equities, including transit rights into Afghanistan/Central 
Asia and energy (natural gas) require the GOI to pursue an 
Iran policy that is "predictable and not confrontational." 
He agreed on the importance of preventing Tehran from 
crossing the second step on uranium enrichment, on which 
A/DCM asked Sinha for Delhi to continue to proactively nudge 
Tehran back into productive talks with the EU-3.  On energy, 
Sinha reported bilateral talks on the Iran-Pakistan-India gas 
pipeline between Indian Oil Secretary S.C. Tripathi and 
Iran's Deputy Oil Minister Mohammad Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian 
would begin December 29, with the Joint (Indo-Iran) 
Ministerial Commission meeting in March.  The talks are still 
exploratory, though -- Sinha noted that Islamabad has not yet 
appointed its pipeline consultant, nor has Delhi named its 
negotiating team, and only after these people are in place 
could the serious negotiations on transit pricing, routes, 
security, and technical specifications begin.  Likewise, 
Delhi and Tehran are not yet discussing gas pricing, 
available volumes, or other technical aspects of the 
pipeline.  (NOTE: Until now, the three countries have been 
discussing the project bilaterally with each other.  The next 
important step is for them to have a tripartite meeting. 
Although the three parties have agreed in principle to meet 
as a group, no date has yet been set.  The parties have 
agreed to set a 4-6-month target to reach agreement on these 
financial, pricing, legal and technical project specifics in 
tripartite meetings.  End Note.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Aside from updating us on the moving parts of 
Delhi's regional relations, nothing in Sinha's remarks 
journeyed beyond MEA's standard bottom-line assessments on 
India's difficulty in working with Islamabad, its concerns of 
working in Afghanistan, and the importance it grants to 
working with Tehran.  His statements convey his cautious 
optimism that on all three fronts, progress will continue at 
a two-steps-forward/one-step-back pace.  Also telling was his 
obvious anxiety about recent press suggestions that planned 
US redeployments in Afghanistan are a precursor to a broader 
withdrawal of US forces. 
 
¶12.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) 
BLAKE