This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2711
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE
SECDEF WASHDC

UNCLAS  NDJAMENA 001755 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
KHARTOUM FOR USAID DARFUR FIELD OFFICE 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
ROME FOR FODAG 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI CD SU USAID
SUBJECT:  USAID FOOD SECTOR SPECIALIST VISITS EASTERN 
CHAD, PART 2 
 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1.  As reported septel, the USAID Darfur Field Office 
(DFO) food sector specialist visited eastern Chad from 
November 16 to 29 to monitor emergency food assistance 
activities of U.N. World Food Program (WFP). 
Representatives from WFP, food distribution partners, 
and humanitarian organizations accompanied the USAID DFO 
specialist on visits to 6 of 12 refugee camps and to 
several villages in eastern Chad.  This is the second of 
two assessment cables reporting on food security and 
assistance programs in eastern Chad. 
 
¶2.  WFP reported that food assistance reached 347,000 
beneficiaries in eastern Chad between January and 
September 2005, contributing to an improvement in the 
well-being of refugees compared to the previous year. 
Despite the success of the operation to date, the USAID 
DFO member reported that three looming issues will 
affect the efficacy of the program in 2006: the 
availability and timeliness of resources for food and 
air operations; milling costs that deplete refugees' 
cereal rations; and persistent problems with Libyan 
trucking companies transporting contraband among WFP 
food shipments from Libya to Chad.  End summary and 
comment. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
Issue #1: Unmet Resource Needs 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  WFP's eastern Chad Emergency Operations Plan, EMOP 
10327, covers an 18-month horizon ending in December 
¶2006.  Approximately 200,000 Sudanese refugees receive 
monthly food rations.  Through September, 147,000 
Chadians in villages near refugee camps received rations 
as compensation for participating in work, training, 
school, and seed protection programs.  The WFP program 
has contributed to a relatively healthy camp population 
and reduced tensions between refugees and host 
communities. 
 
¶4.  WFP plans to refine operations in 2006, based on the 
expectation that the humanitarian crisis will continue 
through the year.  WFP projects monthly needs of 
approximately 4,200 metric tons (MT) in emergency food 
commodities for refugees and host populations at the 
current caseload level.  The WFP/Chad country director 
reported that in a contingency scenario, the program's 
infrastructure would be sufficient to absorb up to 
150,000 additional Sudanese refugees. 
 
¶5.  WFP estimates that 4,172 MT of food commodities are 
required monthly to support refugees and targeted local 
population.  Current projections indicate that at the 
end of May 2006 the pipeline will break in all food aid 
commodities except corn-soya blend (CSB) and sugar.  As 
recommended in an October 2005 joint assessment mission 
by WFP, U.N. agencies, the Chadian government, and 
humanitarian staff, WFP plans to pre-position four 
months of food needs in warehouses before the rainy 
season, when transporting food is difficult due to poor 
road conditions.  However, even with the anticipated 
contribution of 3,341 MT from the USAID Office of Food 
for Peace (USAID/FFP) in early January, the program will 
not have one month's stock to pre-position before the 
rainy season begins in June.  In discussions with WFP, 
the only solution discussed to avoid the pipeline break 
was for WFP/Chad to appeal to WFP headquarters for 
internal borrowing.  If headquarters does not approve 
this appeal by mid-December, WFP may be forced to reduce 
the food ration size as early as March.  (Comment. 
Reducing the food ration heading into the hungry season 
that begins in late May will bode poorly for nutrition 
indicators and will cause tension within the refugee 
camps. End comment.) 
 
¶6.  In addition, to date WFP has received only $1 
million of the $7.2 million requested for air operations 
 
 
that move humanitarian staff and relief supplies from 
the capital city of Ndjamena to the eastern hub of 
Abeche, where planes depart for remote airstrips near 
refugee camps.  WFP reported that without additional 
donor funding, air operations will close down at the end 
of December.  The impact would be significant; according 
to WFP, in November 2005, these flights carried 1,284 
passengers and approximately 4,700 kilograms (kg) of 
relief supplies and light cargo. 
 
----------------------------- 
Issue #2: High Milling Costs 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7.  In nearly every camp the USAID DFO specialist 
visited, refugees complained about the exorbitant cost 
of milling the cereal ration, confirming findings of the 
October joint assessment mission.  The ration is 12.75 
kg of whole-grain sorghum or wheat, which refugees must 
take to a mill to be converted into flour.  Millers are 
frequently refugees who charge cash or a percentage of 
the ration in-kind in exchange for the milling service. 
The in-kind payment varies by location and is usually 
between thirty to fifty percent of the cereal ration. 
Millers often sell the ration on the local market. 
According to one refugee interviewed, the high milling 
cost has caused many families to reduce the number of 
daily meals from three to two.  WFP has grappled with 
the issue of milling costs for some time, but no studies 
have analyzed the economics of milling.  (Comment.  One 
solution implemented in Darfur beginning in 2005 was 
increasing the cereal ration by 1.5 kg, giving 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) more liquidity in 
transactions and stabilizing sorghum and wheat prices. 
As insufficient resources do not allow the WFP/Chad food 
pipeline to sustain an increased cereal ration, WFP is 
considering purchasing mechanical hand mills to 
distribute to clusters of families.  In Darfur, USAID 
partners Community, Habitat, and Finance International 
(CHF) and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) plan to implement a similar pilot program in the 
coming weeks, and will share the results with USAID 
partners in eastern Chad.  USAID partners in Darfur are 
currently using diesel-powered industrial mills, but the 
high cost of diesel makes this option unsustainable over 
the long term.  End comment.) 
 
-------------------------- 
Issue #3: Libyan Trucking 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  WFP ships approximately 30 percent of food 
assistance for eastern Chad and slightly less than 20 
percent of Darfur-bound food assistance through a supply 
route originating in Libya.  The route begins at the 
Mediterranean Port of Benghazi and continues through the 
Sahara Desert to the air base of Al Khufra, in 
southeastern Libya.  From Al-Khufra, some food is 
airlifted into Darfur, while the rest is trucked south 
into Chad.  A portion of food that enters Chad through 
the Libya supply route is transshipped from Abeche and 
sent eastward into Sudan along road connecting Abeche 
and Geneina, West Darfur.  During a three-week period 
spanning October and November 2005, approximately 7,500 
MT of food aid commodities were shipped to Darfur from 
eastern Chad. 
 
¶9.  WFP continues to face delivery delays that occur 
when Chadian customs authorities find contraband items 
in food aid shipments transported from Libya to Chad by 
Libyan trucking companies.  Smuggling is common along 
traditional commercial routes between the two countries, 
and in recent months WFP ceased to facilitate the 
customs process for Libyan truck deliveries due to the 
persistent presence of contraband goods among food 
shipments. 
 
---------------------- 
USAID Recommendations 
---------------------- 
 
¶10.  As a result of this field visit, the USAID DFO food 
 
 
specialist recommends that WFP continue to refine 
operations with the expectation that the humanitarian 
crisis will last at least until 2007, and clarify 
resource requirements under EMOP 10327 to respond to a 
contingency scenario of up to 150,000 additional 
Sudanese refugees.  Expanding current programs, 
particularly activities for which host populations are 
compensated with food, and gathering refugee input on 
program issues would positively impact the situation in 
eastern Chad. 
 
¶11.  Looking beyond 2006, Chadian authorities, 
humanitarian staff, and beneficiaries all noted that 
Chad has a host of long-term development needs across a 
variety of sectors, but no one could identify any 
regional or sectoral plans for a three- to five- year 
horizon.  Donors would benefit from an inventory of 
existing analyses, plans, and institutional capabilities 
during 2006. 
 
¶12.  The USAID DFO food sector specialist made the 
following recommendations related to issues with 
milling, resources, and Libyan truckers: 
 
¶13.  A.  Before spending an estimated $500,000 on 
mechanical mills, WFP and partners should study costs 
and revenues of milling operations, and opportunities 
for savings or outside intervention.  WFP and partners 
should discuss the results of this study with each 
camp's Refugee Committee and millers to agree on costs, 
fees, and possibly subsidies. 
 
¶14.  B. By January 2006, USAID/FFP should be prepared to 
call forward its next Chad contribution, estimated to be 
3,341 MT, or less than one month's supply.  Additional 
USAID resources should be considered as soon as possible 
in FY 2006 to address future pipeline issues.  USAID or 
another USG agency should consider an immediate 
contribution to sustain the WFP air operation. 
 
¶15.  C. WFP is correctly and carefully observing the 
Libyan trucking companies' performance. 
 
¶16.  The USAID DFO food sector specialist noted the need 
for continued monitoring of food assistance in refugee 
camps in Chad, and increased coordination among USG 
entities on monitoring schedules and objectives. 
 
WALL 
 
 
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