VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #5177/01 3540140
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 200140Z DEC 05
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8481
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS NAIROBI 005177 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMED SEC EAID PREL CASC CMGT KHIV TBIO ECON
KE 
SUBJECT:  GOVERNMENT OF KENYA'S PREPARATIONS FOR AVIAN 
INFLUENZA 
 
REF:  A. STATE 206588 
 ¶B. Nairobi 4829 
 
Sensitive-but-unclassified.  Not for release outside USG 
channels. 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Kenya has started a comprehensive 
response to the threat of avian influenza.  A multi- 
sectoral National Task Force has been established with 
high-level representation from the ministries responsible 
for human and animal health.  Many of Kenya's international 
partners are represented on the Task Force as well, 
including CDC, USAID, MRU, and international organizations. 
The Task Force has drafted an Emergency Preparedness Plan 
and put forward a draft budget.  The robust presence of USG 
agencies in Kenya is of significant assistance to this 
national effort.  Next steps include finalizing and funding 
the plan and quickly implementing the activities it calls 
for.  More broadly, Kenya needs to develop a more robust 
monitoring system for possible influenza outbreaks in both 
humans and birds.  Key new members of President Kibaki's 
cabinet also need to be brought up to speed.  End summary. 
 
 
KENYAN RESPONSE TO AVIAN INFLUENZA THREAT 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) NATIONAL PLANNING AND COORDINATION.  The first high- 
level GOK meeting on avian influenza (AI) took place on 26 
October 2005.  Participants included the Permanent 
Secretaries of the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the 
 
SIPDIS 
Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Department (MOLFD), and 
representatives from the National Disaster Response Unit in 
the Office of the President.  This group established the 
Kenya Avian Influenza National Task Force (the NTF). 
 
¶3. (U) NATIONAL AI TASK FORCE.  The NTF has met regularly 
since October, with the senior technical representatives of 
the MOLFD and the MOH serving as co-chairs.  (Note: 
Disaster management experts from the National Disaster 
Response Unit do not currently participate in Task Force 
meetings.  End note.)  About 20 people from government 
routinely attend.  The Task Force also includes 
representation from international organizations, research 
groups, civil society, and the private sector.  Mission 
agencies -- Centers for Disease Control/Kenya (CDC), U.S. 
Army Medical Research Unit  Kenya (MRU), and USAID 
regularly attend these meetings.  Task Force members have 
attended AI meetings in Kigali, Arusha, and Geneva.  Task 
Force co-chairs are responsible for major public 
announcements and have expressed their commitment to open 
reporting. 
 
¶4. (U) TASK FORCE SUBCOMMITTEES.  At the first meeting of 
the Task Force, six subcommittees were established to plan 
the various components of Kenya's response.  These are: 
(1) surveillance and epidemiology (both animal and human 
monitoring); (2) laboratory and research facilities; (3) 
information, education, communication, and mobilization (to 
increase awareness); (4) infection prevention and control 
(including quarantining and/or culling); (5) case 
management and clinical guidelines (for human infection); 
and (6) coordination and resource mobilization.  These 
subcommittees have been able to secure the participation of 
senior Kenyan professionals in each area and have met 
regularly. 
 
¶5. (U) EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN.  The Task 
Force has recently completed a draft National Strategic 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan for Avian 
Influenza (EPP).  This includes goals and objectives of 
each component represented by a subcommittee and fairly 
detailed, short-term (6-month) work plans and budgets.  The 
Task Force is also working on medium-term (6 months to 2 
years) and long-term (2-5 year) plans and budgets.  Two 
international experts sponsored by the World Bank, WHO, and 
FAO are currently in Nairobi and will help finalize Kenya's 
EPP, which will address the risk mitigation strategies 
outlined in reftel. 
 
¶6. (U) NEXT STEPS.  The Task Force plans to have the EPP 
reviewed and finalized in time for the global AI meeting in 
China in mid-January 2006.  The GOK will concurrently look 
for funding from its own budget and from international 
partners.  Planned actions include obtaining Tamiflu for 
"essential" workers.  (No actions have been taken to date, 
but no obstacles to procurement by GOK are anticipated.) 
 
¶7. (U) USG SUPPORT TO NATIONAL PROGRAM.  The CDC and MRU 
 
both have staff and facilities in Kenya capable of advising 
GOK institutions and assisting with monitoring and testing 
of animal and human laboratory samples.  Both agencies are 
involved with migratory bird surveillance, which has 
already started in collaboration with the Kenya Medical 
Research Institute (KEMRI), the MOLFD's Division of 
Veterinary Services, and the National Museums of Kenya 
(which host country-wide ornithological societies).  USAID 
has used existing resources to support the formulation of 
the EPP and will help finance migratory bird surveillance 
activities.  Related FY06 funding has been requested. 
USAID's regional office, REDSO/ESA, is considering 
additional support to laboratories in Kenya to serve as 
regional referral points, and may also support 
communications organizations in Kenya to create regional 
media campaigns.  The GOK is open to regional cooperation. 
 
 
Priority areas with implications for funding support 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) HUMAN INFLUENZA SURVEILLANCE.  CDC is particularly 
concerned about weaknesses in surveillance for influenza in 
humans in Kenya and elsewhere in the region, particularly 
because Kenya is a major regional air, land, and maritime 
transit hub.  The WHO strategy for local and regional 
containment of influenza, while awaiting production and 
availability of vaccines and antivirals, depends heavily 
upon early detection of person-to-person transmission.  If 
an outbreak is detected early, a strategy of tight 
quarantine, infection control, and aggressive use of 
antiviral drugs (Tamiflu) could prevent rapid geographic 
spread, buying time for vaccine development to protect U.S. 
and global populations.  While mechanisms for infectious 
disease surveillance exist in Kenya, they are still not 
fully developed.  Funding, expertise, and prioritization 
would be needed to ramp-up this activity.  In addition, 
specialized surveillance (such as detection in health care 
workers and school children, which will likely be sentinels 
for early recognition of pandemic influenza) needs to be 
implemented. 
 
¶9. (SBU) ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR ANIMAL SURVEILLANCE. 
Surveillance for avian influenza in birds, while ongoing, 
needs substantial additional support to increase the 
potential that introduction of H5N1 will be rapidly 
detected in the East Africa region.  Kenya is a major 
wintering location for a wide range of migratory birds, 
most significantly from the Central Asian flyway.  While no 
infected birds, wild or domestic, have been detected in 
Kenya to date, detection of the virus may help to prevent 
spread to large numbers of chicken flocks (which will 
suffer huge die-offs if the virus is introduced). 
Undetected virus introduction and die-offs could lead to 
persistence and wide prevalence of the virus in bird 
populations in the region which, in addition to economic 
implications, increases the mathematical possibility that 
an avian influenza strain will recombine with other 
circulating influenza viruses, forming a deadly, highly 
transmittable influenza virus with pandemic potential. 
 
¶10. (SBU) MISSION PREPAREDNESS.  In addition to the work of 
CDC, MRU, and USAID discussed above, Post's preparations 
for a possible AI pandemic are well under way.  Post 
created its own multi-agency Avian Influenza Task Force 
(AITF) on 27 October 2005.  Membership of the AITF 
comprises representatives from CDC (the AITF chair), USAID, 
MRU, RSO, DAO, the Kenya U.S. Liaison Office (KUSLO), 
Post's Medical Unit (Med), the Consular, Economic, 
Political, and Public Affairs sections, and the Front 
Office.  The AITF meets biweekly to discuss CDC and USAID's 
surveillance efforts, Med's progress on stockpiling 
emergency medical supplies including Tamiflu, and other 
preparations undertaken by Post's various agencies, 
offices, and bureaus.  The AITF also appointed a Tripwires 
Subgroup, which is currently finalizing Post's tripwires 
for submission to the Department.  These tripwires and a 
more in-depth discussion of Post's preparations will be 
discussed septel. 
 
¶11. (U) Post's points of contact for AI issues are:  Dr. 
Robert Breiman at CDC Kenya (RBreiman@ke.cdc.gov) and Tim 
Smith (smithtg@state.gov). 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) As noted in ref B, to date, the GOK has been 
forward-looking and generally transparent in its 
 
deliberations on preparations for and possible responses to 
any AI outbreak in Kenya.  While the political will to 
prepare for a possible AI pandemic exists, recent political 
instability following he recent referendum defeat of the 
Government-backed draft constitution dominates political 
life and will likely continue to do so for the foreseeable 
future.  A major cabinet shake-up over the past two weeks 
will require new outreach by the Task Force, and possibly 
the international community, to educate and obtain the 
continued commitment of key new GOK officials, most notably 
in the Ministries of Health and Defense, and in the 
National Disaster Response Unit of the Office of the 
President. 
 
Bellamy