This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 005210 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL SNAR PTER ETRD PE KICC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER OSCAR MAURTUA'S 
TRIP TO WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 12-14 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies.  Reason: 1.4(b/ 
d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Foreign Minister Oscar Maurtua believes 
that the U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement adds a new political 
as well as commercial dimension to our relationship.  He will 
wish to discuss how we can take advantage of this to raise 
the bilateral relationship to a higher level, emphasizing UN 
Security Council cooperation (Peru will join the Council on 
1/1/06), counternarcotics and counterterrorism 
assistance/coordination, and seeking a meeting between POTUS 
and President Alejandro Toledo to promote our common vision 
on how to reduce poverty in the Americas.  Maurtua also can 
be expected to express Peru's concerns over regional 
governability issues (particularly Bolivia), as well as arms 
sales to the region (the Venezuela-Spain agreement and the 
USG's approval of the Netherland's sale of F-16s to Chile). 
On Article 98, Maurtua may argue that renewed talks should be 
delayed until after the presidential elections conclude in 
May or June 2006.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Maurtua, in recent conversations with the 
Ambassador, emphasized that he expects to serve as Foreign 
Minister through the end of the Toledo Administration in July 
2006, and no further.  He described his priority as focusing 
his attention on advancing Peru's foreign relations where he 
sees clear opportunities to do so.  Maurtua, a career 
diplomat, is one of the few Foreign Ministry officials who 
understands that the U.S.-Andean Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
establishes both a new commercial relationship and a new 
political relationship; that it is a conscious choice to 
align Peru with the USG's vision on how to promote growth, 
jobs, social justice and poverty alleviation.  He views a 
POTUS-Toledo meeting as an ideal mechanism to symbolize the 
enhanced dimensions in our bilateral relationship and to 
promote our shared vision for growth and development. 
 
¶3.  (C)  While Maurtua generally understands the direction in 
which he wants to lead Peruvian foreign policy, and that 
Peru's participation in the UN Security Council needs to be 
an element in this, he has yet to define the detailed 
substance.  His meetings in Washington will offer high-level 
USG officials the opportunity to help Maurtua understand our 
priorities, to prioritize our bilateral agenda, to establish 
areas where we can cooperate, and to identify issues where 
further discussion and coordination are needed. 
¶4.  (C)  Maurtua's appointment at Foreign Minister was an 
accidental one; Toledo needed an experienced professional to 
take over when his previous appointment of political ally 
Fernando Olivera engendered a Cabinet crisis, forcing 
Olivera's resignation one day after taking office.  Maurtua 
is not/not a close confidant of the President's, and remains 
uncertain with respect to his standing within the Cabinet. 
 
¶5.  (S)  Based on the Ambassador's conversations with Maurtua 
and the Foreign Ministry's Director for the Americas, Pablo 
Portugal, as well as a 12/5 meeting between IO A/S Kristen 
Silverberg and the Ministry's Directors of North American 
Affairs Nestor Popolizio, Multilateral Affairs Julio Garro, 
and Defense and Security Affairs Daul Matute, we expect that 
Maurtua will also raise the following issues: 
 
--  UNSC COOPERATION:  Peru sees the UNSC as an opportunity 
to enhance its relations with the USG through cooperation on 
international security issues.  Peru supports our 
counterterrorism agenda, shares our concerns regarding Syrian 
compliance with UNSC resolutions and Iran's atomic program, 
and wants to be helpful on Middle East issues.  Peru is 
particularly concerned with peacekeeping operations in Haiti 
(where it has over 200 troops) and in Africa (where it has 
eight observers in various missions).  With respect to Haiti, 
Peru would like to see a firm gameplan and assistance 
commitments aimed at nation-building.  It would also like to 
increase its participation in PKOs, but financial constraints 
will limit this unless UN reimbursements can be speeded up. 
Peru supports Brazil's bid for a permanent UNSC seat, but 
recognizes that UNSC expansion is problematic at the moment 
and is content to leave this on the backburner. 
 
--  OTHER UN ISSUES:  Peru agrees in principle with UN Reform 
aimed at increasing ethical conduct and efficiency, but is 
vague on details and opposes any assessment changes that 
would increase its own financial contribution.  It supports 
replacing the UN Human Rights Commission (which Peru will 
head next session) with a UN Human Rights Council.  It has 
no/no favorite candidate for the next UN Secretary General, 
but supports the principle of regional rotation that would 
favor an Asian candidate this time. 
 
--  COUNTERNARCOTICS ASSISTANCE:  Maurtua has publicly stated 
that counternarcotics and counterterrorism cooperation are 
high on his agenda for the Washington visit.  While we have 
informed GOP officials from Toledo on down that they can 
expect reduced USG counternarcotics funding in the future and 
the need to start preparing now for the gradual 
nationalization of CN programs, the Peruvians continue to 
complain about Colombia receiving more funding and to plead 
for additional resources. 
 
--  COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION:  The GOP and the Peruvian 
Armed Forces have asked for increased USG intelligence 
assistance and resource commitments (NAS helicopters) to 
pursue the remaining Sendero Luminoso terrorist columns in 
the Huallaga and Apurimac-Ene river valleys.  We are 
providing intelligence cooperation, and have agreed to 
consider providing NAS resources on a case-by-case basis for 
counterterrorism operations, given the symbiotic relationship 
between Sendero Luminoso and narcotraffickers.  We are 
insisting that the Armed Forces and National Police work 
together in developing integrated CT operational plans; a 
process that has yet to bear fruit. 
 
--  REGIONAL GOVERNABILITY CONCERNS:  President Toledo and 
his Cabinet are greatly concerned about threats to democracy 
in the Andean Region:  Hugo Chavez's support for 
anti-democratic actors, the specter of Evo Morales winning 
the Bolivian presidency, instability in Ecuador, and the 
civil war in Colombia.  That said, they have no idea how to 
effectively address these problems and look to the USG to 
provide answers. 
 
--  REGIONAL ARMS SALES:  The Toledo Administration has tried 
to limit regional arms purchases in order to reduce political 
tensions and in view of Peru's own severe fiscal constraints 
and competing social demands.  Consequently, Peruvian 
officials have recently expressed serious concerns over 
increased arms sales to the region as evidenced by the 
Spain-Venezuela accord and by the USG's approval of the sale 
of F-16 aircraft by the Netherlands to Chile. 
 
--  ARTICLE 98:  Maurtua physically shies away when renewing 
negotiations on an Article 98 agreement is raised.  Other 
Foreign Ministry officials have suggested that such talks 
should be postponed until after the presidential elections 
are finalized in May/June 2006, so as to avoid this becoming 
a campaign issue. 
 
¶6.  (C)  It is also possible, albeit less likely, that 
Maurtua will raise the following issues: 
 
--  PERUVIANS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN.  The recruitment of 
several hundred Peruvians by American companies, contracted 
by the USG, to perform security services in Iraq and 
Afghanistan has become a highly controversial domestic 
political issue.  The recent apparent suicide of one of the 
Peruvians in Afghanistan resulted in the Foreign Ministry 
requesting USG assistance in determining the facts of the 
case and ensuring repatriation of the remains and ensuring 
payment of contractual benefits to the deceased's heirs 
(Septel).  Maurtua previously suggested to the Ambassador 
that the USG establish a liaison office in Iraq to oversee 
the treatment of Peruvian and other third-country nationals 
employed under USG contracts there, and to act as an 
interface between these employees and their respective 
governments. 
 
--  MARITIME DISPUTE WITH CHILE.  In early November, the GOP 
promulgated legislation unilaterally fixing its maritime 
boundaries.  This has led to a diplomatic rumpus with Chile, 
as Peru's claimed southern boundary would extend its maritime 
jurisdiction into waters historically claimed by Chile. 
Chile insists that the maritime boundaries were set by 
regional agreements signed in 1952 and 1954, while Peru 
argues that the 1952 agreement is irrelevant and that the 
1954 agreement only applies to fishing rights, not maritime 
boundaries.  The USG is guarantor of the 1929 Peace Agreement 
between Peru and Chile, but that agreement only deals with 
land frontiers, not maritime boundaries.  While Peru has 
not/not sought to involve the U.S. in this dispute, and is 
talking about taking the case to the International Court of 
Justice, Maurtua may mention this issue in passing, in 
connection with the F-16 sales to Chile, for example. 
STRUBLE