This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000270 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/8/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KDEM KISL EINV IZ IR SY KRG
SUBJECT: (C) WASHINGTON TRIP HELPS BOOST KURDISH SUPPORT FOR STAYING 
IN IRAQ 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Bell, Regional Coordinator, REO Kirkuk, 
Department Of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C)  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.  KRG (Erbil) PM Nechirvan 
Barzani lauded President Bush for hosting his uncle, KRG 
President Masud Barzani.  PM Barzani said that -- while the U.S. 
had been careful on protocol -- he felt as if the U.S. had 
received President Barzani as a head of state.  PM Barzani said 
the visit helped Kurdish elites show that getting rights in a 
democratic Iraq with U.S. support was better than seeking 
independence without U.S. (or any neighbors') support.  He and 
KRG (Erbil) Minister of State Falah Mustafa Bakir predicted a 
higher voter turnout than in October, expected Jalal Talabani to 
continue "in Baghdad" and Adil 'Abd al Mehdi to become Iraqi PM. 
 The KDP had told sympathetic Assyrians to run their own list, 
so as to have non-Muslim MPs to blunt any push towards an 
Islamic state.  END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 
 
(U) A GREAT TRIP TO WASHINGTON 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  PM Barzani lauded President Bush for hosting his uncle, 
KRG President Masud Barzani.  PM Barzani told the Acting 
Regional Coordinator RC(A) December 6 that -- while the U.S. had 
been careful on protocol -- he felt as if his uncle had been 
received as a head of state.  They considered both the protocol 
and the substance of the visit to be a great success.  PM 
Barzani said the visit helped Kurdish elites show that getting 
rights in a democratic Iraq with U.S. support was better than 
seeking independence without U.S. (or any neighbors') support. 
 
¶3.  (C)  PM Barzani said he was struck by how President Bush had 
a vision for Iraq and was committed to accomplishing it.  PM 
Barzani said Kurds took the warm U.S. welcome as appreciation 
for what the Kurds had done in the past.  It also showed that, 
although the U.S. normally spoke of Iraq as a single entity, 
Washington saw the Kurds had a rightful place in the new Iraq 
and considered the Kurds a partner in the coalition.  He also 
praised the meeting with Secretary of Commerce Gutierrez as 
encouraging and positive. 
 
(U) ELECTION PREDICTIONS 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C)  PM Barzani and Bakir separately predicted the following 
results for the National Assembly elections: 
 
 -- Shia 80-100 (Bakir); 80-110 (PM) 
 -- Kurdish Alliance 60 (Bakir); 45-55 (PM) 
 -- Sunnis 45-50 (Bakir); over 40 (PM) 
 -- Allawi 30-35 (Bakir); 25 (PM) 
 -- Chalabi 5-10 (Bakir) 
 -- Kurdistan Islamic Union 1-2 (Bakir). 
 
¶5.  (C)  PM Barzani said the Shia had divided their list as 
follows: 
 
 -- 30 seats to SCIRI, but -- unbeknownst to Sadr -- SCIRI would 
get 2 extra seats from Shadur (as heard), who was only nominally 
independent; 
 -- 30 seats to Sadr; 
 -- 25 seats to the 2 Da'wa parties; and 
 -- 15 seats to the Faylis. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Both PM Barzani and Bakir predicted a higher turnout 
than in October, when some Kurds opposed the constitution for 
not allowing independence and others did not bother to vote 
because they were so sure it would pass.  The KDP was now 
ramping up its public campaign.  They said it aimed largely at 
turning out the vote, since, they claimed, they need not 
campaign much against other Kurdish parties.  PM Barzani 
lamented the difficulty of getting younger voters to vote. 
RC(A) stressed the importance of running a fair election and 
avoiding intimidation against minorities or other Kurdish 
parties.  (Note:  This conversation took place before the Dahuk 
attacks on the KIU, reported septel.  End Note.)  Bakir said the 
KDP would welcome international observers. 
 
¶7.  (C)  PM Barzani said the KDP had told sympathetic Assyrians 
to run their own list rather than in the Kurdish Alliance.  The 
KDP wanted non-Muslims in the National Assembly to blunt a Shia 
push towards an Islamic state.  The KDP knew it could form a 
coalition with Assyrians after the election. 
 
¶8.  (C)  PM Barzani said the KDP would encourage Iyad Allawi to 
join the government that he was sure would be headed by Adil 
'Abd al Mehdi; Iran would create problems were Allawi to become 
PM.  Chalabi would get a post, though not PM.  Iran was taking 
the Iraq elections even more seriously than the U.S.: Iran was 
paying politicians monthly stipends and saw the vote as a 
historic opportunity.  SCIRI had placed 6,000 supporters in the 
Ministry of Interior (MOI).  The Ba'athists were becoming better 
organized and financed; he assumed Syria was helping them.  The 
Sunni Arabs were the only group with real experience in running 
Iraq.  If the U.S. left, it would mean civil war. 
 
¶9.  (C)  When asked how KRG politics would change if President 
Talabani lost the Presidency and returned home, Bakir dismissed 
the possibility.  A Kurd had to be President, PM or National 
Assembly Speaker: Talabani was the Kurds' nominee.  Bakir 
expected the Kurds to become the second largest bloc in the 
National Assembly, so did not expect any problems in keeping one 
of the three top posts.  He said Kurds had to convince others 
that Kurds wanted to remain part of a new democratic Iraq, 
albeit with fair representation. 
BELL