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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002668 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS NP
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES CONCERNED ABOUT MAOISTS, 
PARTIES 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 2556 
 
     ¶B. KATHMANDU 2547 
     ¶C. KATHMANDU 2572 
 
Classified By: CDA Elisabeth I. Millard, reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In separate discussions with the ambassadors of 
Israel, Norway, Bangladesh, and Germany, the Ambassador 
discussed our concerns that the recent 12-point understanding 
between the political parties and Maoists contained no Maoist 
commitment to give up violence (ref A).  He remarked that the 
Parties ran a great risk by signing such an understanding: if 
the Maoists returned to violence, the King could take action 
against the Parties for treason.  The Ambassador raised the 
suggestion that the King could call for an internationally 
monitored cease-fire, which would show him as a proponent of 
peace (ref B).  The other ambassadors shared this concern; 
the Bangladeshi Ambassador was the only one who expressed 
optimism that the Maoists might join the political 
mainstream.  End Summary. 
 
DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES CONCERNED ABOUT THE UNDERSTANDING 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶2. (C) On November 25, the Ambassador briefed his colleagues 
(Israeli Ambassador Dan Stav, Norwegian Ambassador Tore 
Toreng accompanied by Jon Lomoy from Norway's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Bangladeshi Ambassador Humayun Kabir, and 
German Ambassador Franz Ring) on our concerns regarding the 
Maoist-Parties 12-point understanding.  The Ambassador noted 
that the understanding contained no Maoist commitment to give 
up violence; if the Maoists returned to violence, the King 
could act against the Parties as abetting terrorists and 
committing treason.  Ambassador Stav agreed that the current 
situation looked grim.  He added that, if the Maoists resumed 
violence, the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) would need more arms, 
and suggested that this would be an opportunity to put 
international pressure on the King by withholding military 
assistance to Nepal (ref C).  Ambassador Toreng suggested 
that the international community explain to His Majesty's 
Government of Nepal (HMGN) what the good and bad points of 
the understanding were.  Ambassador Ring shared U.S. concerns 
and was extremely skeptical of the understanding. 
 
BANGLADESHI OPTIMISTIC MAOISTS MIGHT JOIN MAINSTREAM 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶3. (C) Bangladeshi Ambassador Kabir speculated that, if the 
Maoists could gain politically, they might abandon violence 
and rejoin the mainstream political process.  The Ambassador 
explained that, if the Maoists joined the mainstream they 
would most likely fare poorly in elections and have little or 
no political clout.  Kabir noted that political parties in 
South Asia that had been around a long time tended to do 
better in subsequent elections.  The Ambassador countered 
that the Maoists never had ten percent support even in the 
best of times and had alienated most Nepalis by their violent 
behavior.  There were no indications that many people would 
vote for them in an election.  The Bangladeshi Ambassador 
added that perhaps the Maoists were realizing the lack of 
success of Mao's ideology and were rethinking the need to go 
mainstream.  He commented that it would require six months to 
two years to prepare for constituent assembly elections with 
Maoist participation, and it would be interesting to observe 
the political discourse during that period. 
 
MAOIST IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador explained to Ambassadors Stav and Kabir 
that the Maoist central committee membership had decreased 
from 90 to 30 members, perhaps as a result of those 
affiliated with Baburam Bhattarai leaving (or being forced 
out) after Prachanda had come out on top of the recent 
Bhattarai-Prachanda ideology rift.  Prachanda was clearly in 
charge now and there had been a bit of an ideological shift. 
Stav noted that he understood that there were a growing 
number of Maoist desertions and that some Maoists were going 
abroad for work.  The Ambassador agreed, explaining that the 
 
cease-fire had allowed some cadre to go back to their 
villages and some had then quit the movement.  Kabir 
mentioned that he had talked with the King at the SAARC 
summit in Dhaka, who had said the calling of municipal 
elections was dividing the Maoists.  The Ambassador remarked 
that forced recruits were using the cease-fire as an 
opportunity to desert. 
 
WELCOME SUGGESTION THAT KING CALL CEASE-FIRE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador raised the suggestion that the King 
call for an internationally monitored cease-fire, which would 
show him as a proponent for peace.  Mr. Lomoy was curious 
whether the Parties would lose power under such a cease-fire 
agreement; the Ambassador replied that stopping violence with 
a cease-fire would have the opposite effect, allowing the 
Parties to get back out in the countryside.  It would also 
expand the reach of HMGN, which could resume delivery of 
government services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MILLARD