This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005260 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, EB 
NSC FOR THARRIMAN, KAMEND 
TREASURY FOR APARAMESWARAN 
COMMERCE FOR AADLER 
USAID FOR JPRYOR 
USTDA FOR DSTEIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2010 
TAGS: ENRG EAID ECON EFIN ETRD AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN'S WINTER FUEL SHORTAGE 
 
REF: A. KABUL 4872 
     ¶B. TASHKENT 3214 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN. REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) A diesel fuel shortage in Afghanistan threatens to 
leave Kabul, Kandahar and other regions cold and in the dark 
this winter.  USAID currently provides the GoA with diesel 
fuel for power generation that is both expensive and 
logistically challenging to supply.  Recent losses of diesel 
fuel supplies from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have raised 
concerns that supplies may be inadequate to meet increased 
winter demand and could place the GoA in a politically 
vulnerable situation.  Embassy is working to manage the 
situation:  Ambassador is being provided daily sitreps of 
fuel deliveries to major cities, with additional fuel 
resources steered to areas in greatest need.  USAID is now 
working with an expanded number of fuel suppliers to minimize 
the risk of supply chain disruption and has amassed a ten day 
supply of diesel, the largest accumulation of reserves in 
winter months in Afghanistan since USAID took over the 
program in 2003.  While significant USAID, international 
donor and IFI resources are dedicated to rebuilding 
Afghanistan,s shattered power infrastructure, this massive 
reconstruction effort will not provide significant relief 
until late 2008 at the earliest.  To help cover 
Afghanistan,s interim emergency power needs, Post intends to 
ask major donors here to consider creating an Afghan 
emergency fuel fund to share the near-term fuel supply 
burden.   End Summary. 
 
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DIESEL FUEL FOR AFGHANISTAN:  EXPENSIVE AND SCARCE 
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¶2.  (SBU) In 2003 USAID, at the urgent request of the GoA, 
assumed responsibility from the (World Bank-managed) Afghan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund to provide diesel fuel for power 
generation in Kabul, Kandahar, Lashkar Gah and Qalat.  This 
fiscal year, USAID is budgeted to spend USD 55 million 
appropriated in the FY 2005 supplemental on diesel fuel 
deliveries to the GoA.  However, increased fuel prices over 
the past year have raised the cost of providing equivalent 
levels of diesel-generated power to approximately USD 83 
million for the current fiscal year.  The GoA is aware that 
this shortfall will require them to make additional unpopular 
rationing allocations. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Unreliable suppliers, logistical problems bringing 
tanker trucks across the border, poor winter weather 
conditions, inadequate roads, corruption and a difficult 
security situation all contribute to produce an unusually 
complex supply challenge.  Diesel fuel suppliers for USAID 
and the U.S. military have been unable to obtain fuel from 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  Embassy Almaty informed post that 
the Kazak government suspended all diesel fuel exports in mid 
October to ensure adequate domestic supplies for the winter. 
Uzbekistan, another prior source of diesel fuel imports to 
Afghanistan, has been suffering from a severe fuel shortage 
for the last three months and is no longer able to export 
diesel fuel (Ref B).  The loss of diesel supplies from 
Central Asia has exacerbated an already difficult fuel 
situation. 
 
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DRIVERS KILLED DELIVERING FUEL 
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¶4.  (C) USAID currently has diesel reserves to guarantee 
power generation for ten days (a large margin by local 
standards: In the past reserves have dropped to as low as a 
two day supply).  Suppliers have contracted with USAID to 
provide sufficient fuel through the end of February. 
However, in the past contractors have proven unreliable in 
delivering on their commitments and winter weather conditions 
in the coming weeks may become treacherous.  Diesel fuel can 
only be imported into the country overland via a dilapidated 
road system that crosses mountainous terrain.  The security 
situation in Afghanistan also hampers fuel imports.  USAID 
reports that since September, 2004, 27 truck drivers and 
other contractors have been killed trying to deliver fuel 
into Afghanistan.  Approximately two dozen tanker trucks have 
been stolen, destroyed or seriously damaged over the same 
period.  CFC-A reports that four drivers carrying aviation 
fuel have been killed in the last six weeks. 
 
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TOO MUCH DEMAND, TOO LITTLE POWER 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) User connections in Kabul alone have increased from 
70,000 to 110,000 in the last two years.  Consequent 
increased demand is straining a fragile and already 
overburdened urban power generation and transmission 
infrastructure.  The GoA faces grousing and the potential for 
large-scale public discontent as the country,s power grid, 
especially in the capital, suffers from blackouts of 
increasing duration.  Local Afghans report that electricity 
in parts of Kabul is often unavailable for days at a time and 
that regular power availability can be as low as five hours a 
day. 
 
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WHAT WE ARE DOING 
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¶6.  (C) Embassy is moving aggressively to head off a 
potential diesel crisis this winter.  Ambassador is being 
provided daily sitreps of fuel deliveries to major cities, 
with additional fuel resources steered to areas in greatest 
need.  USAID is working with an expanded number of suppliers 
to ensure that difficulties of any one provider will not cut 
off the supply.  Most importantly, USAID has amassed a ten 
day supply of diesel, the largest amount of reserves on hand 
in winter months in Afghanistan since USAID took over the 
program in 2003.  USAID will continue to augment these 
reserves as supply and storage capacity allow. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶7.  (C)  Significant USAID, international donor and IFI 
resources are being put into the coordinated reconstruction 
of Afghanistan,s shattered power generation, transmission 
and distribution infrastructure, including the construction 
of a north-south transmission line that will end Kabul,s 
dependence on costly and environmentally unfriendly diesel 
generation (Ref A).  The bulk of this massive energy grid 
reconstruction, however, will not come on line until late 
2008 at the earliest.  Meanwhile, Afghanistan,s improving 
economy and its increased appetite for electricity are 
straining current resources to the extent that the Karzai 
administration could face a political crisis if Kabul and 
other cities experience prolonged power interruptions this 
winter  While Post is working proactively to avoid such a 
situation, ensuring adequate funding for diesel fuel for 
Kabul and other cities during winter months will be a 
significant call on GoA and donor resources for at least the 
next few years.  Accordingly, Post intends to ask major 
donors to consider creating and contributing to an Afghan 
emergency fuel fund to share the near-term burden of keeping 
the lights on in Kabul. 
NEUMANN