This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, SA/CT AND SA/A 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT HERAT: TROUBLING ISSUES AFFECT HERAT'S DIAG 
PROCESS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Herat Governor Anwari is angered by reported 
MOI criticism of DIAG (Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups) 
in his province.  It is Kabul, he affirmed at the December 14 
weekly DIAG Committee meeting, which is underperforming.  The 
GOA, moreover, has failed, so far, to force Herat's two major 
warlords, Ismael Khan and Amanullah Khan, to comply with 
DIAG.  Neither, Anwari said, can be brought to heel from 
Herat, and the success of DIAG depends on such compliance. 
Even more fundamental, the provincial entities tasked with 
enforcing DIAG, especially police, lack the necessary tools, 
such as boots, coats, food, and fuel, for even basic 
operations.  While inter-agency bickering in Herat can 
probably be overcome with a committed Governor Anwari, such 
basics as proper equipment, fuel, and timely pay, are just as 
critical for DIAG success.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) There was tension in the air at Herat Governor 
Anwari's December 14 DIAG meeting, attended by most of 
Herat's senior security leadership, the PRT and RCAG-West 
commanders, UNAMA, lead Italian PRT civilian Ambassador Carlo 
Ungaro, and PRToff, among others.  Herat is one of the DIAG 
to four, Phase I provinces, and the Governor has affirmed he 
is committed to a successful DIAG in his province during his 
tenure. 
 
------------------------ 
Disconnect with Kabul... 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) The Governor stated he felt the DIAGprocess in Herat 
had moved forward with weapons collection as well as could be 
expected, given the constraints.  He then noted a recent MOI 
evaluation which criticized DIAG in Herat for its tardiness. 
The key issue, Anwari said, and one Kabul apparently has 
chosen to ignore, is the confiscation of weapons held by 
Herat's two most prominent warlords, Energy Minister Ismael 
Khan (IK) and his rival Amanullah Khan (AK).  Only the 
central government, Anwari argued, and not the provincial 
one, can address the weaponry held by these two 
"troublemakers." 
 
¶4.  (C) Anwari angrily rejected the MOI criticism.  IK, 
Anwari said, had been granted political and social privileges 
in Kabul.  He should thus be forced by the GOA to make his 
commanders comply with DIAG.  AK, on the other hand, was a 
criminal and should be removed by the GOA from Shindand 
District, his personal fiefdom.  Moreover, provincial 
authorities had no authorization from Kabul to order IK and 
AK personnel to comply with DIAG.  Unless Kabul takes action 
regarding the two warlords, the Governor warned that 
additional DIAG meeting would be a waste of time. 
 
------------------- 
...and within Herat 
------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Governor Anwari fixated on the lack of coordination 
within the D&R Commission in Kabul and the mixed signals 
being sent to him.  Herat, he affirmed, had been selected for 
DIAG Phase I because of its strong leadership.  Now, others 
were saying his leadership was unsatisfactory.  Still, Anwari 
asked his security team if Herat could do better.  How, he 
asked, could the process be accelerated?  This resulted in 
provincial interagency bickering about information sharing 
and alleged hoarding of weapons by various police entities. 
ANBP accused the police of hoarding a large amount of 
"unauthorized" munitions and ordnance (e.g., mortars, RPG's, 
artillery shells).  Herat Chief of Police Salangi retorted 
that the police had never been requested to turn in such 
munitions.  Regarding already identified weapons caches the 
police were to have confiscated, ANBP alleged that the police 
had not delivered these weapons under DIAG as it should have. 
 The Governor did not seem pleased with the quarreling among 
his security cabinet in front of the non-Afghan attendees. 
(Note: ANBP later affirmed to PRToff that Herat PC 
coordination is very good and the Governor, very motivated 
and committed.  End Note.) 
 
---------------------- 
Lack of Enabling Tools 
---------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) According to provincial Chief of Information and 
Culture Bahara, Kabul DIAG leadership is critical of the 
apparent lack of a public information campaign in Herat. 
However, Bahara explained, no budget had been allocated for 
television, radio, and print media -- which in any case would 
have scant impact in much of rural Herat.  Still, he felt the 
message was getting through as well as anywhere else in the 
country despite the dearth of information flow from Kabul. 
DIAG West General Aziz pointed out that Imams were being 
asked to deliver the DIAG message, a potentially very 
effective tool for small weapons holders.  (Note: ANBP again 
affirmed to PRToff that it enjoys good ties with Herat 
Culture and Information officials.  Also, there is resistance 
among some mullahs to preaching the DIAG message, according 
to ANBP.  End Note.) 
 
¶7.  (C) Police shortcomings are even more severe.  After the 
DIAG meeting, Salangi told PRToff that the policemen being 
asked to enforce DIAG lack uniforms, coats, boots, and food 
-- a similar situation exists with the Border Police as well. 
 The average police station receives about five liters of 
fuel daily total for all vehicles, he maintained.  Despite a 
German-financed maintenance depot in Herat City, vehicle 
maintenance in outlying areas remains a severe problem. 
Embedded Regional Training Center (RTC) U.S. mentors 
confirmed that their trainees lack even the most basic 
equipment. 
 
----------------- 
Oil on the Waters 
----------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) PRToff intervened to soften the Governor's threat 
that MOI take back its words or else.  All recognized, PRToff 
said, that there were leadership and coordination problems in 
Kabul.  In addition, he noted, there is consensus that unless 
the IK/AK issue is resolved, DIAG in Herat would have little 
impact.  Finally, police participation in DIAG was critical 
to its success; the police are either part of the problem or 
part of the solution.  Thus, we should identify their needs 
and urge the police receive the tools to do the job.  The 
Governor seemed placated with the pledge for our continued 
support for DIAG in Herat. 
 
¶9.  (C) Herat Comment: A number of the key Herat players in 
the DIAG process are alleged to have ties with IK, and this 
could well complicate DIAG's forward movement.  A more 
aggressive approach to the two warlords from Kabul, we feel, 
would help negate this.  However, Kabul criticism of DIAG in 
Herat, without providing the most basic tools for success, 
will doom DIAG from the start.  Efforts must be made to get 
the tools to the enablers, and to sustain them over time. 
Despite reported assurances to the contrary, the MOI has 
failed, so far, in delivering adequate tools to any of the 
police services here. 
 
¶10.  (C) Embassy Comment: The international community (Japan, 
UNAMA, ANBP) approached President Karzai last week about 
reining in IK; Karzai was non-committal, but offered no 
objections to the international community's pressuring IK. 
In the absence of a strong central governmental leadership 
and backing for this program, starting with the President, it 
will be difficult to make significant progress with the 
politically sensitive program.  End Comment. 
NEUMANN