This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 005185 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA/FO, SA/A, ISN/ECC FOR JCOLLINS 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, AMEND 
CJTF-76 FOR POLAD, CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A 
TREASURY FOR PARAMESWARAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PINS ECON EFIN AF
SUBJECT: URGENT RESOURCE REQUEST TO SUPPORT AFGHAN BORDER 
MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE (BMI) 
 
Ref: KABUL 4952 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) We have long recognized the Border Management 
Initiative (BMI) as a top USG priority for mission success 
in Afghanistan givendue to its links to GoA revenue 
generation, security, and counter-narcotics initiatives. 
Reftel laid out the basic elements of a BMIn approach that 
we now make more concrete.  Washington help will be 
essential. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Significant progress in realizing BMI goals needs 
to begin with a trial project targeting Herat province 
customs revenue generation and Afghan Border Police Sixth 
Brigade security activities along the Iranian border.  This 
border point hosts has the largest flow of commercial 
traffic in Afghanistan.  We are moving rapidly to design a 
new trial plan with the involvement of Ministries of Finance 
and Interior.  Its success will require the urgent 
deployment of additional resources to Afghanistan by 
Washington agencies, including as follows: 
 
-- Customs, counter-narcotics and border patrol technical 
experts (e.g., immigration) to be deployed to the Herat 
customs areas, Afghan Border Police brigades, the MoF, and 
the MoI as advisors and mentors.  Onward dDeployment of 
these resources to other border posts may be necessary 
later. 
 
-- Supplemental resources, including specialized equipment 
to support customs, counter-narcotics and specified border 
patrol activities. 
 
END SUMMARY 
 
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Background 
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¶3. (SBU) Recent fact-finding missions by the Ambassador, the 
ARG Chief of Staff and a State Dept. EXBS expert to Herat 
province and the Islam Qalah border crossing point pilot 
project have revealed the need for significant improvement 
in customs organization and Ministry of Finance/Ministry of 
Interior cooperation.  Under the current customs clearing 
system, traders declare goods at Islam Qalah and then clear 
those goods and pay associated duties at the customs house 
in Herat city, over 100 km inland.  While this arrangement 
is common  -- and even regarded as a "best practice" -- in 
more developed countries, under primitive conditions in 
Afghanistan it permits tremendous leakage in imported cargo, 
much of which either bypasses the customs house via other 
transport routes or else is sold into the local market 
before reaching the customs house.  There is also a general 
lack of oversight in the customs yards at both Islam Qalah 
and Herat, allowing further leakage in cargo.  Moreover, the 
customs organization in Herat province is rife with 
corruption.  Imported goods are regularly undervalued or 
improperly declared in exchange for bribes paid to customs 
officials, resulting in significant losses in customs 
revenue to the central government and significant increases 
in illicit revenues to local drug networks, warlords, and 
other destabilizing elements. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Sixth Brigade of the Afghan Border Police 
(ABP), which is tasked with securing the Herat, Farah, and 
Baghdis province borders against illegal immigration and the 
smuggling of legal and illegal goods (including narcotics 
and weapons) must receive adequate resources from the 
Ministry of Interior in terms of staffing, salaries, 
training, equipment, and sustainment funding for 
sustainment.  The head of the Sixth Brigade, Col Ayoub, 
enabled by excellent mentoring and support from the CFC-A 
LNO, has done admirable work in rooting out corruption and 
combating cross-border threats, including narcotics 
trafficking.  The implementation of the USG-approved Police 
Rreform Pprogram, which prioritizes border police 
development, is addressing these resource shortfalls. 
Additionally, when the Border Police worked by themselves, 
they generated serious disagreements with the Ministry of 
Finance (that controls the Customs Service).  This 
disagreement has blocked further progress of the unilateral 
border plan designed earlier.  It is clear from this 
experiment that we have identified the problem but must have 
a new approach that both generates GoA buy in and builds GoA 
capacity to go forward without our running the program. 
 
¶5. (SBU) To that end we are now focused on generating a new 
trial project at Islam Qalah with border police and customs 
to be designed in the Border Management Working Group with 
agreed timelines, goals, and international participation. 
The latter will be essential to referee differences between 
GoA agencies and provide a neutral point of evaluation. 
Without such oversight,that, the effort will degenerate into 
mutual finger pointing among Afghan officials, an easy cover 
for those whose illicit revenue is going to be squeezed by 
more effective customs collection.  Hence there is a need 
for personnel resources with the experience to be credible 
in this difficult endeavor. 
 
¶6. (SBU) An additional problem is that the central Afghan 
government continues to lack the political will necessary to 
reform its customs and border police organizations.  We are 
undertaking a significant high level political push to 
generate support for the new approach.  Ambassador recently 
met with Minister of Finance Ahady to discuss the issue of 
corruption and the lack of will on the part of the MoF and 
MoI to resolve the problems.  The response was somewhat 
positive in that the Minister agreed to revitalize MoF's 
participation in the Border Management Working Group.  He 
also agreed to the new concept of a trial project at Islam 
Qalah, including returning customs officers to the post. 
However, he also pushed back fairly strongly, asserting that 
Border Police are also corrupt, rejecting CFC-A's figures 
for projected revenue figures and asking for a master plan 
for dealing with corruption and customs control. 
 
¶7. (SBU) These counter-arguments are not strong:  The border 
police on the whole may be corrupt, but are relatively clean 
at Islam Qalah; the CFC-A's revenue projections LNO's 
figures are based on ground-level observation of traffic 
and, while the amount is debatable by experts, it is clear 
the bottom line that extensive smuggling is costing the GoA 
large amounts of revenue is certain.  While the U.S. is 
certainly committed to helping the GoA root out corruption 
and is helping to formulate a master plan, the 
responsibility for generating a plan to counter corruption 
and institute customs reform rests squarely with the 
Ministry of Finance.  Nor is it reasonable to wait for a 
perfect plan before making progress.  It appears that 
broader strokes (to include the replacement of senior MoF 
officials responsible for customs) will be required to 
galvanize GoA reform.  A firm MoI commitment to provide the 
border police adequate resources will also be required.  To 
this end the Ambassador will be meeting in the near future 
with Acting Minister of Interior Moqbol to rejuvenate MoI's 
participating in the Border Management Working Group. 
 
8 (SBU) The Ambassador has also secured the support of 
Deputy UNAMA chief Ambassador Alexander for strong UN 
political support for the trial plan.  This is exactly the 
kind of political support envisioned for the new Donors 
Coordinating committee that will be set up during the London 
Conference.  ARG Chief of Staff met on December 19 with 
German Ambassador Freck who agreed to support the trial 
concept in the Border Management Working Group.  The World 
Bank also is a key player in the Border Management Working 
Group.  On December 20 Econ Counselor has discussed the 
issue with World Bank Country Director Mazurelle, who 
strongly supported the Islam Qalah trial project initiative 
and pledged the assistance of two consultants currently 
supporting the Bank's Emergency Customs Modernization and 
Trade facilitation project. 
 
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Recent Actions 
-------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Since Reftel, and in addition to the meetings noted 
above, Post has taken the following actions to move the 
Border Management initiative forward: 
 
-- Conducted fact-finding missions to Herat province and the 
Islam Qalah border crossing point; 
 
-- Met with MoI Deputy Minister and the heads of the Border 
Police and Customs Police to inform them of USG efforts and 
begin building a positive working relationship moving 
forward; 
 
-- Met with EC's in-country leadership to de-conflict 
construction plans at Shir Khan Bandar border crossing 
point; 
 
-- State ISN/EXBS sent its South Asia Program Manager to 
Afghanistan, together with a dedicated personal services 
contractor who will serve for 6 months to 1 year as the EXBS 
liaison officer to Afghanistan to push the trial project 
forward.  This visit included extensive consultations with 
ARG and CFC-A personnel, meetings with all international 
donor implementing partners and senior officials at MoI and 
MoF, as well as a Herat site-visit1;. 
 
 
* 
 
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Planned Actions 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Post plans to take the following actions in the 
coming two months: 
 
-- Embassy Country Team will move forward the trial program 
at Islam Qalah and attempt to expand it to other customs 
posts.  Once this trial has demonstrated a feasible 
solution, we would move to apply the same solution to 
Towrkham, to the remaining three priority crossing points, 
and finally to the balance of the 13 crossings locations. 
We would then follow with a period of international 
monitoring. 
 
-- Meet with International Community (IC) January 12 to 
confirm and solidify a comprehensive list of donor resources 
and to ensure donor buy-in and coordinated donor action (we 
had hoped to meet this week but too many of the key players 
have departed for Christmas breaks). 
 
-- Convene a meeting of the Executive Steering Committee 
which includes GoA Ministers, U.S. Ambassador, ARG Chief of 
Staff, CFC-A CG, and appropriate IC chiefs of mission/party 
January 17 to brief the GoA and gain their support for the 
IC plan's Islam Qalah trial and attempt to get approval on 
the concept of expanding the plan to other customs posts 
 
-- Convene a meeting of the Border Management Working Group 
(includes GoA, USG, and IC) February 4.  Sub-working-group 
level meetings to follow to drill down into specific issues. 
 
--  In response to Reftel request, EXBS will coordinate DHS 
expertise and other resources to meet the needs of the 
Country Team. 
 
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Required Resources 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) Expanding on Reftel requests, Embassy Country Team 
requests the following support on an immediate basis: 
 
-- Customs, border patrol, and counter-narcotics subject- 
matter experts to be deployed within key customs areas, ABP 
brigades, the MoF, and the MoI as advisors and mentors. 
Deployments would begin within the Herat/Islam Qalah customs 
structure and the ABP Sixth brigade.  When reforms are 
sufficiently completed, most personnel would be transferred 
to the next BCP/Brigade combination, with some personnel 
remaining behind to provide quality assurance and oversight. 
 
-- Supplemental resource requirements will be identified by 
subject matter experts by March, 2006 as the Herat/Islam 
Qalah trial moves forward.  These resource requirements will 
likely include specialized equipment to support customs, 
border patrol, and counter-narcotics activities, including 
items such as fixed gamma scanners for use at ports of entry 
to facilitate more thorough and efficient inspection of 
inbound cargo. 
 
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Conclusion 
---------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Border Management Initiative is a top priority. 
Generating increased GoA revenue is critical to the long 
term sustainability of the Afghan government and to reducing 
the need to have donors to fund normal GoA running expenses. 
Truly securing the major border crossing points and 
capturing substantial new customs revenue will be a 
difficult long term endeavor given the high levels of 
corruption, the vast sums of money involved and the weakness 
of the GoA.  Success is essential to realizing an Afghan 
government that can operate independently of international 
donor (and particularly USG) support.  Post is poised to 
realize significant progress in achieving Border Management 
Initiative objectives but requires immediate assistance from 
Washington agencies as detailed above. 
 
NEUMANN 
_______________________________ 
1Doug, CG has left the note of the need for scanners in the 
penultimate para, but  felt it did not belong in a para 
focused on recent actions.