This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005052 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USAID FOR ANATSIOS 
STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, EB 
NSC FOR THARRIMAN, KAMEND 
TREASURY FOR APARAMESWARAN 
COMMERCE FOR AADLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2010 
TAGS: EFIN ECON EAID ETRD PGOV AF
SUBJECT: FINANCE MINISTRY DEFLECTS CUSTOMS REFORM 
 
REF: KABUL 4952 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD E.NEUMANN. REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C)  Afghan customs reform is lagging due to weak GoA 
commitment and systemic corruption at all levels.  In 
discussions between USAID and its implementing partner 
Bearing Point (BP) and with the UK,s DFID and its 
implementing partner Adam Smith International (ASI), there 
was broad agreement that the GoA Ministry of Finance lacked a 
coherent vision and strategy for comprehensive customs reform 
and has yet to exhibit political will to promote change. 
Instead of focusing on increasing customs revenue levels, the 
Finance Ministry appears more concerned with responding to 
the interests of traders who benefit from corrupt border 
practices.  DFID will terminate its support to central 
customs office in July 2006 at the request of the Finance 
Minister, who cites the need to "rationalize" donor 
assistance.  Customs revenue is critical to achieving budget 
sustainability in the next few years.  Reftel outlined 
Embassy,s Border Management Initiative proposal to enhance 
customs collection at 12 key border crossing points. 
However, without firm GoA resolve to support this and related 
efforts to develop transparent customs operations, Afghan 
customs revenues will not increase and the budget gap will 
not be adequately addressed.  How and how urgently the GoA 
addresses the need for customs reform will be and important 
issue for donors to address on the margins of the upcoming 
Afghanistan London Conference.  The Ambassador viewed the 
Herat customs operation December 13 and plans to make a major 
push on the issue with the Finance Minister and President 
Karzai.   End Summary. 
 
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Customs Reform: Lacking 
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¶2. (SBU)  In a December 6 meeting with BP and ASI, key 
expatriate advisors with three years experience working on 
Afghan customs issues noted that customs reform under 
ex-Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani was swift and there had been 
clear GoA resolve to reestablish controls at borders and at 
customs houses throughout Afghanistan.  A new customs law was 
passed to increase transparency and controls in customs 
administration.  A working division of labor was established 
whereby DFID assistance through ASI focused on customs reform 
at the central government level and USAID support through BP 
was directed to customs operations in the field.  Even with 
political resolve and effective technical assistance, there 
were and remain many difficulties, as vested interests 
entrenched over the past thirty years have resisted changes 
that would limit or eliminate corrupt practices. 
 
¶3. (C)  According to ASI and BP, bribes to undervalue cargo 
or to list cargo at reduced volumes are common at Afghan 
border crossings.  Cargo passes through border points and 
then proceeds to the nearest customs house for processing. 
In Herat, the busiest border crossing, the customs house is 
100 km from the border.  Along the way, many truck cargoes 
are unloaded and their goods transported as contraband, often 
to Pakistan.  Many provincial governors have established 
well-oiled mechanisms to extract patronage with traders to 
circumvent customs procedures.  Minister Ghani strongly 
supported customs reforms and revenues quickly increased from 
minimal levels to over USD 150 million in 2004. 
 
¶4. (C) Under new Minister of Finance Ahady and new Deputy 
Minister Farhad, reform efforts have palpably slowed. 
Estimates from CFC-A, BP and ASI all conclude that customs 
revenues could easily double with transparent and effective 
controls.  Private customs brokers, new players authorized 
and regulated under the new customs law, process customs 
forms in the customs house and ensure transparency.  Ahady 
has asked that traders also be able to process their own 
goods directly, a change that would require amending the 
customs law.  Traders wield tremendous power.  This change 
would represent a setback for reform and it is inconsistent 
with international best practice.  Twenty seven women had 
been trained over the past two years by Bearing Point on data 
entry for the new computer system of customs tracking, called 
ASYCUDE.  The GoA agreed to hire the women in July, 2005.  As 
of December 2005 they have yet to receive remuneration from 
the government, but have continued to work based on the hope 
that they will eventually be paid.  This pool of skilled 
labor is at risk and a significant investment could be 
wasted.  These issues highlight the influence peddling of 
local traders and the lack of resolve of central government 
to induce reforms. 
 
¶5. (C) Both BP and ASI long-term advisor teams on the front 
line of customs reform shared the view that the Director of 
Customs Dismullah Kamawi and Deputy Minister of Finance Asad 
Sakhi Farhad are not transparent actors in the customs reform 
process, but are in fact direct beneficiaries of the current 
system of corrupt practices.  Both the USG and DFID have 
insisted on moving customs collection from towns inside 
Afghanistan directly to the border crossings.  This has met 
with stiff resistance and non-action from the GoA.  There is 
also little interest on the part of the Afghan government to 
allow for permanent international oversight at border 
crossings.  Minister of Finance Ahady objects to the "high 
cost" of these international advisors, even though ASI and BP 
project that advisor oversight would produce far more 
revenues than the cost of their salaries, which in any case 
are paid for by international donors at no cost to the Afghan 
government. 
 
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GoA Not Focused on Customs Revenue Generation 
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¶6. (C) The Ministry of Finance customs policies place, 
according to BP and ASI experts, far greater priority on 
serving the interests of traders at the border than on 
revenue generation.  Politically ambitious Finance Minister 
Ahady, they say, is well aware of corruption issues, but does 
not want to take actions that could estrange important 
constituencies, including Herat traders and former Heart 
Governor Ismael Khan who still wields tremendous influence 
through a traditional system of patronage.  As a result of 
such political pressures to maintain the status quo, the GoA 
impetus to increase revenue generation has lost momentum. 
 
¶7. (C) DFID, which has provided support through ASI to 
customs in policy training and human resource management will 
end its customs support eight months early in July 2006, due 
to a request from Minister of Finance Ahady to "rationalize" 
donor assistance.  Yet both USAID and DFID acknowledge close 
collaboration and zero overlap in activities of their BP and 
ASI customs reform implementing partners.  DFID said it was 
informed by Minister Ahady that USAID, through BP, would 
focus on customs reform, while DFID and ASI would concentrate 
on tax and budget reform.  The Finance Minister, however, has 
insisted on a very limited number of advisors from BP that 
would not permit adequate support to customs reform.  USAID 
does not have funding to support complete customs reform that 
BP advisors estimate will cost USD 55 million. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The World Bank began support for customs reform in 
May 2003, focusing on customs refurbishment in Kabul.  Its 
new customs reform program (CURE) was subsequently undertaken 
to provide technical assistance to central government customs 
administration and provide improved communications and 
software for customs management.  The Bank has produced 
numerous customs policy papers for the GoA.  However, 
according to BP and ASI advisors, little action has been 
taken on their recommendations.  For security reasons, World 
Bank staff are limited in their access to remote customs 
houses and border points in Afghanistan and BP and ASI 
advisors agree that the World Bank approach until now has had 
limited impact on the customs reform process. 
 
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Customs Revenues Needed To Close Budget Gap 
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¶9. (SBU)  The IMF, in its latest November 2005 Staff 
Monitored Program review, states that customs duties will 
remain the most significant source of government revenues in 
the near-term until Afghanistan,s income and consumption tax 
base expands.  Ambitious GoA revenue targets to increase 
domestic revenues from 4.5 percent of GDP in FY 04/05 to 8.1 
percent in FY 10/11 will require significant customs 
administration reform in addition to a more coherent tax 
policy.  Government revenue projections for FY 10/11 still 
have customs duties accounting for about 50 percent of 
overall budget revenues, based on the assumption of 
significant customs reform.  Customs reform is central to 
improving government revenue streams and, without revitalized 
Ministry of Finance focus on customs policy and practice, 
there is general agreement among international financial 
institutions that GoA budget revenue targets will be 
difficult to realize. 
 
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Customs Reform: London Conference Theme? 
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¶10. (C)  Reftel details Post,s Border Management Initiative 
proposal on how to proceed with customs reform, a vital 
priority.  The acceleration of GoA customs reform and Finance 
Ministry resolve to promote key reforms should be an 
important theme in discussions of further donor assistance in 
the margins of the London Conference (the GoA needs to hear a 
forceful message of donor concern but we think this should 
not be public).  Joint donor recommendations could include 
moving the physical collection of customs duties and tariffs 
out to the borders; establishing permanent international 
oversight at key border control points for a two to five year 
period; and even (quietly, behind the scenes) propose the 
removal of the Director General of Customs who has not 
supported administrative reforms.  With these changes, 
additional resources to develop customs capacities at the 
borders can be provided.  Customs revenues could increase 
dramatically as a result of these changes and the GoA could 
exceed IMF revenue benchmarks and accelerate progress towards 
budget sustainability.  If Afghanistan is to promote itself 
as a "land bridge" between Central and South Asia, a 
transparent customs process in the framework of broader and 
more efficient border management is the first building block. 
 
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Ambassador,s Comment 
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¶11. (C)  I toured the Herat customs post December 13. 
Everything I saw and sensed is troubling and supports this 
analysis.  In coming days I intend to start consulting the 
donor community and SRSG to try and raise the political level 
of our concerns.  This will be a hard, slow slog but we need 
not wait on London to start work. 
NEUMANN