This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 002071 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2025 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY IZ TU SYRIA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD'S DECEMBER 4 MEETINGS WITH 
FOREIGN MINISTER GUL - IRAQI ELECTIONS, SYRIA, IRAN 
 
REF: A. STATE 219157 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 4802 
     ¶C. ANKARA 7027 
     ¶D. ANKARA 7098 
 
Classified By: Consul General Deborah K. Jones, Reasons 1.4 (b and d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: During a very cordial hour-long lunch 
sandwiched between U.S. meetings with a team of Iraqi Sunnis 
-- conducted in Istanbul and orchestrated and observed by the 
GOT -- Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul told visiting 
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad that Turkey had counseled 
the Sunnis that their non-participation in Iraq's electoral 
process suited Iran's strategic purposes.  Positing that 
Sunni Arabs were the critical middle bloc that held Iraq's 
Sunni Kurds and Shi'a Arabs together, Gul said he had urged 
the Sunnis to accept the December 15 election date, despite 
encouragement from others (possibly the Egyptians and Saudis) 
to seek postponement.  Gul said he would follow up with 
others during this week's OIC summit in Mecca to encourage 
support for Sunni participation.  On Syria, Gul said he had 
used his recent trip to Damascus to urge full cooperation 
with the Mehlis investigation.  Cautioning against radical 
transition in that country, which would lead to "a vacuum and 
chaos," Gul suggested the Syrians need both pressure "but to 
see a way out."  Thus, "the U.S. should continue to push and 
(Turkey) will continue to pull."  Gul characterized the 
recent visit of Iranian FM Mottaki as that "of an old friend" 
and said the latter was "relaxed on Iraq."  Ambassador 
Khalilzad thanked Gul for Turkey's role in facilitating the 
U.S.-Sunni meetings and reiterated there would be no delay in 
elections and no fixed timetable for U.S. withdrawal. 
Khalilzad reiterated U.S. concerns about Syrian interference 
in Iraq and its noncompliance with UN resolutions, and agreed 
that Sunni non-participation played into Iranian hands.  In 
response to the Minister's brief allusion to PKK activities, 
Ambassador Khalilzad suggested that a more stable situation 
in the Sunni heartland would enable more security resources 
to be deployed in the north.  Gul was joined by Turkish MFA 
Director General for the Middle East Oguz Celikkol, the Prime 
Minister's advisor Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, and the Prime 
Minister's press counselor Nabi Avci.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Gul and Khalilzad also met briefly prior to the start 
of the U.S.-Sunni bilats (reported septel).  Gul reviewed the 
issues raised by the Iraqi team during the previous evening's 
meeting with Gul and his advisors, and stressed Turkey's 
desire to contribute to the effort to ensure that all Iraqi 
groups participate in the electoral process.  He noted that 
he and his advisors had made a special effort to convince the 
Sunnis to lower the profile of their initial demand that the 
December 15 polls be postponed and to focus instead on 
technical issues that could be addressed in the run-up to the 
election.  Here Gul suggested that the Iraqi Sunnis might 
have been receiving "bad advice" from the Saudis and 
Egyptians with respect to delaying the elections.  Khalilzad 
expressed appreciation for Gul's initiative in organizing the 
meeting and stressed that the U.S. shares the goal of broad 
participation.  He underscored election postponement is not 
under consideration. 
 
¶3. (C) During the lunch, Khalilzad characterized his morning 
dialog with the Iraqis as open and frank, noting that "while 
we can't deliver on everything," the Sunnis had raised a 
number of legitimate technical concerns which could be 
pursued, including the question of international monitors. 
He added that discussion of a withdrawal timetable had been 
raised, but that he had stressed that an artificial timetable 
would be counterproductive; both sides needed to focus 
instead on achieving the conditions necessary for withdrawal. 
 At the end of the day, the Ambassador speculated, the Sunnis 
would want the U.S. to stay (which he added is not our 
intention), a point with which Gul concurred.  Khalilzad 
stressed that the U.S. goal is an Iraq that works and in 
which all elements of society participate; the Sunnis could 
not continue to dwell in the past or dream of a return to the 
status quo ante.  Gul agreed, stressing that only the 
participation of "all three pillars" of Iraqi society would 
create a healthy polity and suggesting that the Sunni Arabs 
held commonalities with Iraq's Kurds, as Sunnis, and Iraq's 
Shi'a, as Arabs, that were necessary to hold the country 
together. 
 
¶4. (C) Gul also raised the political challenges facing the 
Sunnis, and the need for them to have "concrete things" to 
present to their constituencies to bring them along.  That 
said, the Minister and Ambassador agreed that it is 
particularly important to disabuse the Sunnis of the notion 
that participating in the election is a favor to the rest of 
Iraqi society.  Other elements (read Iran, inter alia) are 
happy to see the Sunnis outside the process, and are taking 
advantage of their absence for their own purposes.  Gul said 
he had warned the Iraqis that they were playing into the 
hands of their opponents, "who did not wish to see the real 
representatives of the Sunnis."  Only from within the system, 
he agreed, could they influence the final shape of Iraq's 
constitutional system.  Khalilzad suggested that a government 
of national unity might be the optimum outcome from the 
upcoming elections.  Gul agreed, judging that this would 
offer all parties some "ownership" of the process. 
 
¶5. (C) Syria and Iran: In response to Ambassador Khalilzad's 
concerns over Syrian misbehavior and Iranian mischief in 
Iraq, and the Ambassador's reiteration of points contained 
ref A, Gul said he had delivered a strong message to Asad 
during his recent meetings in Damascus, warning him to 
abandon his rhetoric, cooperate with the U.N. investigation 
and do more on the Iraqi border.  "We must keep the pressure 
on," he agreed, but "we must also show the way out," since 
"dramatic change" in Syria would lead to a "vacuum and 
chaos."  With pressure and encouragement, he argued, the 
Syrians would change: "You should continue to push and we 
will pull."  Gul opined that Syria's Economic Minister was 
"serious" and that economic reform in Syria would bring 
political changes in its wake.  On Iran, Gul said Foreign 
Minister Mottaki had been "relaxed" about Iraq during his 
recent visit to Ankara (ref C), but agreed with Ambassador 
Khalilzad's observation that the Iranians have been playing a 
divisive game in Iraq, permitting extremists to infiltrate 
the north of the country, while also encouraging Shiite 
sectarianism. 
 
¶6. (C) PKK:  In a passing reference to the PKK, Gul argued 
that it is "essential" that it be addressed to counteract the 
perception some have that the U.S. does not view all 
terrorists with the same seriousness.  Khalilzad expressed 
hope that when the security situation stabilizes in the Sunni 
heartland, security resources could be refocused to address 
PKK concerns. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Press Event: At the conclusion of the luncheon, 
based on a progress report on ongoing U.S.-Sunni meetings led 
by Baghdad Political Counselor Robert Ford and other members 
of the U.S. delegation, the Minister and Ambassador Khalilzad 
agreed to a joint press conference (photo op and brief 
statement) to announce the fact of the meeting and to stress 
the determination of all sides to work to ensure broad 
participation in the elections.  In his remarks to the press, 
Gul emphasized Turkey's interest in seeing an "Iraq that 
moves forward" and the GOT's efforts to  encourage all 
groups, including those that did not participate in the 
referendum, to take part in the December 15 poll.  "This is a 
process," he emphasized, to which Turkey is "determined to 
contribute."  Ambassador Khalilzad thanked Gul for his 
leadership in convening the meeting, and for the "role Turkey 
has played and has promised to continue playing."  He 
stressed that the United States is committed to work as hard 
as it can to facilitate the participation of all Iraqis in 
the election, and that the meeting with the Sunni delegation 
was part of that process.  "We want an Iraq that can stand on 
its own feet," the Ambassador said, and for that to happen 
"all of Iraq's communities need to agree."  Tariq Hashemi, 
leader of the Sunni Iraq Islamic Party and designated 
spokesman for the Sunni team, also expressed appreciation for 
"Turkey's role in Iraq," and noted that important issues had 
been tabled for discussion, specifically the request for 
cessation of bombing of civilian centers in the run-up to the 
elections; the question of observers, and a request that the 
election be postponed.  He thanked Ambassador Khalilzad for 
his open-minded attitude, and stressed the Sunnis' desire to 
participate in the election, to be represented in the 
assembly and government, and to have a "genuine role" in the 
political process.  He concluded, however, that this is 
subject to a healthy environment, which he said would not be 
achieved without "American consideration of our concerns." 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: The bilateral U.S.-Sunni meetings, while 
useful, produced no breakthroughs.  The real winner here was 
Prime Minister Erdogan's government, which clearly wanted to 
signal to us, the Iraqis, and the Turkish public its efforts 
to contribute to stability in neighboring Iraq and raise its 
profile as a key regional player.  End Comment. 
 
¶9. (U) This message was cleared by Ambassador Khalilzad. 
JONES