This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ISLAMABAD 019100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID 
USAID/W FOR A/AID ANDREW NATSIOS, JBRAUSE 
DCHA/OFDA GGOTTLIEB, MMARX, RTHAYER, BDEEMER 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA 
SOUTH ASIA ACTION TEAM 
SOUTH ASIA EARTHQUAKE TASK FORCE 
DCHA/FFP FOR JONATHAN DWORKEN 
ANE DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR MARK WARD 
BANGKOK FOR OFDA SENIOR REGIONAL ADVISOR TOM DOLAN 
KATHMANDU FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR WILLIAM BERGER 
ROME PASS FODAG 
GENEVA FOR RMA AND NKYLOH 
NSC FOR JMELINE 
EUCOM FOR POLA/J3/J4/J5 
BRUSSELS FOR USAID PLERNER 
NEW YORK FOR TMALY 
SECDEF FOR SOLIC/PKHA, USDP/J3 
JOINT STAFF WASH DC FOR J3/J4/J5 
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE FOR J3/J5 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID AEMR ASEC MASS ECON KMDR KPAO OIIP OPRC PGOV PREL PK UN
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN - EARTHQUAKE: UN PERFORMANCE SHOWS 
IMPROVEMENT BUT OVERALL LEADERSHIP STILL LACKING 
 
REF: A) ISLAMABAD 17311 B) ISLAMABAD 17632 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. More than two months into the earthquake relief effort, 
the UN has made some improvements in response to early 
criticisms of start-up delays and performance issues reported 
in ref A.  However, a lack of overall UN leadership, poor 
coordination, and insufficient staff continues to undermine 
the Pakistan earthquake response.  Most urgently, the UN 
should deploy a disaster expert to oversee the entire UN 
humanitarian operation. End summary. 
 
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Overview of the Response 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. The humanitarian community marshaled massive resources to 
respond to the devastating October 8 earthquake in Pakistan. 
Overwhelming humanitarian needs, difficult terrain, and harsh 
winter weather conditions make the response particularly 
challenging.  There were also a large number of stakeholders, 
including numerous donors, humanitarian agencies, and GOP 
officials. 
 
¶3. Rather than deploying a disaster expert to supervise 
multi-UN agency efforts at the start of the earthquake 
response, the UN Resident Coordinator who was already 
overseeing the UN Development Program,s portfolio in 
Pakistan became the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (UNHC).  The 
deployment of OCHA,s Director for Coordination and Response 
Kevin Kennedy was a welcome step to pull together the efforts 
of UN agencies more effectively, but Mr. Kennedy,s tenure in 
Pakistan was too brief. 
 
¶4. The UN also piloted a &cluster lead8 system to replace 
the &collaborative approach8 of informal sectoral working 
groups that had been employed in previous emergencies.  Under 
the cluster system, agencies are appointed as leads to 
represent the interests of and formally develop a strategy 
for an entire sector.  Therefore, the cluster response places 
heavy demands on staff time for meetings and planning, taking 
away from operations.  Cluster leads are also failing to 
communicate and coordinate among themselves, which is 
hampering an integrated response.  While it may be too late 
to abandon the cluster approach in Pakistan, the UN needs 
leadership to pull together the cluster leads to ensure more 
information-sharing and cohesion among and across the 
sectors. 
 
--Coordination and Information Management-- 
 
¶5. Undermining UN coordination and information sharing is the 
inadequate staffing of the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).  In particular, OCHA,s 
Humanitarian Information Center (HIC) has insufficient staff 
to manage and respond to large-scale information needs. 
According to its mandate, the HIC serves as the primary 
information collection point and gathers information 
submitted voluntarily by NGOs, other UN agencies, and the 
GOP.  Cluster leads are responsible for submitting sector 
information to the HIC; however, they have not yet developed 
standardized reporting formats.    Without enough HIC staff, 
there is no comprehensive information management system, and 
competing and often contradictory information streams have 
emerged. 
 
 
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Progress of Individual UN Agencies 
---------------------------------- 
 
--Relief commodities-- 
 
¶7. There were significant early logistical problems managing 
air cargo shipments arriving at Islamabad Airport (Ref A). 
These have receded with improved inventory of incoming goods, 
and the slowdown in the number of airlifts arriving.  One 
remaining concern is that current UNJLC procedures do not 
identify transportation missions according to urgency of need 
but by location and access.  As a result, transportation is 
logical and efficient, but may fail to consider time 
sensitivity. 
 
¶8. A UN Operational Data Management Team is now being formed 
to collect information systematically about the commodities 
pipeline. The arrival of a new UNJLC head on December 13 may 
also improve information collection and dissemination. 
 
--WFP Food Assistance-- 
 
¶9. WFP has made progress since ref A and the food aid 
pipeline is healthy.  WFP field staff is dedicated and 
knowledgeable; in general, WFP and its cooperating partners 
are doing a competent and sometimes innovative job.  One 
concern is that WFP may have too quickly passed its 
responsibility to the GOP in Mansehra.  NGOs there are 
frustrated with the closure of WFP,s office, which has 
temporarily left the logistics, food and nutrition, and 
information technology clusters without leadership. 
 
--Essential Services-- 
 
¶10. UNICEF staff have demonstrated strong technical skills in 
the water and sanitation sector.  Some UNICEF staff have 
shown more initiative than others, but have generally 
coordinated well with local government officials and the 
overall effort has been satisfactory to very good.  One 
concern is that UNICEF field staff are overstretched and 
unable to monitor closely projects in such a large coverage 
area.  To augment UNICEF efforts, the USAID/DART provided 
technical assistance to repair the damaged well at Mehra 
camp.  USAID also funded two staff positions through an NGO 
partner to provide surge capacity and oversight of water and 
sanitation activities. 
 
¶11. The Camp Management Cluster lead, UNHCR, has doubled its 
camp management budget and increased the number of personnel 
and teams in the field per ref B.  To date, UNHCR has 
received USD 30 million in contributions, which is sufficient 
to cover camp management through March 2006, when the FRC and 
UNHCR plan to close camps. 
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Comment and Recommendations 
--------------------------- 
 
¶12. Overall, UN agencies have made progress since the early 
days of the response.  The deployment of experienced staff 
including Kevin Kennedy, and WFP Chief of Logistics Service, 
Amer Daoudi, led to significant improvements in UN 
operations.  The UN Secretary General, as well as directors 
from UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO traveled to Pakistan 
in the past two months, helped to rally agencies, efforts. 
Post also welcomes the announcement of former President Bush 
as Special Envoy for the South Asia Earthquake Disaster to 
pressure donors to honor pledges made in Geneva and 
Islamabad. 
 
¶13. Although most individual agencies have shown improvement 
since ref A, the lack of sufficient staff and poor overall 
coordination continue to undermine the earthquake response. 
Post recommends the following: 
 
a) The UN should immediately deploy a disaster expert to 
assume the role of the UNHC and oversee the entire UN 
operation.  Post recommends conveying this recommendation to 
the UN Secretary General, possibly through former President 
Bush.  At present, there is no leadership to hold the cluster 
leads accountable and ensure that information is shared 
between the field to headquarters and across different 
clusters.  The UNHC also needs special authorities for 
procurement and staffing. 
 
b) Introduction of the cluster system concept was 
inappropriate for this major disaster response.  At this 
stage, it is too late to abandon the cluster approach, but 
the situation would improve by deploying UN staff with 
disaster experience and improving decision making authority 
for cluster leads. 
c) The HIC lacks sufficient staff to manage and disseminate 
incoming data.  Competing systems must be streamlined to 
better prioritize immediate interventions, identify gaps, and 
avoid duplication of efforts. 
CROCKER