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Viewing cable 05HANOI3236, FUNDING FOR PHASE II VIETNAM UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05HANOI3236 2005-12-09 05:21 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 003236 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR PM-WRA, EAP-BCLTV, AND S-GHD; OSD PASS TO DR. 
STERN; SOLIC PASS TO COL JORDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT EAID MARR MOPS PREF PREL KHDP VM MAS
SUBJECT: FUNDING FOR PHASE II VIETNAM UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE 
AND LANDMINE IMPACT SURVEY 
 
REF: A. (A) SECSTATE 00214260 
     B. (B) HANOI 2049 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. THE CURRENT ESTIMATED COST PROJECTION 
FOR PHASE II OF THE UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE AND LANDMINE 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND TECHNICAL SURVEY IS USD 9.2 
MILLION OVER THREE YEARS, WHICH INCLUDES TWENTY 
MILITARY CLEARANCE TEAMS. THIS TOTAL REPRESENTS A COST 
EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO OTHER PLANNED NGO-EXECUTED 
CLEARANCE ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM, INCLUDING THOSE 
SPONSORED BY THE USG.  MINE CLEARANCE CARRIED OUT BY 
MILITARY DEMINERS AS PART OF PHASE I WAS SOME OF THE 
MOST COST EFFECTIVE MINE CLEARANCE TO DATE IN VIETNAM 
AT LESS THAN USD 2K PER HECTARE.  THE TOTAL COST FOR 
PHASE II CLEARANCE WILL LIKELY BE OFFSET BY OTHER 
GOVERNMENT DONORS, SOME OF WHICH HAVE RECENTLY 
EXPRESSED INTEREST IN JOINING THE PHASE II EFFORT.  USG 
LEADERSHIP IN HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION IN VIETNAM IS A 
CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. 
PHASE II OF THIS PROJECT IS ALSO VIEWED AS AN IMPORTANT 
INDICATOR OF USG COMMITTMENT IN THE WIDER FIELD OF 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.  IN LIGHT OF THESE FACTORS, 
POST BELIEVES FUNDING FOR PHASE II SHOULD BE CONTINUED 
INCREMENTALLY AT A LEVEL THAT WILL ALLOW PLANNING TO BE 
COMPLETED IN FY06 AND THE FIRST STAGE OF A MULTI-PHASE, 
MULTI-YEAR EXECUTION TO BEGIN IN FY07. END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) POST IS IN RECEIPT OF REF A OUTLINING A RECENT 
PM/WRA DECISION TO TERMINATE FOLLOW-ON FUNDING FOR 
PHASE II.  START-UP FUNDING FOR PHASE II OF THIS 
PROJECT WAS RECOMMENDED BY POST IN ITS INPUT FOR THE 
FY06 DEMINING COUNTRY PLAN (REF B). 
 
3. (SBU) PHASE I OF THIS PROJECT WAS COMPLETED ON 14 
NOVEMBER 2005 WITH THE PUBLICATION AND RELEASE OF A 
FINAL REPORT. THIS REPORT WAS THE CULMINATION OF NEARLY 
FOUR YEARS OF INCREASINGLY CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN 
THE VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA FOUNDATION (VVAF) AND 
THE CENTER FOR BOMB AND MINE DISPOSAL TECHNOLOGY 
(BOMICEN) OF VIETNAM'S MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.  PHASE I 
WAS CONDUCTED IN THE THREE CENTRAL VIETNAM PROVINCES OF 
HA TINH, QUANG BINH AND QUANG TRI FROM MARCH 2004 UNTIL 
MAY 2005. DURING THIS PERIOD, OVER 5,000 PEOPLE WERE 
INTERVIEWED IN 344 COMMUNES, PRODUCING A DATA SET THAT 
HAS BEEN INCORPORATED INTO AN INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM FOR MINE ACTION (IMSMA) DATABASE, ALONG WITH 
PRE-EXISTENT ARCHIVAL DATA MADE AVAILABLE BY THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.  ANALYSIS OF THIS DATA HAS 
ALREADY HELPED IDENTIFY AND RANK ORDER THE MOST 
SIGNIFICANT CLEARANCE PROBLEMS IN THESE PROVINCES BASED 
ON THE INJURY RATE AND THE RELATIVE DEGREE OF SOCIO- 
ECONOMIC IMPACT. 
 
4. (SBU) PARALLEL ACTIVITIES BY 17 BOMICEN TEAMS 
SUCCESSFULLY CLEARED 421 HECTARES AT 2,761 SITES TO A 
DEPTH OF ONE METER, REMOVING OVER 6,200 UXO-RELATED 
ITEMS, INCLUDING FIVE LARGE (250-1000 LB) BOMBS, 1,283 
BOMBLETS, 859 ARTILLERY OR MORTAR ROUNDS, 180 M79 
SHELLS, 32 ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES, 24 HAND GRENADES AND 
3,822 OTHER PIECES OF MISCELLANEOUS ORDNANCE.  UXO 
ITEMS DETECTED AT GREATER DEPTHS WERE MARKED AND 
ASSIGNED TO LOCAL MILITARY OFFICES FOR SUBSEQUENT 
CLEARANCE. 
 
5. (SBU) THE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE OF THIS PROJECT IS THE 
RECOGNITION THAT IT IS NOT ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE TO 
CLEAR ALL 330,000 SQUARE KILOMETERS OF VIETNAM'S 
TERRITORIAL LANDMASS, MUCH OF WHICH IS CONTAMINATED TO 
SOME DEGREE BY EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR (ERW). 
CONSEQUENTLY, AN ASSESSMENT THAT MEASURES THE SOCIO- 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PERSISTENT UXO/LANDMINE 
CONTAMINATION IS INTENDED TO HELP PLANNERS DEVELOP A 
STRATEGY FOR ALLOCATING SCARCE RESOURCES FOR 
PRIORITIZED CLEARANCE, EDUCATION AND SURVIVOR 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. 
 
6. (SBU) CURRENTLY, MINE CLEARANCE EFFORTS IN VIETNAM 
UNDERTAKEN BY NGOS WITH INTERNATIONAL SPONSORSHIP ARE, 
WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOCUSED ON THE 
THREE CENTRAL VIETNAM PROVINCES SURVEYED IN PHASE I. 
THE MAJORITY OF BOMICEN'S CLEARANCE ACTIVITIES ARE 
CURRENTLY BEING CARRIED OUT IN SUPPORT OF LARGE-SCALE, 
GOVERNMENT-DIRECTED INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
AT STATE-INVESTED INDUSTRIAL ZONES OR IN SUPPORT OF 
INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES.  OTHER SMALL-SCALE AND 
RELATIVELY LOW-ECONOMIC-IMPACT CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS 
ARE DIFFICULT TO SERVICE WITH AVAILABLE RESOURCES. 
CLEARLY, DATA FROM A NATIONWIDE ASSESSMENT WOULD ASSIST 
COMMUNITIES IN ALL 64 PROVINCES IN THE COMPETITION FOR 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION RESOURCES BASED 
ON OBJECTIVELY DEMONSTRATED NEEDS. 
 
7. (SBU) VIETNAM'S CURRENT LACK OF A NATIONAL MINE 
ACTION STRATEGY REMAINS DISAPPOINTING AND INHIBITS 
EFFICIENT RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN THIS AREA.  PHASE II 
WOULD PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN FACILITATING THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH A STRATEGY BY PROVIDING THE BASIC 
DATA NEEDED TO BEGIN TO PRIORITIZE THE GOVERNMENT'S 
ACTIVITIES, WHILE IDENTIFYING WHERE NGOS CAN BE MOST 
EFFECTIVE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO FILL THE RESOURCES GAP. 
SECTION II (PARA 2.2) OF PART V (RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION) OF THE FINAL REPORT FOR PHASE I OUTLINES AN 
INITIAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGY FOR CLEARING THE REMAINING 
ERW FROM THESE THREE PROVINCES.  THIS SHOULD BE TAKEN 
AS AN ENCOURAGING STEP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A 
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. 
 
8. (SBU) BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
TERMINATING USG SUPPORT FOR PHASE II, SUCH AN ACTION 
ALSO HAS THE POTENTIAL TO HAVE DAMAGING EFFECTS ON THE 
OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.  PHASE I/II HAS ALREADY 
TAKEN ON THE PATINA OF A FLAGSHIP PROGRAM BETWEEN THE 
USG AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM IN AN AREA THAT 
REMAINS HIGHLY VISIBLE AND EMOTIVE.  THE IMPORTANCE OF 
BILATERAL COOPERATION ON PHASE I HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY 
AFFIRMED DURING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN SENIOR U.S. AND 
VIETNAMESE LEADERS.  THE VALUE OF A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN 
AN AMERICAN NGO AND VIETNAM'S MILITARY, WHICH HAS 
TRADITIONALLY BEEN CONSERVATIVE AND INWARD-LOOKING, 
SHOULD NOT BE PREMATURELY DISMISSED.  CONTINUED CONTACT 
NOT ONLY WITH NATIONAL LEVEL MILITARY AGENCIES (I.E., 
ENGINEERING COMMAND AND BOMICEN), BUT ALSO AT THE 
PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEVEL THROUGH COORDINATION WITH 
LOCAL MILITARY DEMINING UNITS, IS GOOD FOR THE OVERALL 
RELATIONSHIP AND FOR ENCOURAGING MILITARY INTERACTION 
WITH OTHER CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS.  IN FACT, MOD 
REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE FIRST TIME RECENTLY ATTENDED A 
LANDMINE WORKING GROUP PROJECT REVIEW CONFERENCE, HELD 
IN HUE ON 2 DECEMBER 2005 BY VARIOUS NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS WORKING IN THE FIELD OF MINE ACTION. 
 
9. (SBU) REF A NOTED A FIGURE OF APPROXIMATELY USD 13 
MILLION OVER THREE TO FOUR YEARS TO COMPLETE PHASE II. 
BASED ON BEST AVAILABLE DATA, POST BELIEVES THIS FIGURE 
IS OVERSTATED.  VVAF ESTIMATES THE COST OF PHASE II TO 
BE $6.36 MILLION OVER THREE YEARS, WITH AN ADDITIONAL 
$2.83 MILLION TO EQUIP AND DEPLOY 20 RESPONSE TEAMS TO 
CONDUCT TECHNICAL VERIFICATION AND HIGH-PRIORITY 
CLEARANCE.  WHILE LESSONS FROM THE PHASE I EXPERIENCE, 
ESPECIALLY FROM THE PLANNING PERIOD, INDICATE THE 
POTENTIAL FOR COST OVERRUNS DUE TO EXTENDED AND LENGTHY 
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS, THE 
RELATIONSHIP THAT HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN VVAF AND 
BOMICEN PERSONNEL OVER THE LAST FOUR YEARS MITIGATES 
AGAINST THIS.  EARLY INDICATIONS FROM PHASE II PLANNING 
MEETINGS SUGGEST THAT THE PLANNING PERIOD FOR THE 
FOLLOW-ON EFFORT WILL BE FACILITATED BY SHARED PAST 
EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED.  MANY SUBSTANTIVE 
ISSUES HAVE ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED. 
 
10. (SBU) THE LEARNING CURVE FOR THE VIETNAMESE 
MILITARY DURING PHASE I, BOTH INSTITUTIONALLY AND AT 
THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL, WAS STEEP, BUT POST BELIEVES THAT 
MOD IS NOW WILLING TO MOVE FORWARD AT A QUICKER PACE IN 
PLANNING AND EXECUTING PHASE II.  WHILE IT IS PREMATURE 
TO SUGGEST THAT BOTH PARTNERS SHARE A UNIFIED VISION ON 
HOW TO PROCEED IN PHASE II, IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY ARE 
MORE COMFORTABLE WORKING WITH EACH OTHER AND ARE 
CAPABLE OF ARRIVING AT COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS THAT 
SATISFY THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT WHILE 
CONCURRENTLY SAFEGUARDING VIETNAM'S VALID STATE 
SECURITY INTERESTS. 
 
11. (SBU) REF A ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE PROJECTED COST 
FOR PHASE II OUTWEIGHS THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS.  POST 
DISAGREES.  WHILE IT IS DIFFICULT TO QUANTIFY THE LONG- 
TERM BENEFITS OF A STUDY OF THIS NATURE, IT IS CLEAR 
THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM NEEDS A NATIONAL 
STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH THE VERY REAL PROBLEM OF ERW. 
DOMESTIC RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL DONATIONS OF MONEY 
AND EQUIPMENT TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM ARE BOTH 
CURRENTLY INADEQUATE.  A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THIS 
TYPE WILL NOT ONLY FACILITATE ALLOCATION OF CURRENT 
RESOURCES, BUT WILL ALSO ALLOW BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES TO IDENTIFY AND JUSTIFY REQUESTS FOR 
FURTHER AID.  IT WILL ALSO PROVIDE THE ONLY OBJECTIVE 
EVALUATION OF VIETNAM'S OVERALL PROGRESS IN DEALING 
WITH THE PROBLEM OF ERW.  ALREADY, OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS HAVE EXPRESSED AN 
INTEREST IN RECEIVING THE DATA FROM PHASE I IN ORDER TO 
STUDY THE POSSIBILITY FOR FUTURE PROJECTS IN VIETNAM. 
IN ADDITION TO VARIOUS AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF 
VIETNAM, COPIES OF THE FINAL REPORT HAVE BEEN 
DISTRIBUTED TO 17 EMBASSIES, 25 NGOS, VARIOUS UNITED 
NATIONS OFFICES IN HANOI AND SEVERAL BUSINESSES, 
INCLUDING SHELL, SIEMENS AND BHP BILLITON, LTD.  SINCE 
A PRESENTATION OF PHASE I RESULTS AT THE RECENT 
LANDMINE WORKING GROUP PROJECT REVIEW CONFERENCE, 
SEVERAL OTHER NGOS WORKING IN VIETNAM HAVE OFFERED UP 
THEIR OWN DATA FOR INCLUSION IN THE IMSMA DATABASE. 
 
12. (SBU) CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR BOMICEN'S EFFORTS TO 
UNDERTAKE TECHNICAL CLEARANCE ALONGSIDE THE SURVEY 
TEAMS PROVIDES A VERY COST EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO NGO 
CLEARANCE OPERATIONS.  AS NOTED ABOVE, 17 MILITARY 
DEMINING TEAMS DEDICATED TO THE PHASE I EFFORT CLEARED 
421 HECTARES DOWN TO A DEPTH OF ONE METER.  THE COST 
FOR THIS EFFORT WAS APPROXIMATELY USD 800,000.  PHASE 
II PROPOSES TO EQUIP AND EMPLOY TWENTY TECHNICAL 
RESPONSE TEAMS AT A COST OF APPROXIMATELY USD 950,000 
PER YEAR.  THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY 
INDICATED AN INTEREST IN EXPANDING THE CLEARANCE 
CAPACITY ASSOCIATED WITH PHASE II BY FUNDING ADDITIONAL 
TEAMS. 
 
13. (USD) BY WAY OF COMPARISON, IN FY06, MAG-AMERICA 
HAS PROPOSED TO USE FOUR TEAMS TO CLEAR 20 HECTARES IN 
QUANG BINH PROVINCE AT A COST OF USD 1.5 MILLION OVER 
12 MONTHS, AND 30 HECTARES IN PHU THO PROVINCE AT A 
COST OF USD 1.8 MILLION OVER A PERIOD OF 15 MONTHS 
USING AN ADDITIONAL FOUR TEAMS.  WHILE THE TECHNICAL 
STANDARDS EMPLOYED AND QUALITY OF THE RESULTS ACHIEVED 
MAY VARY SOMEWHAT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND NGO DEMINING 
PERSONNEL, POST BELIEVES IT IS ALMOST ALWAYS PREFERABLE 
TO EQUIP AND TRAIN GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL BECAUSE THEY 
ARE MORE OPERATIONALLY FLEXIBLE, MORE MOBILE AND HAVE A 
MORE ROBUST NETWORK TO PROVIDE THE FULL SPECTRUM OF 
REQUIRED MEDICAL, LOGISTIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT. 
IT ALSO SUPPORTS THE USG OBJECTIVE OF EXPANDING 
NATIONAL CAPACITY. 
 
14. (SBU) POST RECOMMENDS THAT FUNDING FOR PHASE II NOT 
BE TERMINATED IN ITS ENTIRETY. ADEQUATE FUNDING SHOULD 
BE MADE AVAILABLE TO VVAF TO CARRY OUT PLANNING FOR 
PHASE II UNTIL THE END OF FY06.  SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT 
OF A MULTI-YEAR, MULTI-PHASED PLAN OF EXECUTION 
BEGINNING IN FY07 AND EXTENDING FOR THE PROJECTED LIFE 
OF THE PROJECT SHOULD BE USED AS THE CRITERIA TO 
REINFORCE SUCCESS AND TO DEVELOP SUBSEQUENT GRANT 
PROPOSALS FOR FOLLOW-ON EXECUTION FUNDING IN THE COMING 
YEARS.  FOR EXAMPLE, FOR THE NEXT PHASE OF THIS 
PROJECT, POST RECOMMENDS LIMITING THE SURVEY TO THREE 
TO FOUR ADDITIONAL PROVINCES.  THE FUNDING FOR EACH 
SUBSEQUENT SUB-PHASE BEYOND THIS ONE SHOULD BE 
PREDICATED ON ITS TIMELY COMPLETION.  THIS WILL PERMIT 
STAGGERED FUNDING FOR THE LIFE OF THE PROJECT AND ALLOW 
NOT ONLY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, BUT ALSO OTHER POTENTIAL 
DONORS, TO OBSERVE AND THEN TO REINFORCE SUCCESS.  IT 
WILL ALSO PERMIT DONORS TO WITHDRAW SUPPORT IF THE 
RESULTS DO NOT MEET EXPECTATIONS.  PREMATURE 
TERMINATION OF FUNDING FOR PHASE II WILL NOT ONLY 
REFLECT ADVERSELY ON THE USG COMMITMENT TO VIETNAM'S 
DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL MINE ACTION STRATEGY, BUT MAY 
ALSO JEOPARDIZE OTHER STREAMS OF INTERNATIONAL DONOR 
FUNDING.  MANY DONORS LOOK TO THE USG FOR LEADERSHIP IN 
THIS AREA, AND WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. SUPPORT FROM THIS 
FLAGSHIP EFFORT MAY BE PERCEIVED AS A LACK OF 
CONFIDENCE IN THE PROJECT GOALS, THE PARTNERS, OR BOTH. 
A UNRELATED PLANNED DECREASES IN USAID HUMANITARIAN 
PROGRAM FUNDING FOR VIETNAM FROM USD 4 MILLION IN FY 05 
TO USD 1 MILLION IN FY 06 MAY FURTHER EXACERBATE 
NEGATIVE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM PERCEPTIONS OF USG 
COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN VIETNAM. 
 
15. (SBU) WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE UPCOMING VISIT OF THE 
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PM/WRA IN FEBRUARY 2006 AND THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS NOT ONLY PHASE II, BUT ALSO 
OTHER WAYS TO FACILITATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL 
DEMINING CAPACITY IN VIETNAM, STRATEGIC MINE ACTION 
PLANNING, TRAINING SUPPORT, AS WELL AS OTHER U.S. 
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT TO INTERNATIONAL NGOS IN THE AREAS 
OF MINE ACTION, MINE RISK EDUCATION AND VICTIM'S 
ASSISTANCE. 
 
16. (U) THE POINTS OF CONTACT AT ARE MAJOR R.E. LUCIUS, 
MARINE AND NAVAL ATTACHE, (84-4) 772-1500, EXT. 2307 OR 
PROGRAM ASSISTANT MS. NGO KIM THUY, (84-4) 772-1500, 
EXT. 2232; UNCLAS E-MAIL: LUCIUSRE@STATE.GOV, 
NGOTK@STATE.GOV AND CLASSIFIED EMAIL: DILUCRE@ 
NOTES.DAWN.DIA.SMIL.MIL. 
MARINE