This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T  DUSHANBE 001966 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, SA 
NSC FOR MERKEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/8/2015 
TAGS: PINR MARR PREL AJ PL RO TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN'S VIEWS OF US FORCE POSTURE (C-RE5-00249) 
 
REF: STATE 220627 R SE 06-DEC-05 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: RICHARD HOAGLAND, AMBASSADOR, DUSHANBE, 
TAJIKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (S)  Post's DATT and DCM polled their colleagues informally 
on the questions below.  The following answers should be seen as 
the Tajik government's current mood on these hypothetical 
questions.  When and if negotiations were to start, outside 
pressures and local politics would influence the rhetoric, but 
we believe the core commitment to supporting a more robust U.S. 
presence in Tajikistan would remain.  So far, no senior U.S. 
government official has directly raised the issue of U.S. basing 
in Tajikistan. 
 
¶2.  (S)  A.  DOES YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT ESTABLISHMENT OF A 
US FACILITY IN-COUNTRY? WHY OR WHY NOT? HOW STEADFAST IS 
THEIR POSITION AND ARE THERE ANY SIGNS OF IT WAVERING? WHAT 
FACTORS (STRATEGIC, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC) WOULD INFLUENCE 
THEIR INTEREST IN A US MILITARY PRESENCE? 
 
In 2001, President Rahmonov stated his strong support for U.S. 
basing in Tajikistan.  Neither the President nor those close to 
him have stated since that they oppose U.S. basing here.  Post 
believes that should President Rahmonov be asked by a senior 
U.S. official, he would likely pause and gauge Russian reaction, 
but would eventually support U.S. basing.  Tajiks have expressed 
in private that foreign military basing in Tajikistan provides 
important economic assistance.  Tajikistan remains a steadfast 
supporter of the United States in the global war on terror. 
President Rahmonov would probably be at greatest ease if any 
U.S. basing was under the context of the Global War on Terror or 
directly linked to operations in support of Afghanistan. 
 
Our MFA contact emphasized that while Tajikistan as a small 
country must take into consideration the views of its neighbors, 
including big neighbors like Russia, the decision on basing 
would be a purely bilateral decision and not an issue for the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization or any other multilateral 
body. 
 
¶3.  (S)  B.  HOW VIABLE IS THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT?  WOULD A 
SUCCESSOR REGIME HOLD A SIMILAR OR OPPOSITE POSITION? 
 
Tajikistan is becoming the more stable regime in the region. 
President Rahmonov has reduced much of the opposition threat to 
his regime by sustaining modest economic growth, retaining 
general domestic security following the civil war, and jailing 
or threatening opposition leaders.  While a successor regime in 
the near to mid-term is highly unlikely here, successor regimes 
could range from staunchly pro-Russian to Islamic.  No successor 
regime is likely to be wholly anti-American, given the reservoir 
of goodwill from U.S. humanitarian and other assistance, and the 
recognition that the United States has improved Tajikistan and 
the region through its action in Afghanistan. Our MFA contact 
could not foresee a real change in power for the next 20-30 
years, but he added, if there were a change, and if "the group 
in power is wise, they will certainly know to cooperate with 
Russia, China and the United States." 
 
¶4.  (S)  C.  HAVE THERE BEEN ANY RECENT POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE 
CHANGES IN THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR US POLICY IN THE REGION? 
 
During recent senior U.S. visits, President Rahmonov has 
remained consistent in his support for U.S. security priorities 
in the region.  Rahmonov has specifically pointed out that the 
Global War on Terror continues and the United States should not 
reconsider its position in the region.  Continued U.S. 
assistance projects including building a bridge between 
Tajikistan and Afghanistan have bolstered U.S.-Tajik relations. 
There was a dip in relations, according to the MFA interlocutor, 
after the color revolution in Bishkek.  However, he believes 
that the attitude has changed now, adding that all countries in 
Central Asia, except Uzbekistan, have good relations with the 
United States.  Any "negative attitudes" come from small groups. 
 
 
¶5.  (S)  D.  HOW MUCH FINANCIAL COMPENSATION WILL THE GOVERNMENT 
SEEK OR ACCEPT FOR US USE OF THE FACILITY? WHAT FEES 
(NATIONAL, LOCAL, OR PRIVATE) DO THEY PLAN ON IMPOSING FOR 
USE? 
 
The Tajiks appear more limited in the level of pressure for 
funds exhibited toward foreign military tenants.  The French 
military have stated they have little to no problems with the 
Tajiks in renegotiating their basing agreements.  The French 
currently conduct C-160 operations out of Dushanbe airport in 
support of the French contribution to ISAF.  However, the Tajiks 
will expect any significant military presence will bring with it 
significant infrastructure upgrades and additions.  Post 
believes basing in Tajikistan would likely include compensation 
packages more amenable to the United States than currently 
underway elsewhere in Central Asia.  The Tajiks would also 
welcome the employment and local procurement opportunities a 
base would represent. 
 
¶8.  (S)  E.  WHAT NON-FINANCIAL COMPENSATION OR QUID PRO QUO 
(SUCH AS POLICY CONCESSIONS) MIGHT THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXPECT 
IN RETURN FOR HOSTING U.S. BASES? 
 
Our MFA contact did not foresee any policy concessions, but he 
did say Tajikistan would have to balance all of the big powers 
in the region, hinting that it might be Russia that pressures 
Tajikistan to seek concessions from the United States.  In fact, 
we believe Russia would put enormous pressure on Tajikistan to 
ban basing or at least make the cost exorbitant. 
 
¶9.  (S)  F.  WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPAL DEMANDS THE COUNTRY WILL 
EXPECT TO BE FILLED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
A US FACILITY?  MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC? 
 
The government of Tajikistan will generally see a basing 
negotiation as an opportunity to raise Tajikistan's regional 
political importance, while adding to its economic potential. 
Increased military to military contacts, exchanges and programs 
would inevitably follow. 
 
¶10.  (S)  G.  DOES THE HOST COUNTRY SEEK A WRITTEN SECURITY 
COMMITMENT AS PART OF AN AGREEMENT FOR A US FACILITY? 
 
Previous agreements, with the French for example, have been 
negotiated and then codified by an exchange of diplomatic notes, 
rather than an instrument needing ratification by the 
Parliament.  In the case of a more complicated agreement, 
Parliamentary ratification could be needed, according to the 
MFA. The U.S. already has a basic SOFA with Tajikistan from the 
currently suspected OEF refueling operation. 
 
¶11.  (S)  H.  WHAT CONDITIONS DOES THE GOVERNMENT SEEK TO IMPOSE 
FOR THE FACILITY? WILL THE US HAVE EXCLUSIVE USE? DO THEY 
INTEND TO RESTRICT US DEPLOYMENTS FROM THE FACILITY OR 
COUNTRY?  WILL DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES BE SUBJECT TO 
GOVERNMENT OR PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL? 
 
Exclusive use would be subject to negotiation, but would likely 
be achievable. 
 
¶12.  (S)  I.  HOW WILL THE HOST COUNTRY PROPOSE TO PROVIDE 
SECURITY FOR THE FACILITY? 
 
Our MFA contact said that Tajikistan does have secure 
facilities, but any facility used by the United States would 
have to be improved.  Tajikistan would expect major funding to 
come from the United States for security upgrades. 
 
¶13.  (S)  J.  WHAT OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE HOST-NATION GOVERNMENT 
(FOR EXAMPLE PARLIAMENT OR SECURITY COUNCIL) WILL PLAY A ROLE 
IN OR INFLUENCE NEGOTIATIONS OR POTENTIAL US DEPLOYMENTS? 
 
The Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Security, Defense, and the 
Committee on Border Affairs would all play a role in 
decision-making and clearance of any U.S. proposal.  The 
President's office would have the final decision. 
 
 
¶14.  (S)  K.  WHAT IS PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING HAVING A US 
FACILITY IN COUNTRY?  WHAT ARE THE PUBLIC'S EXPECTATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, OR MILITARY BENEFITS FROM A US PRESENCE? 
 DOES PUBLIC OPINION DIFFER AMONG VARIOUS GROUPS (I.E., 
REGIONAL, ETHNIC, AGE, PROFESSIONAL)? WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY 
INSIGHTS POSTS MIGHT OFFER TO THE REASON FOR THESE 
DIFFERENCES. 
 
Our MFA contact did not see much public opposition, and opined 
that any dissent could be ameliorated by having hearings in 
Parliament, which he was confident would ultimately endorse U.S. 
 
basing. 
 
¶15.  (S)  L.  ARE THERE ANY VIABLE OPPOSITION GROUPS THAT COULD 
BE 
EXPECTED TO CAPITALIZE ON A US PRESENCE AS LEVERAGE AGAINST 
THE CURRENT HOST GOVERNMENT? WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES 
FOR THIS OPPOSITION? 
 
There are no well organized opposition groups that would oppose 
basing if the benefit to Tajikistan's national security and 
economic interests are made clear.  There would be a serious 
calculation made about the damage caused to Tajik-Russian 
relations, and that could be the most serious political and 
economic question. 
 
 
¶16.  (S)  M.  HOW CONCERNED IS THE HOST COUNTRY OVER SUCH 
OPPOSITION? IS THERE ANY CONCERN THAT A US PRESENCE COULD 
PRECIPITATE VIOLENCE OR TERRORISM? 
 
Tajikistan is a stable country that is not easily fazed by 
events connected with the war on terror.  Very unlikely a U.S. 
presence would precipitate violence. 
 
 
¶17.  (S)  N.  ANALYSTS WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN ANY 
INFORMATION 
OR INSIGHTS POSTS HAVE INTO THE INFLUENCE OF THIRD COUNTRIES 
OR INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS ON THIS ISSUE.  SPECIFICALLY: 
 
 
1)  WHAT MEASURES ARE BEING TAKEN BY THIRD PARTIES 
(SUCH AS RUSSIA, CHINA, IRAN OR THE EU) TO SUPPORT OR 
DISSUADE THE HOST GOVERNMENT FROM AGREEING TO HAVE US 
FACILITIES IN THE COUNTRY?  ARE INTERNATIONAL MEMBERSHIPS 
(SUCH AS THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION, COLLECTIVE 
TREATY SECURITY ORGANIZATION, AND BLACK SEA ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION) BEING USED AS LEVERAGE? 
 
Because there have been high-level visits to Tajikistan, 
including Secretaries Rice and Rumsfeld with no discussion of 
basing, neither Russia, China, nor Iran have conducted campaigns 
lobbying against a base.  It has not been an issue.  However, if 
negotiations were to become public and to take a long time, all 
three countries would likely wage an intense public and private 
battle to dissuade Tajikistan. 
 
2)  HOW SUSCEPTIBLE IS THE HOST COUNTRY TO THIRD PARTY 
INFLUENCE IN DECIDING WHETHER TO HOST A US FACILITY?  ON 
WHETHER TO ALLOW USE OF THE FACILITY FOR DEPLOYMENTS? 
 
Tajikistan's President is confident of his ability to balance 
the major powers.  He would no doubt come to an independent 
decision, but we can not predict the inducements or pressures 
Russia and China would bring to bear. 
 
3)  HOW WOULD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A US FACILITY IN 
COUNTRY AFFECT ITS RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES? 
 
A U.S. presence is problematic for Uzbekistan only, of the 
countries in Central Asia.  There is little to lose in 
Tajik-Uzbek relations.  Russia could make Tajikistan "pay" by 
restricting the flow of Tajik migrants to Russia and reducing 
Russia's economic investments in Tajikistan.  Our MFA contact 
had an interesting anecdote.  When Pakistan confronted the 
Tajiks with news that India was building a base in Tajikistan 
and said that the base meant Tajikistan "was against Pakistan," 
the Tajiks quickly countered that they had another military base 
that the Pakistanis were welcome to upgrade.  The Tajiks have 
heard no further complaints from Pakistan. 
 
¶18.  (S)  The Tajiks would be anxious to understand how 
beneficial a base would be in creating jobs, new businesses, and 
infrastructure for the country.  There is no clear understanding 
now, according to our MFA contact, of the ramifications of a 
United States base. 
HOAGLAND 
 
 
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