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P R 211345Z DEC 05
FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7414
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0293
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1154
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBAI 006335 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL TC IR IS PGOV
SUBJECT: RAK CROWN PRINCE COMMENTS ON IRAN'S AHMADINEJAD 
 
REF: DUBAI 5316 
 
DUBAI 00006335  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L. Davis, Consul General, Dubai, UAE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In a December 15 meeting with CG, Ras 
Al-Khaimah Crown Prince Saud Al Qassimi offered his views of 
Iran's new president, views including elements of both scorn and 
admiration.  Saud sees Ahmadinejad's recent anti-Israel comments 
as an effort to build his own street credibility at home and in 
the region, by asserting himself as the only regional leader 
willing to say aloud what others only think.  Saud related 
claims we have heard elsewhere about an Ahmadinejad 
anti-corruption drive, including a willingness to give contracts 
to foreign companies if they are more capable than Iranian 
firms.  Saud related a story about a prominent Iranian who had 
refused to align himself with the new president, out of concern 
Ahmadinejad was not up to the task.  Some of what Saud said 
tracks with what others are saying, though he seemed more upbeat 
on Ahmadinejad's prospects for political longevity than many 
Iranians we have spoken to. End Summary. 
 
Speaking Out 
------------ 
 
¶2. (C) In a December 15 meeting with Consul General, Ras 
Al-Khaimah (RAK) Crown Prince Saud Al Qassimi offered his views 
on Iranian President Ahmadinejad's recent comments about 
establishing a Jewish state in Germany, Europe or (as reported 
in local newspaper headlines here December 15) Alaska.  Sheikh 
Saud said comments like these were not aimed at the West, but at 
"us -- the people and the leaders in the region."  Such comments 
resonated with people in the region, who admired Ahmadinejad for 
saying "what many are thinking but no one else is willing to say 
out loud," Saud claimed. 
 
¶3. (C) While tacitly agreeing that Ahmadinejad was surely an 
embarrassment to many Iranians, especially those in the regime, 
Saud discounted reports that the president was on the verge of 
being removed from power. "It's true that he puts Khamenei in an 
awkward position because he (Ahmadinejad) is more pious and 
fervent in his religious beliefs than the Supreme leader 
himself," Saud allowed, "but Khamenei believes that Rafsanjani 
is the only alternative, and is determined to keep him out of 
power," so Ahmadinejad's position was secure.  Saud said with 
some incredulity that Ahmadinejad's belief in the imminent 
return of Imam Mehdi was so strong that "he has just allotted 75 
million dollars to widen and improve the road from Qom to 
Tehran" to facilitate the 12th century imam's travel.  According 
to Saud, Ahmadinejad's belief in the imam's imminent return was 
rooted in an incident "four or five years ago in Azerbaijan," 
where Ahmadinejad had been working in relative obscurity.  A 
devoutly religious contact there had revealed to him that "you 
are the future of Iran, and Imam Mehdi will return in your 
time."  Initially skeptical of this prophecy, Ahmadinejad had 
become a believer after unexpectedly becoming first mayor of 
Tehran and then President of Iran, Saud claimed (he did not 
state the source of this information.) 
 
Squeaky Clean? 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Saud said that Ahmadinejad's avoidance of all the 
trappings of power, and his squeaky clean administrative style, 
were raising many eyebrows.  Bashar Al-Assad of Syria had been 
"shocked" when Ahmedinejad received him "in the street" and then 
took him to a modest office.  Senior officials at the Ministry 
of Mining, meanwhile, had prepared for an Ahmadinejad visit "in 
the usual fashion," by coming up with potential mining projects 
that the president might consider awarding to his cronies; 
Ahmadinejad "surprised them all" by rejecting such ideas and 
saying "from now on, no projects will be rewarded based on 
favoritism; instead they will be awarded to the company that is 
best equipped to carry them out -- you must go out and recruit 
foreign companies with the best expertise to exploit these 
resources for the good of the country." (Comment: Saud 
attributed the Ministry of Mining anecdote to a senior ministry 
official who had been a "close friend for many years."  While 
Saud maintains many other contacts in Iran, it is likely that 
this same friend was the source of some of the other material 
mentioned here. End Comment.) 
 
¶5. (C) Saud reported that at least one prominent Iranian 
political figure (NFI) had refused the Supreme Leader's request 
that he take up a senior position in the Ahmadinejad 
administration.  After letting it be known that he considered 
Ahmadinejad an amateur and a novice with whom he did not wish to 
be associated, this official was instead given a different task 
by Khamenei:  "taking care of all of former President Khatami's 
 
DUBAI 00006335  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
ministers" by finding bonyad positions for them. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶6. (C) Some of what Saud said corresponds to what we have heard 
from other contacts.  For instance, we have many other accounts 
of people turning down opportunities to work in the new 
government because they did not want to associate themselves 
with Ahmadinejad.  Saud clearly puts credence in the stories of 
Ahmadinejad's conviction that the return of the twelfth Imam is 
imminent; some of our Iranian interlocutors share that 
assessment, while others argue that Ahmadinejad is only using 
religious rhetoric in order to curry favor with clerics.  We 
have heard anecdotal evidence that the Arab street may indeed be 
responding to Ahmadinejad's anti-Israel comments: a close 
Iranian contact of Conoff recently claimed that during an NGO 
conference she attended in Tunis she was approached by a number 
of Arab delegates who congratulated her on Ahmadinejad's 
election, applauding his religious piety, and his statements in 
support of the Palestinians.  In contrast to Saud, most Iranians 
we have spoken to believe that one way or another, Ahmadinejad 
will be sidelined within the next three to six months if he does 
not do a better job proving himself up to the task. 
DAVIS