This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 002037 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR ISN/CB JAY HANLINE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2015 
TAGS: PARM PREL MARR KTIA QA
SUBJECT: QATAR: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION CHALLENGE 
INSPECTIONS AGREEMENT OUTLOOK 
 
REF: STATE 191328 
 
Classified By: CDA Scott McGehee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. Qatari authorities balked at meeting a CWC 
Challenge Inspections negotiating team from Washington on 
December 15 because, in post's view, senior decision-makers 
had not been prepared by subordinates on the substance of the 
meeting. Officials also had not obtained sufficient 
decision-making authority through their inter-agency process. 
Post will revisit the issue with the MFA and, using points 
provided by the interagency team from Washington, will 
encourage the GOQ to move toward a CWC challenge inspection 
agreement. End Summary. 
 
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A Slow Start 
------------ 
 
¶2. (C) From October 2004 through October 2005, the Qatari MFA 
was unresponsive to requests to discuss challenge 
inspections. In November 2005, the MFA told P/E Chief that a 
committee led by a brigadier general had been established to 
look at the issue. POC on the committee, Hassan Saleh, 
arranged for the interagency team, including Dr. David 
Cooper, Col. Richard Smart, Dr. Deborah Ozga, and ISN/CB Jay 
Hanline, to meet the committee on December 15. P/E Chief 
provided (again) copies of the draft MOU, discussed the 
purpose of the visit, and requested that MFA legal affairs 
director be at the meeting. 
 
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Qataris Balk at Last Minute 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) On December 11, Saleh confirmed the meeting with 
control officer. The Qatari principal would be (as previously 
discussed) Brig. Nasser al-Sulaity. The following day, Saleh 
asked for a formal letter requesting a meeting with Brig. 
al-Sulaity, which the Embassy provided. On December 14, the 
day before the scheduled visit, Saleh said the meeting would 
now be with Brig. al-Jumaan, and another letter was needed. 
Controloff faxed the letter to the number provided by Saleh. 
On the 15th, Saleh said the letter had not been received. 
Controloff worked with DATT to get another copy delivered. 
After delivery of the letter, Brig. Jumaan told controloff 
that this was the first he had heard about the meeting. 
Although the visiting team offered to reschedule for the 
following day, Brig. Jumaan declined, saying the matter 
needed to be worked through the MFA. 
 
-------------------- 
The Internal Dynamic 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Post's analysis is that, first, the MFA was not eager 
to work the CWC MOU issue. With the departure of a senior 
official with the bilateral pol/mil portfolio in September, 
there is no official at the MFA with sufficient expertise or 
seniority to bridge military and foreign affairs issues. 
(Note. The MFA, like other Qatari government agencies, is 
thinly staffed with capable people and easily becomes 
overwhelmed with work.) Second, it seems that the Chemical 
Weapons Committee had been prepared to welcome the American 
delegation but questions of "turf" arose from officers in 
charge of the bilateral military relationship. Thus the 
substitution of Brig. Jumaan for Brig. al-Sulaity at the last 
minute. Third, it is likely that Brig. Jumaan, who is 
familiar with handling external issues, understood the need 
for an MFA green light, and thus decided to scuttle the 
meeting. 
 
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Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶5. (C) Embassy Doha will to re-engage with the MFA to 
identify the appropriate interlocutor and encourage the GOQ 
to move forward on the issue. Post will make use of talking 
points previously provided but welcomes addtional input, 
especially to explain, in simple terms, why an MOU is in 
Qatar's best interest. 
MCGEHEE