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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5951
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 006342 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KMPI PREL SY
SUBJECT: MAPPING SYRIAN CIVIL SOCIETY:  A WILDERNESS OF 
CONFLICTING INTERESTS AND SARG PRESSURES 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Developments in Syria over the past 18 
months have focused fresh attention on the need for USG 
support for democratization and efforts to strengthen civil 
society in Syria.  As Post begins mapping out the different 
players in civil society and the opposition for use in 
identifying future interlocutors and programs to support, we 
believe it is important to raise some of the challenges that 
will face us in our dealings with Syrian civil society. 
These include intense, ongoing SARG intimidation and 
surveillance; ideological cleavages, especially between 
secularists and Islamic groups; divisions over whether to 
accept USG support and concerns with losing credibility if 
viewed as too close to the U.S.; personal jealousies and 
top-down management culture, as well as divisions between 
civil society and the political opposition in Syria.  Given 
these factors, Post advocates an enhanced USG program of 
assistance to Syrian civil society that would emphasize 
sustained public expressions of support for fundamental 
political and economic reform, even as we identify new groups 
or individuals who could benefit from ramped up funding for 
existing programs.  Post would also like to see a more 
ambitious use of regional projects with neighboring Arab 
countries.  Embassy Damascus looks forward to the input and 
insights that Senior Advisor Denehy will provide as he begins 
his meetings with local activists.  Post's suggested mapping 
exercise will be forwarded by email to relevant parties.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) In recent months, as dissatisfaction with the SARG's 
repression of basic civil rights has grown,  Post has 
intensified efforts to identify key civil society and 
opposition players who are likely to play a role in 
democratization efforts in Syria.  Part of that experience 
has made it clear that there are real problems to be 
confronted in any effort to increase our outreach to Syrian 
civil society dramatically, or in proposing more ambitious 
collaborative efforts among groups in civil society. 
 
¶3.  (C) SARG CONTROL OVER CIVIL SOCIETY:  As our reporting 
has indicated over the past two years, civil society in Syria 
is very weak, suffering from years of systematic repression 
by the SARG and its security services.  The government 
closely controls which fledgling organizations are granted 
licenses to organize.  Only organizations that toe the party 
line are allowed any sort of political role or voice.  Others 
who aspire to such a role are refused licenses.  The 
government more routinely licenses organizations that stick 
to anodyne activities divorced from anything distinctly 
political (with the SARG using a very broad definition about 
what constitutes political activity).  There is, for example, 
an active NGO focused on the environment that has unofficial 
SARG blessing.  (Note:  The NGO's president consciously chose 
an environmental mission as a way to develop civic activism, 
knowing the subject matter would not /not alarm the SARG. 
End Note.)  A few SARG-licensed NGO's, like FIRDOS, which 
focuses on micro-enterprise, are blessed with the official 
patronage of First Lady Asma Asad.  The number of independent 
NGO's and civil society players with  the capacity -- putting 
aside for the moment the issue of willingness -- to develop 
new projects that the USG could fund is very limited. 
 
¶4.  (C) ASKING FOR PERMISSION TO ORGANIZE:  There is a 
two-track system for controlling the licensing of new NGO's, 
one controlled by the Ministry of  Labor and Social Affairs, 
which has nominal control over the licensing of NGO's, and 
the other controlled by the security services.  Both 
Political Security Directorate (PSD) and General Intelligence 
Directorate (GID), as well as Syrian Military Intelligence 
(SMI) seem to exercise overlapping, sometimes unpredictably 
enforced authority over civil-society activities.  When the 
activities of XXXXXXXXXXXX, the head of XXXXXXXXXXXX, 
for example, became an irritant to the SARG, he was called in 
on several occasions and interrogated by SMI head Asif 
Shawkat himself.  (Note:  XXXXXXXXXXXX subsequently left Syria 
and is now in the U.S., trying to run his organization 
long-distance.) 
 
¶5.  (C) THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT:  Those activists who dare to 
organize and pursue activities without SARG authorization are 
acting illegally.  Under the Emergency Law, in force since 
1963, any legal right to assembly is suspended.  Some 
gatherings are tolerated by the government, for a variety of 
complicated reasons (not seen as overly threatening; 
identified as valuable window-dressing for a repressive 
regime; or possessing some level of  behind-the-scenes 
 
"shelter" from a senior figure in the regime, often from one 
of the security services). Some civil society activists get 
around the strict laws by identifying themselves as a 
publishing house, for which more malleable rules  apply, 
rather than as an NGO (e.g. XXXXXXXXXXXX, run by XXXXXXXXXXXX).  Others, like women's activist XXXXXXXXXXXX, try to 
stay beneath the radar screen, by restricting meetings to 
very small groups and holding them in private homes. 
 
¶6.  (C) There are also laws restricting NGO's from receiving 
funds from foreign government sources.  While organizations 
use a variety of financial subterfuges, and the SARG 
sometimes looks the other way, the government can at any 
moment use these laws, or threaten to use them, to shut down 
an organization or intimidate its supporters  Sometimes the 
mere suggestion from "a friend" of the regime that the 
current environment is not right for a USG-sponsored project 
is enough to frighten already-cowed NGO leaders into 
returning USG funds.  This  happened recently when acting 
XXXXXXXXXXXX head XXXXXXXXXXXX notified PD that he would 
be returning nearly USD 20,000 in unused MEPI funding after 
being told by SARG proxies that the project -- XXXXXXXXXXXX -- was 
ill-timed and unacceptable with respect to content.  XXXXXXXXXXXX, another recipient of a MEPI grant, decided not to 
proceed with the parts of his project relating to the 
publication of essays and exhibition of photographs, after 
the SARG interfered to heavily censor content.  The source of 
the funding was not raised, but this may have been an 
additional irritant to the SARG. 
 
¶7.  (C) INTERNALIZING THE REPRESSION:  Because of the level 
of SARG suppression and surveillance, there is tremendous 
suspicion and paranoia among civil society activists about 
the independence of others in the movement.  Activists fear 
being reported by colleagues to the security services, which 
can threaten imprisonment or closure of their organizations. 
These internalized fears also keep civil society weak and 
fractured. 
 
¶8.  (C) SECULARISTS VERSUS ISLAMIC GROUPS:  Among civil 
society activists and NGO's, there are profound ideological 
cleavages, for example between Islamists and secularists. 
(There are other more arcane ideological disagreements, some 
factional in nature, for example, between different 
communists groups in Syria.)  Much of the driving force 
behind the modern development of civil society in Syria has 
come from the left, with many former communists and a range 
of other leftists -- nearly all of them very secular -- 
channeling their energies away from a direct focus on 
politics and towards building civil society.  The most 
glaring weakness in civil society on the left side of the 
equation is the lack of any significant grass roots support. 
(It is this recognition that drove many of the most 
perceptive leftists to guardedly embrace a re-tooled, 
moderate Muslim Brotherhood, over the past few years.) 
Because the SARG has long feared any secular alternatives to 
Ba'athism, it has generally demonstrated tremendous hostility 
to such groups. 
 
¶9.  (C) SARG SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIC GROUPS:  To counterbalance 
these secular groups (and to counter the influence of Islamic 
fundamentalists, both the traditional Muslim Brothers and the 
upstart Wahabi/Salafists), the Alawite-dominated regime has 
provided funding and encouragement for moderate Islamic 
institutions, many of them civil society organizations. 
These Sunni organizations include Salah Kuftaro's Abu Noor 
Institute (founded by his deceased father, the former Grand 
Mufti of Syria) and MP Mohammed Habash's Islamic Studies 
Center.  There are also civil society activists, either 
former Islamists, or those sympathetic to Islamist 
perspectives, like Haithem Maleh, one of the most important 
human rights activists in Syria. 
 
¶10.  (C) DAMASCUS DECLARATION A CEASE-FIRE DOCUMENT:  Between 
the secularists and the Islamic activists, there are powerful 
suspicions, resentments, and differences about approaches, 
priorities, and future political and social objectives.  In 
the middle are a key group of moderates -- those who brokered 
the Damascus Declaration in October -- who seek common cause 
so as to strengthen their efforts and ability to resist SARG 
repression.  While the Declaration is a powerful bridging 
device, whose influence will continue to play itself out, 
many of the differences between these two groups remain, and 
will complicate any effort to forge a civil society consensus 
in the future. 
 
¶11.  (C) A DIVIDE OVER USG SUPPORT:  A completely different, 
somewhat ragged, cleavage exists between those who endorse 
working with the U.S. and those who are suspicious of USG 
intentions and do not want to be associated with American 
policy or projects.  For every XXXXXXXXXXXX or XXXXXXXXXXXX , who harbor some reservations about U.S. policies 
but are generally well disposed to the U.S., there are others 
who are more hostile and deeply skeptical about any benefits 
that could accrue to Syrian civil society (and to a better 
future in Syria) from cooperating with the U.S.  Some of 
these, like XXXXXXXXXXXX, are much more pro-European. 
 
¶12.  (C) While some attribute the cold shoulder XXXXXXXXXXXX got 
from civil society and the opposition upon his return from 
the U.S. to the nationalist political climate that the regime 
stirred up in Syria post-UNSCR 1636, a lot of it resulted 
from this long-standing suspicion of U.S. intentions and 
skepticism about the benefits of cooperating with Washington. 
 Some activists like MP XXXXXXXXXXXX assert that there is 
no problem in accepting USG help, but the U.S. needs to work 
with the SARG in a transparent way in any effort to assist 
civil society.  Otherwise, such efforts will endanger civil 
society and will not work. 
 
¶13.  (C) RAGING JEALOUSIES; DYSFUNCTIONAL MANAGEMENT CULTURE: 
 Certainly, XXXXXXXXXXXX also provoked intense jealousies among 
rivals struggling for influence.  That reality, however, also 
highlights yet another divisive element in Syrian civil 
society.  Leaders of these organizations tend to be 
one-man-bands, whose powerful egos dominate weak 
organizations, and they do not "play well with others."  Many 
accused XXXXXXXXXXXX of opportunism in portraying himself -- they 
believe unfairly -- as a prime mover behind the Damascus 
Declaration.  Few demonstrated any ability to look beyond 
that arguable proposition and recognize that XXXXXXXXXXXX's 
powerful articulation of their cause with senior USG 
officials, based to some degree on fortuitous circumstances, 
could be beneficial.  Ethnic, sectarian, class, and family 
divides often exacerbate personal or organizational 
jealousies and make it more difficult to make common cause in 
Syria.  An institutional culture that emphasizes leadership 
and initiative only at the top of an organization, rather 
than network-building and delegation, also contributes to 
this weakness.  In addition, there is often an astonishing 
lack of networking or even familiarity among civil society 
leaders.  At Embassy social gatherings, influential figures 
sometimes meet each other for the first time. 
 
¶14.  (C) PARTIES OF ONE:  Many who are identified as active 
in civil society tend to be independent intellectuals like 
Michel Kilo or artists like film director Nabil Maleh, for 
example.  They have no followers, in an organizational sense, 
just readers or viewers.  (And they often clash in private 
and in print about their views.) 
 
¶15.  (C) CIVIL SOCIETY VERSUS THE OPPOSITION:  Finally, there 
is a divide of sorts between civil society and the political 
opposition in Syria.  Political activists like Hassan 
Abdul-Azim and Riyad Turk, who are leaders in a five-party 
opposition coalition (tolerated by the SARG), are directly 
involved in politics, while many civil society activists 
focus on more parochial activities.  There are lots of 
overlaps, of course, with many activists wearing different 
hats, either political, intellectual, or operational, and 
banding together to sign each others' petitions, or to 
promote common action.  Nonetheless, it is a mistake to lump 
together many of these people in any common USG approach to 
"civil society and the opposition," since they define their 
interests and perceive their roles in Syria very differently. 
 
 
¶16.  (C) Economic reformers are a distinct category, separate 
from other elements of civil society.  Though there are 
subcategories, most share the common characteristic of having 
been educated in the West and have work experience in Europe 
or the US.  All are advocates of some variety of a 
market-based economy and are uniformly critical of the pace 
and scope of economic reform in Syria.  The most influential 
subset collaborates actively with the SARG in developing new 
economic policy, but they do so as private citizens.  They 
believe that affecting economic change is best done from 
within the existing system, but keep a careful distance from 
a regime they view as corrupt.  They fear public 
collaboration with the SARG would discredit them internally. 
They are even more wary of being perceived as too close to 
the West in general and the US in particular.  This group 
would view attending any outside USG-sponsored activity or 
 
accepting any USG funds NGOs they are affiliated with as 
potentially seriously compromising their ability to advance 
reform.  Advocates of economic reform who work outside of the 
system have a much lower profile and smaller base of support. 
 This group would be most open to anything resulting from the 
mapping exercise but have far fewer levers to affect change. 
A final group of economic reformers have accepted formal 
positions within the SARG and have subsequently been 
compromised in the eyes of many Syrians. 
 
¶17.  (C) CONCLUSIONS:  The ideological fissures, the personal 
jealousies, and SARG repression have all contributed to the 
divided, weak state in which Syrian civil society finds 
itself.  An enhanced, sustained USG program of assistance to 
Syrian civil society would emphasize identifying groups or 
individuals who could benefit from ramped up funding for 
existing programs, as well as an aggressive, creative attempt 
to develop new USG programs, and identify promising NGO's and 
innovative strategies for delivering funding. 
 
¶18.  (C) There are already strong private interests in 
developing greater freedom for private-sector commercial 
concerns.  Programs to promote emerging and SARG-tolerated 
entrepreneurial activity may be more successful than 
supporting well-meaning civil society voices crying in the 
desert.  In addition to promoting a small publisher who 
doubles as a civil society proponent (like XXXXXXXXXXXX ), we 
might be able to identify a for-profit human resources 
development organization that could conduct training programs 
for civil society activists.  Any kind of training for civil 
society actors, including English language training, brings 
people together on a regular basis and develops critical 
skills.  Success will hinge on our ability to harness and 
influence individuals and groups with already existing 
concrete interests in a more open society and economy. 
 
¶19.  (C) Post would also like to see a more ambitious use of 
regional projects and training, where Syrian civil society 
players could interact with peers from neighboring Arab 
countries.  Sending individual Syrians, or small groups made 
up of carefully screened, compatible individuals to the U,S., 
for IV-type programs is also an option, although anything 
more high-profile in the U.S. at this point might prove 
problematic.  Embassy Damascus looks forward to the input and 
insights that Senior Advisor Denehy will provide as he begins 
his meetings with local activists. 
SECHE