VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #6325/01 3391452
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051452Z DEC 05
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5930
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0518
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 006325 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: A NERVOUS LULL IN DAMASCUS BEFORE THE NEXT MEHLIS 
REPORT 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary and Comment:  As five Syrian suspects arrive 
in Vienna for questioning set to begin on December 5, Syrians 
remain suspended in a nervous lull that ensued with President 
Bashar al-Asad's strident but generally well-received speech 
on November 10.  With the perceived brinkmanship with UNIIIC 
head Detlev Mehlis having yielded Vienna as a venue, rather 
than Beirut, the success for the moment in shielding SMI 
chief Asif Shawkat from questioning, the widely bruited 
assurances from the Russians, and the (by Syrian standards) 
near-spectacular unveiling of the recanting witness Husam 
Husam, the Asad regime is perceived to have some momentum 
going its way.  The highly nationalistic, marginally 
anti-American PR campaign centered in Damascus, emphasizing 
the need to protect Syrian dignity and interests, has 
reinforced public perceptions that the regime has at least 
temporarily regained the initiative. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary and Comment continued:  This lull, like the 
one that occurred in late September and early October, after 
the perceived SARG success in the interrogations in Damascus 
and before the issuance of Mehlis' hard-hitting report, is 
likely to end suddenly in mid-December.  Conversations with 
contacts December 2-3 indicate that many Syrians believe the 
regime has bought some time, possibly several months, with 
its latest maneuvers.  While the SARG is cooperating for the 
moment, many key contacts continue to insist that Asad, if 
required, will not -- some say "cannot" -- send Shawkat 
abroad for interrogation.  Even among the five currently 
slated to be interrogated, the SARG is apparently concerned 
about their loyalties and morale.  Contacts remain curious 
about USG intentions for Syria in the post-December 15 
environment, questioning in particular if the U.S. wants to 
see a Sunni-led regime replace Asad and his family.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶3.  (C) THE CURRENT LULL:   The Syrians have "bought" three 
to four months time, with their recent maneuverings, since 
Mehlis will likely need an extension post-December 15, 
according to Riyad Abrash.  He described the level of Syrian 
cooperation to date as "typical, begrudging, but effective." 
They continue to play for time, in the hope that they can 
outlast Bush's political influence, given his troubles in 
Washington. 
 
¶4.  (C) CAN BASHAR DEAL WITH HIS SHAWKAT PROBLEM?  Contacts 
remain divided about whether Asad is strong enough to move 
against SMI head Asif Shawkat.  Abrash, All4Syria website 
founder Ayman Abdul Noor, and former MP and businessman Ihsan 
Sankar all insisted to PolChief in early December that the 
President will refuse to send Shawkat abroad for questioning. 
Abrash pointed to personal characteristics signifying 
weakness to make his point, saying Bashar is hesitant, lacks 
political acumen, and loves the superficial trappings of 
power.  He remains loyal to powerful people around him, 
despite any personal reservations he harbors, but will not 
protect those who are without powerful allies, if the 
pressure against them become too great, said Abrash.  (Note: 
Abrash knows Asad from having briefed him periodically on his 
semi-official trips to Washington.  An economist, Abrash 
harbors some bitterness that Asad in 2001 did not offer him a 
promised Cabinet position, after opposition expressed by a 
senior official in one of the security services, thought to 
be Bahjat Sulayman.) 
 
¶5.  (C) Abdul Noor attributed the anticipated Asad refusal 
to send Shawkat for questioning to regime adherence to its 
real strategy, which is to opt for confrontation, although 
for the moment it is going through the motions of 
cooperating.  Sankar viewed Asad's inability to turn Shawkat 
over to Mehlis for questioning in Vienna as a function of 
family politics, where Shawkat's wife and mother-in-law 
(Asad's sister and mother) have pre-emptively attacked Bashar 
and warned him that "he will be next" if he does not protect 
Shawkat. 
 
¶6.  (C) THE OTHER WITNESSES:  Regarding the other witnesses, 
Sankar described Dafer Yusuf and Rustom Ghazaleh as 
potentially dangerous to the regime, because of the regime 
secrets they know about, and because their loyalty to the 
 
SIPDIS 
regime is now shaky.  (According to Sankar, Yusuf does not 
feel that the regime has showed him the respect he deserves.) 
Abdul Noor made a similar point, noting that the regime was 
concerned and had done everything possible to shore up the 
confidence of the suspects that the regime would protect them 
(and get them back to Syria after the interrogations). Both 
Sankar and Abdul Noor said that the regime would "lose the 
street and its support" if Mehlis offers persuasive proof of 
Syrian complicity and the regime then refuses to cooperate. 
Previous refrains asserting that Syria as a nation should not 
be sacrificed for the (often corrupt) interests of a 
half-dozen regime members are likely to be heard again, say 
these contacts. 
 
¶7.  (C) A SUNNI REGIME IN THE FUTURE?  Sankar and Abrash both 
probed on the issue of whether the U.S. wanted to see a 
Sunni-dominated regime eventually assume power.  While Abrash 
acknowledged that the USG had not made its intentions clear, 
he speculated that the U.S. would like to see such a regime 
in Syria, as a bulwark against ascendant Shiite influence in 
Iraq.  Abrash, like Sankar, from a prominent Damascene 
family, also noted that U.S. allies in the region (generally 
Sunni regimes) were also likely to be supportive.  In the 
past, western powers had generally supported regimes with 
"contrasting tones" in Iraq and Syria, for example an Alawite 
minority regime in Syria paired with a Sunni regime in Iraq, 
explained Abrash.  Without some kind of an external push, 
however, there would be no regime change in Syria, said 
Abrash, noting that the regime is in complete control. 
Sankar mused about whether it was time for him to begin 
reaching out to potentially disaffected, retired Alawite 
chieftains like Ali Duba, Ali Zeyout, Mohammed Khouli, and 
Ali Haydar, as well as to GID deputy chief Mohammed Nassif 
(whom Sankar says now has a travel ban imposed on him.) 
 
¶8.  (C) On a separate issue, Sankar offered a refreshingly 
supportive view on Kamal Labwani, saying that the views he 
expressed publicly during his trip to the U.S. had been "very 
good, very helpful" and echoed many of the things Sankar 
himself has said publicly in the past.  Sankar denied that 
Syrians who knew of Labwani had turned against him.  In fact, 
many agreed with Labwani but were fearful to say anything 
publicly.  Labwani has a political future in Syria, not as a 
solo actor, but as one of a group of nascent  opposition 
figures, said Sankar. 
 
 
 
SECHE