This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 002158 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2015 
TAGS: PTER PREL CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT ASKS CO-CHAIRS FOR ACTION AS VIOLENCE 
ESCALATES; TIGERS STIFF CO-CHAIR REPS 
 
REF: (A) COLOMBO 2149 (B) COLOMBO 2118 (C) COLOMBO 2112 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
SUBJECT: Government asks Co-Chairs for Action as 
Violence Escalates; Tigers Stiff Co-Chair Reps 
 
REF: (A) Colombo 2149 (B) Colombo 2118 (C) Colombo 
2112 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Co-Chair Chiefs of Missions 
(COM's) met with Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister on December 23 to de-brief on Brussels 
meeting.  In light of renewed Tiger attacks, GSL 
asked Co-Chair COM's to travel to Kilinocchi to 
deliver hard message to Tigers.  COM's (minus US 
Ambassador) delivered message on December 24, but 
Tigers showed little flexibility.  COM's also met 
Foreign Minister on December 26 as attacks 
continued; Foreign Minister pondered "What do we 
do now?" and asked for greater international 
community action to put pressure on Tigers.  US 
should take action on Tiger fundraising to send 
message to LTTE and strengthen Government's 
resolve to avoid being provoked.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Meeting Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Following Dec 19 Co-Chairs meeting in 
Brussels at which Co-Chairs decided to have 
Colombo COM's deliver strong private messages to 
all parties in conflict, COM's had requested 
meeting with Foreign Secretary.  Following Tiger 
attacks on Sri Lankan Nay vessels and claymore 
mine attacks, GSL asked Co-Chairs to meet with 
Foreign Minster Mangala Samaraweera and Prime 
Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake evening of Dec 
¶23.  Also attending were Sri Lankan Navy Chief, 
Defense Secretary Godabhaya Rajapaksa, Peace 
Secretariat Head John Gunaratne, and Foreign 
 
SIPDIS 
Ministry Additional Secretary Amunagama.  Co- 
Chairs were Ambassador Lunstead, EC Ambassador 
Julian Wilson, Norwegian Charge Oddvar Laegried, 
UK High Commissioner Steven Evans and Japanese 
Ambassador Akio Suda. 
 
More LTTE Attacks 
----------------- 
 
¶3. (C) PM Wickremanayake thanked the COM's for the 
Brussels statement, but said since then the 
situation had deteriorated with the attack on the 
naval vessels and then the claymore mine attack 
that day, which had killed 13 (ref a).  Extremist 
forces in the South could react, he said; perhaps 
that was the LTTE's intent.  The GSL had sent a 
letter that same morning to the LTTE reiterating 
that they were ready for talks on the ceasefire. 
The Government does not want war, but "we don't 
know what can be done."  Foreign Minister 
Samaraweera added that the GSL had first sent a 
message to the Tigers on December 13 stating that 
its first choice for talks on the Ceasefire 
Agreement (CFA) was Colombo, but it would be 
flexible and was willing to consider an Asian 
venue.  Every day our hand is getting weaker, he 
said.  The President is not a hawk, and has put a 
clear approach to peace in motion.  He persuaded 
others (JHU and JVP) to accept a continued Norway 
mediation role, and he is willing to accept 
ceasefire talks outside of Sri Lanka.  Now people 
are asking, who will prevent further escalation? 
The LTTE actions "seem a clear declaration of 
war." 
 
Co-Chairs to see LTTE? 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) EC Chief of Mission Julian Wilson replied 
that the Co-Chairs in Brussels had prepared a 
strong message to deliver to the Tigers.  The 
rationale for that message was now even stronger. 
Co-Chairs wanted the Government's approval for the 
Co-Chair COM's (minus the US) to go to Kilinocchi 
to take the message directly to the Tigers.  The 
FM said he thought this was a good idea, but they 
would have to consult the President.  He added 
that, if after the GSL's request to open talks and 
a Co-Chairs visit, "they say 'up yours,'" the 
Government will have no choice but to react. 
 
Government Response? 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Lunstead asked what the 
Government response might be.  Defense Secretary 
Godabhaya Rajapaksa said that the response would 
be entirely in cleared (ie, Government controlled) 
areas.  Since the attacks had been in cleared 
areas, it was evident that the Tigers were able to 
smuggle in arms and cadres.  The security forces 
would take actions to try to clamp down on these 
types of activities.  They could not allow these 
types of casualties to the soldiers to continue. 
(See septel DATT report on planned security forces 
actions.) 
 
¶6. (C) UK Hicomm Evans asked how the GSL intended 
to approach talks.  Samaraweera said that they 
wanted the first round to be on the ceasefire. 
Evans asked what the Government meant when it 
spoke of maximum devolution, and Samaraweera 
replied that they had a working group dealing with 
this issue now.  Of course they could not talk 
about it until the LTTE agreed to meet. 
Ambassador Lunstead added that the GSL might have 
noticed that the Brussels statement did not 
mention the Oslo Declaration or use the word 
"federalism"; this was not by chance.  It spoke of 
"maximum devolution" because we wanted to give the 
GSL the greatest flexibility to come up with a 
workable solution.  Samaraweera said they had 
noticed this and appreciated it. 
 
¶7. (C) At this point the meeting adjourned so that 
the Sri Lankan participants could go off to a 
National Security Council meeting with the 
President.  Later that evening, GSL and LTTE 
agreed to the Kilinocchi trip proposal, and date 
was set for the following day, Dec 24.  Foreign 
Minister also agreed he would try to meet Co- 
Chairs on December 26 after tsunami memorial event 
which they would all be attending. 
 
Tigers Rebuff Co-Chairs; It's the Peoples' Will 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8. (C) COM's (minus US) spent the day of Christmas 
Eve in Tigerland, meeting with LTTE political 
chief Tamilchelvan, then debriefed Peace 
Secretariat (SCOPP) head John Gunaratne that 
 
SIPDIS 
evening on their return.  They made same 
presentation to Foreign Minister morning of 
December 26 in Hikkaduwa after national tsunami 
commemorative event. Main points were: 
 
--COM's ran through the messages from Brussels in 
a tough and straightforward way.  They focused on 
the violence and the ceasefire talks. 
 
--The Tigers made several points. 
 
(1) The ceasefire was still in force and they were 
committed to it. 
(2) They were willing to have talks on the 
ceasefire, but the venue was a problem.  They 
insisted on Oslo. 
(3) They would "try" to curb the escalating 
violence, but it was a result of "the people's 
anger" at events such as the Army shooting at 
university students and the recent rape and murder 
of a Tamil woman, allegedly by Sri Lankan Navy 
personnel (ref b). 
¶9. (C) The COM's pressed very hard on the 
violence, but the most the Tigers would commit to 
was to "do whatever they could to restrain the 
people."  The COM's spent almost an hour 
discussing the venue issue; the Tigers said that 
the "feeling of the people" was against talks 
anywhere but Oslo.  They implied that they could 
accept a second round of talks in Tokyo if the 
first round were in Oslo. 
 
"Subtle" Messages 
----------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The atmosphere of the meeting was austere. 
Contrary to normal practice, the Tigers served no 
lunch, only peanuts.  When the COM's left the 
meeting, they had to detour to avoid a 
"spontaneous" demonstration accusing the Co-Chairs 
of not doing enough to prevent incidents like the 
rape/murder. 
 
Government in a Bind 
-------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Foreign Minister Samaraweera said that the 
Government was in a difficult situation.  In order 
to survive and govern, they needed the support of 
the hard-line JVP and JHU in Parliament.  They had 
convinced both parties to accept a continued 
Norwegian role and an Asian venue for talks.  If 
they gave in on Asia, they would not be able to 
manage the domestic scene.  The issue of venue was 
not substantively important, but the perception 
was crucial. 
 
¶12. (C) All participants agreed the crucial next 
step was to have the parties work on the 
ceasefire, and that to get agreement on this a 
visit by Norway's Eric Solheim was needed. 
Samaraweera had conveyed this to Solheim in a 
phone conversation the previous evening.  Solheim 
was insisting to the LTTE that if he came he must 
be able to see Prabhakaran.  The LTTE leader said 
that he could only meet Solheim if LTTE 
theoretician (and UK resident) Balasingham was 
present, and Balasingham did not want to come to 
Sri Lanka until Jan 23 -- almost a month off. 
Samaraweera said that he was trying to meet 
Solheim before then, perhaps on his way to or from 
Washington for his meeting with the Secretary on 
Jan 5. 
 
What are the "serious consequences"? 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) Samaraweera said that the "real hawks" 
within the Government were pushing for a military 
response to the Tigers.  The President was 
restraining them for now.  The Co-Chairs had told 
the Tigers of "serious consequences" if their 
behavior did not change.  What would those 
"serious consequences" be?  "Visible action by the 
international community" would strengthen the 
President and allow him to be restrained.  In 
particular, the EU might designate the LTTE as a 
terrorist organization, and all states could crack 
down on LTTE fundraising. 
 
¶14. (C) Foreign Minister left on December 27 for 
New Delhi accompanying President Rajapaksa on his 
first overseas visit as President.  He agreed to 
meet with Ambassador on Dec 31 to compare notes 
before he takes off on his trip to Washington. 
 
¶15. (C) COMMENT: Tiger behavior becomes more 
outrageous every day.  As this cable is being 
typed on Dec 27, word has come in of yet another 
claymore mine attack with significant casualties. 
The Tigers seem to trying to provoke the GSL into 
some type of military response which would almost 
certainly lead to the end of the ceasefire.  Their 
newfound excuse that "the people made us do it" 
is, of course, nonsense, but may be a part of a 
larger strategy to portray a "Tamil intifada" in 
the North and East.  Their actions are also a 
direct rebuke to the Co-Chairs and the 
international community.  Their unwillingness to 
see Solheim until another month has passed 
underlines their intransigence. 
 
¶16. COMMENT CONTINUED: In these circumstances, GSL 
restraint is extraordinary, and the GSL request 
for action by the international community to send 
a strong message to the Tigers--to show that there 
are indeed "serious consequences" for pursuing the 
path of war--is a reasonable one.  The EU should 
declare the Tigers a terrorist organization.  Of 
course, the US cannot make that happen.  What we 
could do, however, is to take action on Tiger 
fundraising.  We have raised this issue again in 
ref (c).  We continue to believe that even the 
word that the USG is investigating possible 
illegal contributions would have a significant 
effect in drying up Tiger funds.  It would also 
send a clear message to the Tigers, and strengthen 
the GSL in its so-far resolute adherence to the 
ceasefire agreement.  We expect Foreign Minister 
Samaraweera will raise this issue when he meets 
Secretary Rice on January 5. 
 
SIPDIS 
LUNSTEAD