This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 COLOMBO 002121 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR OIE DANIEL SINGER AND REBECCA S DALEY 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
S/ES-O/CMS - OFFICE OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT SUPPORT 
 
E.O 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMED AEMR AMGT ASEC CASC EAGR KFLO TBIO ECON CE
SUBJECT:  SRI LANKA: AVIAN FLU TRIPWIRES AND SHELTER-IN- 
PLACE PLANS 
 
REF: A) COLOMBO 1592, B) COLOMBO 1992, C) COLOMBO 1993, 
D) STATE 219189 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY:  THIS CABLE REPORTS OUR REVISED AVIAN 
INFLUENZA (AI OR H5N1) TRIPWIRES AND SHELTER-IN-PLACE 
PLANS REQUESTED IN REF D.  THIS CABLE SUPERSEDES REF C. 
 
¶2.  SRI LANKA LACKS SEVERAL CRITICAL RESOURCES - 
TAMIFLU, LABORATORY EQUIPMENT TO IDENTIFY AI, AND 
MODERN, FULLY EQUIPPED HOSPITALS.  IF AI COULD BE 
DIAGNOSED RAPIDLY AND IN A DEFINED AREA OF SRI LANKA, 
THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT (GSL) COULD OSTENSIBLY CONTAIN 
AI.  WORKING-LEVEL OFFICIALS ARE ACTIVELY DEVELOPING 
PLANS AND SEEKING RESOURCES.  YET AI IS NOT A HIGH 
PRIORITY WITHIN THE GSL.  DEVELOPMENT OF POLICIES AND 
STAFFING OF MINISTRIES FOLLOWING A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
AS WELL AS A TENUOUS CEASEFIRE, TAKE HIGHER GSL PRIORITY 
THAN AI PREPAREDNESS.  POST ANTICIPATES IT IS ABLE TO 
PROVIDE SHELTER IN PLACE FOR SEGREGATING PERSONNEL BY 
UTILIZING THE CHANCERY AND HOMES AS DETAILED IN THE 
TRIPWIRES.  DRAWDOWN MAY BEGIN IN TRIPWIRE 3 - WITH 
SUSTAINED HUMAN-TO-HUMAN TRANSMISSION OCCURRING IN 
COUNTRIES WITH REGULARLY SCHEDULED FLIGHTS TO SRI LANKA. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3.  US EMBASSY COLOMBO'S REVISED TRIPWIRES WERE PREPARED 
BY POST'S AVIAN INFLUENZA WORKING GROUP (AIWG) AND HAVE 
BEEN APPROVED BY THE CHIEF OF MISSION.  WE INVITE AND 
WELCOME FEEDBACK FROM RELEVANT OFFICES AND AGENCIES WITH 
EXPERTISE IN EMERGENCY PLANNING AND/OR INFLUENZA. 
 
¶4.  POST'S ADMINISTRATIVE COUNSELOR, FOREIGN SERVICE 
MEDICAL OFFICER, ECONOMIC OFFICER, CHIEF OF CONSULAR 
SECTION AND AID HEALTH AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM OFFICER ARE MEMBERS OF THE AIWG.   IN ADDITION 
TO CONSULTING WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND MULTILATERAL 
REPRESENTATIVES (REFS A AND B) AND PREPARING THESE 
TRIPWIRES, POST HAS DISTRIBUTED AN ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE 
TO ALL PERSONNEL REGARDING AI SYMPTOMS AND PREVENTIVE 
MEASURES.  THE CONSULAR SECTION HAS ALSO INCLUDED A LINK 
TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AVIAN FLU FACT SHEET WITHIN ITS 
MEDICAL INFORMATION PAGE FOUND AT: 
HTTP://SRILANKA.USEMBASSY.GOV/MEDICAL_INFORMA TION.HTML. 
THE AIWG WILL CONTINUE PLANNING FOR A POSSIBLE PANDEMIC, 
INCLUDING REFINEMENT OF PROGRAMS AVAILABLE TO EMBASSY 
PERSONNEL IN THE EVENT OF A PANDEMIC. 
 
¶5. THE FOLLOWING AMERICAN CITIZEN EMPLOYEES WILL BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR INPUTTING THE TRIPWIRE DATA:  ALEXIS 
SMITH, ELSA BRITT, AND CAROLINA RUDISEL. 
 
KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  THE AIWG HAS MADE THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS FOR 
PLANNING PURPOSES: 
 
- THE CURRENT THREAT TO PERSONS IN SRI LANKA, AND USG 
PERSONNEL IN PARTICULAR, IS LOW.  NO BIRD HAS YET BEEN 
DIAGNOSED WITH AI IN SRI LANKA.  THE CONTINGENT RISK IS 
THAT H5N1 BEGINS TO TRANSMIT ACTIVELY BETWEEN HUMANS. 
RISK WOULD BE MANAGEABLE IF HUMAN-TO-HUMAN TRANSMISSION 
OCCURRED ONLY IN CASES OF EXTENSIVE INTIMATE CONTACT. 
TRANSMISSION BY CASUAL HUMAN-TO-HUMAN CONTACT WOULD 
REQUIRE RAPID ACTION TO PROTECT OUR PERSONNEL. 
 
- THERE IS A LOW PROBABILITY THAT SRI LANKA WOULD BE AT 
THE CENTER OF ANY OUTBREAK OF HUMAN-TO-HUMAN AI 
INFECTION.  BUT IF CASUAL CONTACT WOULD RESULT IN AI 
INFECTION, SRI LANKA IS ONLY A SHORT AIRLINE FLIGHT AWAY 
FROM PROBABLE OUTBREAK CENTERS.  DUE TO THESE FACTORS, 
WE CHOSE TO DEFINE THREE SEPARATE TRIPWIRE LEVELS FOR 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ALL FALL WITHIN IN THE EXAMPLE 
TRIPWIRE 1 FOUND IN REF D. 
- SRI LANKA'S CAPITAL CITY, COLOMBO, IS ALSO ITS 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION HUB.  VIRTUALLY ALL 
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL BEGINS OR ENDS WITHIN 20 MILES OF 
COLOMBO'S CITY CENTER.  ANTICIPATING THAT HUMAN-TO-HUMAN 
AI WOULD MUTATE IN THE HIGH-RISK PARTS OF THE WORLD FOR 
AI AND ARRIVE THROUGH THESE TRANSIT CHANNELS, WE 
CONSIDER SUSTAINED HUMAN-TO-HUMAN TRANSMISSION IN ANY 
PART OF SRI LANKA AS EQUALLY THREATENING TO OUR 
PERSONNEL.  THEREFORE, WE DO NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN 
INFECTION WITHIN RURAL AREAS AND THE CAPITAL CITY AS 
FOUND IN SAMPLE TRIPWIRES 2 AND 3 OF REF D. 
 
- SRI LANKAN MEDICAL FACILITIES ARE ALREADY NEAR 
CAPACITY EVEN WITHOUT AN EPIDEMIC OF ANY SORT.  MEDICAL 
FACILITIES WILL BE UNABLE TO HANDLE A LIMITED NUMBER OF 
CASES.  THERE ARE NO ENTIRELY SUITABLE ISOLATION WARDS 
SHOULD H5N1 HUMAN-TO-HUMAN TRANSMISSION BECOME HIGHLY 
EFFICIENT. 
 
- DEPENDING ON THE SPEED OF A HUMAN-TO-HUMAN OUTBREAK, 
U.S. CITIZENS COULD BE QUICKLY CUT OFF FROM EVACUATION 
ROUTES. 
 
- POST WOULD BE UNABLE TO OBTAIN ESSENTIAL MEDICAL AND 
BASIC SUPPLIES IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS AND SHOULD 
STOCKPILE ADEQUATE PROVISIONS. 
 
CURRENT PREPARATORY ACTIONS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  IN ADDITION TO REGULAR MEETINGS OF THE AIWG AND 
SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS BY THE EAC, POST IS TAKING OR 
CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS IN PREPARATION FOR A 
POSSIBLE AI PANDEMIC: 
 
- BEGIN REGULAR COMMUNICATION WITH OVERSEAS SCHOOL OF 
COLOMBO AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS USED BY US 
FAMILIES AT THE EMBASSY ON THEIR AI PREPARATIONS AND 
PLANS. 
 
- PREPARE FOR POTENTIAL NEED FOR PERSONNEL TO WORK AT 
HOME AND COMMUNICATE WITH THEIR CONTACTS FROM SHELTER-IN- 
PLACE LOCATIONS. 
 
- THE COMMUNITY LIAISON OFFICER AND MEDICAL OFFICER WILL 
PREPARE A LIST OF BEST PRACTICES FOR EVACUATION - 
WHETHER FOR AN AI-RELATED EMERGENCY OR OTHER FOR 
PURPOSES. 
 
- DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN A LIST OF PERSONAL EMAIL 
ADDRESSES OF USG PERSONNEL IN CASE OF EMBASSY SHUTDOWN 
AND/OR NEED TO COMMUNICATE WITH PERSONNEL AT SHELTER-IN- 
PLACE LOCATIONS. 
 
- PREPARE LIST OF AI-SPECIFIC ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL AND 
PREPARE FOR POTENTIAL NEED TO LODGE SUCH PERSONNEL AT 
CHANCERY.  (NOTE:  DUE TO THE NATURE OF A HEALTH-RELATED 
EMERGENCY AND POSSIBLE SHELTERING OF ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL 
AT THE CHANCERY, THIS LIST WILL DIFFER FROM THE REGULAR 
LIST OF ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL.  END NOTE.) 
 
- DEVELOP SMS CAPABILITY FOR EMBASSY TO EFFICIENTLY 
COMMUNICATE WITH EMBASSY COMMUNITY AND AMERICAN 
CITIZENS. 
 
- TRAVEL ORDER PACKETS ARE ALREADY PREPARED SHOULD 
EVACUATION BE REQUIRED. 
 
 
TRIPWIRES AND RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 
--------------------------------- 
THE CHIEF OF MISSION HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING 
TRIPWIRES AND POSSIBLE ASSOCIATED ACTIONS: 
 
¶8.  TRIPWIRE ONE:  SIGNIFICANT OCCURRENCES OF AI 
TRANSMITTED FROM BIRDS OR OTHER ANIMALS TO OTHER BIRDS 
OR ANIMALS EMERGE IN SRI LANKA; NO EVIDENCE OF SUSTAINED 
TRANSMISSION TO HUMANS.  (Note:  "Significant 
occurrences" include transmission to a population of non- 
migratory birds or animals within a geographically 
limited area or transmission in more than one area of 
the country.  "Sustained transmission to humans" is the 
transmission of disease beyond the situation where a 
single infected person transmits to another single 
person with whom he/she is in extremely close physical 
contact, e.g., sick child to mother. End Note.) 
 
POSSIBLE ACTIONS: 
 
- EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed. 
 
- Restrict official and unofficial travel to affected 
areas, bird markets and similar facilities. 
 
- Reiterate current Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
recommendations to staff and post's food service 
regarding AI prevention: reinforce caution against 
consuming improperly cooked eggs or poultry meat as well 
as advise on proper handling of raw poultry products; 
advise people to avoid butcher or wet markets where 
poultry is prepared; consider issuing further 
recommendations regarding preparation or consumption of 
poultry. 
 
- In coordination with the Department, release a warning 
announcement to Mission personnel and a warden message 
to private US citizens and post the announcement on the 
website. 
 
- Hold a town hall meeting with the American community 
to discuss AI and other topics of interest. 
 
- Continue regular communication with Overseas School of 
Colombo and other international schools used by US 
families at the embassy on their AI preparations and 
plans. 
 
¶9.  TRIPWIRE TWO:  ANY CASE OF BIRD-TO-HUMAN OR ANIMAL- 
TO-HUMAN TRANSMISSION OF AI IN SRI LANKA 
 
POSSIBLE ACTIONS: 
 
- EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed. 
 
- Restrict travel to affected areas. 
 
- Release a warning announcement to Mission personnel, 
and in coordination with the Department, release a 
warden message to private US citizens; post the 
announcement on the website.  Information will include 
details of the episode, instructions on watching for 
signs and symptoms of avian influenza, triage criteria 
and the use of personal protective equipment. 
 
- Ensure that any public announcements or warnings 
issued relating to neighboring countries regarding AI 
are disseminated with American citizens in host country. 
("Neighboring countries" include both countries 
geographically near as well as those with direct flights 
to or from Sri Lanka.) 
 
- Begin stockpiling water and canned goods to prepare 
for possible need to quarantine individuals returning 
from areas where human-to-human transmission may occur 
(i.e., prepare for Tripwire 3). 
 
- Instruct Embassy community regarding the medical 
response and Emergency Action Committee (EAC) Plan. 
 
- Continue regular communication with Overseas School of 
Colombo and other international schools used by US 
families at the embassy on their AI preparations and 
plans. 
 
¶10.  TRIPWIRE THREE:  SUSTAINED HUMAN-TO-HUMAN 
TRANSMISSION OCCURS AS EVIDENCED BY A CLUSTER OF CASES 
IN COUNTRIES WITH REGULARLY SCHEDULED DIRECT FLIGHTS TO 
SRI LANKA (E.G., CHINA, INDIA, MALDIVES, THAILAND) 
 
POSSIBLE ACTIONS: 
 
- EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed. 
 
- EAC considers requesting authorized departure of U.S. 
family members and non-essential personnel, potentially 
recommending authorized departure of only individuals at 
high risk for AI. 
 
- Consider recalling all employees who are currently in 
remote areas 
 
- Personnel who have frequent contact with the public 
will use protective gear including masks, according to 
MED guidance. 
 
- Restrict travel to affected countries. 
 
- Do not grant country clearances to non-emergency TDY 
personnel from or transiting affected countries. 
 
- Conduct home visits to sick individuals who receive 
care under the Embassy health unit. 
 
- Quarantine USG and Foreign Service National (FSN) 
personnel who are returning to Sri Lanka from affected 
countries for two weeks or for the predetermined time of 
virus incubation. 
 
- Order mandatory sick leave with enforced quarantine at 
home for any employee who shows any flu-like symptoms or 
has a family member with flu-like symptoms. 
 
- In coordination with the Department, issue a public 
announcement to private American citizens. 
 
- In coordination with the Department, prepare press 
guidance. 
 
- Continue communication with Overseas School of Colombo 
and other international schools used by US families at 
the embassy on their AI policies. 
 
- Establish daily briefings on AI status/cases with 
Ministry of Health or WHO. 
 
- Close American Center Library to public access. 
 
¶11.  TRIPWIRE FOUR:  SUSTAINED HUMAN-TO-HUMAN 
TRANSMISSION IN SRI LANKA 
 
POSSIBLE ACTIONS: 
 
- EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed 
(perhaps by phone or email). 
- In consultation with CA, provide emergency consular 
services only. 
 
- Cancel incoming official travel, except for personnel 
involved in investigative/containment efforts, or as 
otherwise deemed necessary by COM. 
 
- EAC considers requesting authorized departure.  EAC 
discusses ordered departure (on the assumption that the 
airlines will take passengers from countries where human- 
to-human transmission has occurred). 
 
- Consider options for minimizing workplace exposure 
(e.g., teleconferencing). 
 
- Instruct all non-emergency American and LES staff at 
post to remain home on administrative leave.  Children 
shall remain home from school. 
 
- Order mandatory sick leave with enforced quarantine at 
home of any employee who shows any flu-like symptom or 
has a family member with flu-like symptoms. 
 
- Implement home quarantine of any staff or dependent 
who has been in contact with a person confirmed to have 
an AI infection and implement at home monitoring 
procedure. 
 
- Conduct home visits to sick individuals who receive 
care under the Embassy health unit. 
 
- Permit visitors embassy access for emergency purposes 
only. 
 
- Consider using designated space to isolate emergency 
personnel (those not on leave) to prevent risk of 
transmitting to families or to others who are on leave. 
 
- Divide Marine Security Guard detachment into two 
separate and independent entities to decrease the risk 
of the spread of the disease and ensure proper coverage 
of classified materials. 
 
- Consider delivery services of groceries and other 
essential items to residences. 
 
- Personnel who have frequent contact with the public 
will use protective gear including masks as directed by 
MED. 
 
- Cancel local community gatherings until confirming 
there are no immediate further occurrences of cases in 
Sri Lanka. 
 
- Advise closure of Overseas School of Colombo and other 
international schools used by US families at the 
embassy. 
 
- Those personnel who are required to be in direct 
contact with potentially infected persons will be 
considered as candidates for antiviral prophylaxis. 
 
- Release a warning announcement to Mission personnel, 
and in coordination with the Department, provide a 
warden message to private US citizens; post the 
information on the website.  Information will include 
details of the episode(s) and advice on means of 
prevention, as well as treatment options.  Urge American 
citizens to defer all non-emergency travel to Sri Lanka. 
 
- Depending on level of public inquiries, Embassy may 
staff and equip a situation room. 
 
- Consular officers establish a database tracking 
American citizens who have been quarantined, 
hospitalized, or ill at home. 
 
- In coordination with Department, prepare press 
guidance. 
 
 
¶12.  TRIPWIRE FIVE: ONE OR MORE EMBASSY OR IN-COUNTRY 
PERSONNEL SUSTAIN HUMAN-TO-HUMAN TRANSMISSION 
 
POSSIBLE ACTIONS: 
 
- EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed 
(perhaps by phone or email). 
 
- Order mandatory sick leave with enforced quarantine at 
home for affected personnel. 
 
- Initiate treatment of affected individuals with 
antivirals; medevac if possible. 
 
- Those personnel who are required to be in direct 
contact with potentially infected persons will be 
considered as candidates for antiviral prophylaxis. 
 
- Release a warning announcement to Mission personnel, 
and in coordination with the Department, provide a 
warden message to private US citizens; post the 
information on the website.  Information will include 
details of the episode(s) and advice on means of 
prevention. 
 
- In coordination with Department, prepare press 
guidance. 
 
- Continue all actions listed in Tripwire 4. 
 
¶13.  POST-TRIPWIRE DETERMINATIONS 
 
The AIWG will continue monitoring the situation and 
recommend to the EAC when particular threats are no 
longer substantial.  Advice from in-country contacts as 
well as medical and agricultural contacts worldwide will 
be used in forming such recommendations. 
 
ENTWISTLE