This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 002096 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS, USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV CE LTTE
SUBJECT: CO-CHAIRS SHOULD FOCUS ON PRIVATE MESSAGES TO 
PARTIES 
 
REF: COLOMBO 2088 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
 ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Co-Chairs Chiefs of Mission (COM's) and 
visiting EC DDG Jouanjean agreed Dec 19 Co-Chairs meeting in 
Brussels should focus on role of Co-Chairs in changed peace 
process environment in Sri Lanka.  All agreed Co-Chairs 
should develop messages to be passed privately to both GSL 
and LTTE, in addition to standard public statement.  Our 
suggestions for elements of such messages follow.  Norwegian 
and Sri Lankan Foreign Ministers may meet at WTO meeting in 
Hong Kong.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (C) Co-Chairs Chiefs of Mission (US Ambassador, Norwegian 
Ambassador Brattskar, EC Ambassador Wilson, Japanese 
Ambassador Suda, UK Deputy High Commissioner Craig) met with 
EC Deputy Director General for External Relations Herve 
Jouanjean Dec 13.  Jouanjean had been sent to Sri Lanka by EC 
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner to help prepare ground for Dec 
19 Co-Chairs meeting in Brussels. 
 
¶3.  (C) Jouanjean, who was just beginning his visit to Sri 
Lanka, said that there were "negative signals but signs of 
hope," and that despite the troublesome rhetoric there were 
possibilities for progress.  Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar 
said that this was the most difficult spot since Norway began 
as facilitator, and that Norway needed clarity from both 
parties on the substance and the framework of the peace 
process.  Norway was ready for a visit by Eric Solheim, but 
the GSL was not yet ready to see him.  However, he added, it 
was possible that Solheim and Foreign Minister Samaraweera 
could meet during the WTO meeting in Hong Kong this week. He 
said that Norway was now the only outside party talking to 
the LTTE, and that this was a disadvantage.  (Japanese 
Special Envoy Akashi had not visited Kilinocchi during his 
Sri Lanka visit last week at the express request of the GSL.) 
 
¶4.  (C) Ambassador Lunstead, using points from para 11 of 
reftel, said that we believed the Co-Chairs were meeting in a 
drastically changed environment and should discuss how they 
could play a useful role in this new atmosphere.  He said 
that there had been too much emphasis in the past on the 
public statement issued at the end of each Co-Chairs meeting. 
 The group then agreed that strong messages needed to be 
passed to both parties on the Co-Chairs expectations and that 
this could best be done in private discussions, not through 
the public statement, which should be short and pointed. 
Consensus was reached that it would be useful if Co-Chairs 
officials in Brussels could agree on messages to be passed to 
GSL and LTTE--presumably through Co-Chairs COM's in Colombo. 
COM's (presumably minus US Ambassador) would travel to 
Kilinocchi to deliver the message to the Tigers.  This would 
allow much more direct messages to both sides, and make clear 
Co-Chairs' expectations as well as recommendations. 
 
¶5.  (C) COMMENT: We recommend most strongly that US at the 
upcoming Co-Chairs meeting support the proposal for a new 
emphasis on engaging privately with the two parties.  While a 
public statement is useful and should still be issued, its 
utility is circumscribed by its very public nature. States 
(and non-state entities) normally conduct their diplomatic 
business through direct and private discussions. Co-Chairs 
need to find a useful role beyond issuing nagging public 
statements.  We believe the type of frank discussion which is 
needed with both the GSL and the LTTE should be held 
privately.  END COMMENT 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) We recommend the following points for Co-Chairs 
messages to GSL and LTTE: 
 
For the GSL: 
 
--We support President Rajapaksa's commitment to achieving a 
peaceful and equitable resolution; 
--While it is up to Sri Lankans to devise this resolution, we 
agree with you that it must include substantial devolution of 
power within a united Sri Lanka, whether or not this is 
called "federalism; 
 
--It must also address the numerous legitimate and 
long-standing grievances of the Tamil community; 
 
--We urge the GSL to consider what confidence building 
measures it might offer in the near term; 
 
--An example could be some lessening of restrictions on the 
High Security Zones, if conditions permit; 
 
--We welcome the GSL's commitment to provide post-tsunami and 
other reconstruction/rehabilitation aid to LTTE-controlled 
territory; 
 
--It is not realistic to think that this can be done without 
providing the LTTE some political and/or decision-making 
role; 
 
-- The Tigers are responsible for the overwhelming majority 
of ceasefire violations, and we have criticized them for 
this.  But both sides are contributing to an increasingly 
untenable security situation; 
 
--The GSL is responsible for maintaining law and order in the 
territory it controls; 
 
--The GSL must crack down on the operations of the Karuna 
faction and other anti-LTTE paramilitaries; 
 
--We welcome the continuation of Norway in its difficult role 
as facilitator; 
 
--Scapegoating Norway for the failures of the parties to 
advance the peace process must cease.  Similarly, the SLMM 
cannot take actions which are not within its mandate agreed 
to by both parties.  The Government needs to make clear that 
it supports Norway and the SLMM. 
 
For the LTTE: 
 
--We want to see a peaceful resolution to this conflict, and 
we recognize that the Tamil community has many long-standing 
grievances that deserve an equitable remedy; 
 
--You and the GSL are the only ones who can come up with this 
resolution, but you have to engage with one another to do so; 
 
--We can't prescribe a formula for the resolution, but it 
will have to involve substantial devolution of powers-whether 
or not it is called federalism-within a united Sri Lanka; 
 
--We do not and will not support the division of Sri Lanka; 
 
--We are increasingly concerned at the deterioration of the 
Ceasefire Agreement; 
 
--Both sides are guilty of violations, but you commit the 
overwhelming majority.  In particular your targeted killings 
with Claymore mines of soldiers and policemen in Jaffna have 
been disgraceful; 
 
--Among those violations is your continued recruitment of 
children, which contravenes the agreement you signed with 
UNICEF; 
 
--You need to engage now with the GSL in a practical 
discussion on how to strengthen the ceasefire; 
 
--Besides discussion, you must also change your behavior; 
 
--That means ending the use of terror; 
 
--If you don't do that soon, co-chair member nations and 
others may consider a range of remedial measures (sanctions, 
asset freezes, visa bans, crackdowns on expatriate 
fundraising, terrorist designations). 
 
--If your behavior does change, you have the opportunity for 
enhanced engagement with the international community and a 
recognition of your legitimate political role. 
 
 
¶7.  (C) On logistics of meeting, Jouanjean said that there 
would be a working level-meeting from 10-12 on December 19 to 
discuss the proposed statement.  (If there are to be private 
messages, they could be discussed here also.) The high-level 
meeting would run from 12-1630.  The Indians have been 
invited to attend the lunch portion of that session, and have 
accepted in principle.  Jouanjean made no mention of an 
international conference on Sri Lanka, an idea we understand 
the EU has mooted in Washington. 
 
 
LUNSTEAD