This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 002088 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  SCENESETTER FOR DECEMBER 19 CO-CHAIRS 
MEETING 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 2058 
 
     ¶B. COLOMBO 2054 
     ¶C. COLOMBO 2008 
     ¶D. COLOMBO 2042 
     ¶E. COLOMBO 2076 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) In the run-up to their December 19 meeting in 
Brussels, the co-chairs are faced with rapidly degenerating 
security in the north and east; an inexperienced new 
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) administration that won on a 
hardline platform; a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
that has proven impervious to international pressure and 
promises of international aid for improved behavior; and a 
backing away by both parties from the Oslo Declaration--which 
posited a federal system as the basis of an eventual 
political settlement.  The LTTE has greeted the November 17 
election of President Mahinda Rajapaksa with mixed signals. 
While a Tiger-enforced boycott of the polls in areas under 
their control helped clinch Rajapaksa's victory, LTTE leader 
Prabhakaran's annual Heroes' Day address ten days later 
sternly warned the new president that he has little time left 
to restart the peace process.  Even more worrisome, the LTTE 
is backing up this threat with small-scale--but increasingly 
fatal--attacks on Sri Lanka Army troops and police in the 
north and east.  Tiger actions over the past month have 
fueled skepticism about their commitment to a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict.  While Rajapaksa has shown more 
flexibility on the peace process than his hardline campaign 
rhetoric reflected, he seems to lack a specific strategy for 
how to engage with the LTTE.  The meeting in Brussels is an 
opportunity for co-chairs to re-focus both parties on the 
immediate need to shore up the fragile Ceasefire Agreement 
(CFA) by halting the increasingly violent "dirty war"; to 
urge flexibility from both parties in approaching the 
process; and to review what leverage the international 
community, including India, might exert.  At the same time, 
the co-chairs must make clear that a lasting peace in Sri 
Lanka can only be delivered by Sri Lankans.  End summary. 
 
------------------------- 
SITUATION ON THE GROUND: 
SINKING 
------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Mahinda Rajapaksa, a perceived hardliner on the peace 
process, owes his victory in the November 17 presidential 
election to two very different constituencies:  the Sinhalese 
(Rajapaksa won 60 percent of the Sinhalese vote--the largest 
ever by a candidate in a presidential election) and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  The Tigers' 
powerful intimidation kept Tamils in areas under LTTE 
control, who probably would have supported opposition 
candidate and peace process veteran Ranil Wickremesinghe in 
significant numbers, away from the polls.  Rajapaksa's 
campaign, backed by the Sinhalese nationalist Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), 
criticized Norwegian peace process facilitators for alleged 
pro-LTTE bias, vowed to amend the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) 
and rejected a federal solution to the ethnic conflict, 
pledging instead to uphold the "unitary" nature of Sri Lanka. 
 There could be several reasons that the Tigers decided to 
back Rajapaksa, ranging from the most benign--a hardliner has 
a better chance of selling a political settlement to the 
Sinhalese--to the least--the Tigers want out of the peace 
process, and Rajapaksa's hard line makes breaking the CFA 
easier to justify. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Since his election, however, Rajapaksa has shown 
greater flexibility on the peace process than his campaign 
rhetoric indicated.  While stopping short of endorsing 
federalism, he has called for a solution that allows "maximum 
devolution" within a unitary state--or a kind of 
"federalism-lite," as he indicated to co-chair 
representatives on December 7 (Ref A), that includes almost 
all the features of federalism except the name.  He has also 
stepped back from his crowd-pleasing scapegoating of Norway, 
inviting the Scandinavian nation to continue its role as 
facilitator and welcoming co-chairs' interest and advice. 
(Note:  A source close to the president told us the LTTE had 
insisted that Norway be kept on.)  Instead of revising the 
CFA, as he vowed on the campaign trail, he wants talks  with 
the Tigers about strengthening its implementation--and, 
unlike his predecessor, is even prepared to consider a venue 
outside Sri Lanka (Ref A).  Acknowledging his team's lack of 
experience on the peace process, Rajapaksa has also asked 
former negotiator and opposition United National Party (UNP) 
MP G.L. Peiris for assistance.  The president has succeeded 
in partially blunting opposition to these conciliatory moves 
from some of the more strident voices in the chauvinist JVP 
and JHU (although it is unlikely they will keep quiet for 
long). 
 
¶4. (C) While Rajapaksa has backed off from his more hard-line 
electoral rhetoric, he does not seem to have a clear and 
detailed set of ideas on how to move forward.  Rather, he 
sometimes seems to think the international community will do 
that job.  Moreover, some of his ideas--for example, that the 
LTTE would be satisfied by the chance to run its members for 
seats in upcoming local bodies elections--seem dangerously 
naive. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Unfortunately, as Rajapaksa is showing greater 
flexibility, the  Tigers are doing just the opposite.  LTTE 
supremo Prabhakaran's annual Heroes' Day speech on November 
27 put the new president on notice that the clock is running 
out on Tiger forbearance, challenging him to put a political 
offer on the table by "next year" (which could mean either 
next month or one year from now) or face a renewed LTTE 
struggle for "self-determination" (Ref C). The LTTE quickly 
followed up this sobering message with isolated, 
small-scale--but lethal--attacks on the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) 
in the northern district of Jaffna, racking up the highest 
SLA body count (17 in less than a week) since the ceasefire 
began in 2002 (Ref B). A similar attack in the eastern 
district of Batticaloa wounded two soldiers on December 12, 
while 21 policemen were injured in a grenade attack on a 
police post in Mannar later the same day. 
 
¶6.  (C)  There are other disturbing signs of Tiger aggression 
as well.  Kethesh Loganathan of the Center for Policy 
Alternatives, a prominent local think tank, told us last week 
of unsettling reports from Jaffna that the LTTE is giving 
civilians short-term training (primarily in grenade throwing 
and barricade construction) as auxiliary "home guards" to 
give the impression of a popular uprising against the 
"occupying" SLA.  According to some analysts, the goal is to 
create a Sri Lankan version of the Palestinian intifada.  In 
addition, the local press recently ran several reports of 
stepped-up LTTE extortion among the Tamil diaspora in Canada, 
Australia and the EU with LTTE comments that the time of 
decision is near.  Meanwhile, the LTTE and its paramilitary 
rivals, the breakaway Karuna faction, have kept up the 
violence in the east--this time, apparently, drawing in 
members of the Muslim community as well, provoking 
back-to-back hartals (general strikes) and counter-strikes 
that shut down business and deepen communal divisions in this 
ethnically diverse and habitually volatile region.  The 
stepped-up violence has tightened the pressure on the 
president to seek talks on upholding the CFA as quickly as 
possible--perhaps even before he is really ready to do so. 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In addition to the worsening security situation, both 
parties' perceptions of the international community in the 
peace process have altered as well.  While Rajapaksa has 
moderated his campaign criticism of "foreign pressure," he 
seems to view the co-chairs as little more than a useful tool 
to pressure the Tigers.  At the same time, perhaps prodded by 
the JVP, he is actively soliciting a more expanded role for 
India in the peace process.  Foreign Minister Mangala 
Samaraweera tried to entice greater Indian involvement during 
his recent trip to India (Ref D). The Indians told him, 
however, that they wanted Norway to continue as facilitator 
and did not want to play a high-visibility role themselves. 
Rajapaksa will visit India at the end of December and no 
doubt will make another run at the goal; we doubt he will 
have much greater success. 
¶8.  (C) Apart from Norway and the Nordic-sponsored Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), the LTTE right now appears to see 
international involvement in the process as a liability. 
(Prabhakaran's Heroes' Day message lambasted Tokyo process 
plans to use an "international safety net" of donor support 
to isolate and marginalize the LTTE.)  From the LTTE's 
viewpoint, international interest in the peace process has 
caused nothing but trouble:  donors have not forked over the 
foreign aid expected from the Tokyo process, while the 
debacle over a tsunami aid mechanism, the continued US FTO 
listing and EU ban on Tiger travel have cost the Tigers 
political face.  The Tigers may crave international 
legitimacy, but not badly enough to change their behavior. 
(That the Tigers' deadliest attacks since the ceasefire began 
coincided with separate visits to Kilinochchi from Amnesty 
International's Secretary General, the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial Killings and the head of the SLMM provides 
as good an indication as any how little international opinion 
influences the LTTE.)  In the near term, the Tigers may wish 
to keep international involvement in the peace 
process--again, with the notable exception of Norway and the 
SLMM--at a minimum. 
 
------------------- 
WHAT A TIGER WANTS 
------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Skeptics believe that the Tigers never really 
abandoned their demand for a separate state--they just 
shelved it temporarily to buy time and curry international 
legitimacy.  While the Tigers have stopped short of reviving 
their call for a separate state, Rajapaksa's backing off from 
the Oslo Declaration allows them to recast the debate--and 
increase their demands for "self-determination."  For right 
now, it remains unclear if the Tigers see continuing the 
peace process as the best means to achieve this.  To keep the 
LTTE in the peace process, the GSL and co-chairs should focus 
on what Prabhakaran, via his Heroes' Day address, cited as 
the Tigers' immediate concerns, i.e., the "frustration" of 
the Tamil people, the "shadow war" and the scuttling of the 
tsunami aid coordination mechanism (aka the P-TOMS) (Ref B). 
 
SIPDIS 
To stay in the peace process, the Tigers must be convinced 
that the GSL will put the brakes on anti-LTTE paramilitary 
operations, especially from the Karuna faction, and offer an 
aid coordination deal that gives the LTTE some recognition as 
an independent political entity. 
 
---------------------------- 
AND WHAT A PRESIDENT CAN DO 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Rajapaksa has already begun consulting other 
political parties for their views on resolving the conflict. 
An accomplished political tactician, Rajapaksa may gain more 
southern support than his predecessors, but certainly will 
not be able to get the more extreme voices to join in a 
consensus.  Whatever degree of consensus he gets, it will 
make little difference if it fails to address long-standing 
Tamil grievances or offer the LTTE expanded political status. 
 Rajapaksa's idea of a beefed-up provincial council with 
expanded powers may give the president the political cover he 
needs with his hardline allies, but does very little for the 
Tigers, who want to show their struggle for political 
recognition has had results.  With federalism and the LTTE's 
earlier demand for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) 
now off the table, Rajapaksa should leave aside the question 
of a final settlement and focus instead on short-term 
"deliverables" that can shore up the Tigers' stake in the 
peace process. Among these steps could be: 
 
--a policy statement acknowledging past GSL failure to 
address Tamil concerns, along with an offer of immediate 
relief on a long-standing sore point--perhaps turning some of 
the property designated as High Security Zones back to the 
original owners if the security situation improves and some 
kind of safeguards can be devised; 
 
--cracking down on anti-LTTE paramilitaries (which Rajapaksa 
told the Ambassador he is already doing) and instructing 
police to investigate killings in GSL-controlled territory 
more aggressively; 
 
--engaging the LTTE on strengthening the CFA; 
 
--inviting the LTTE for talks on an aid coordination 
mechanism that gives the Tigers some decision-making 
authority. 
 
------------------------------- 
AND HOW THE CO-CHAIRS CAN HELP 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) The co-chairs meet in a severely changed 
environment.  When the group was founded in Tokyo in 2003, 
the expectation was that promises of development assistance 
would induce the Tigers to cooperate in the peace process. 
That proved to be false, as the Tigers subordinated economic 
growth to their goal of political dominance.  Even more has 
changed since the co-chairs last met in New York in 
September.  Ceasefire violations are increasing with deadly 
regularity; the majority of Sinhalese have voted for a man 
they believe will preserve a unitary Sri Lanka; and the 
Tigers have stopped talking about peace and gone back to 
demands for "self-determination."  The co-chairs should use 
the December 19 meeting to re-evaluate their role in this new 
and bleaker environment.  Among the questions that should be 
considered: 
 
--What should the role of the co-chairs be in these changed 
circumstances?  If the GSL is only lukewarm and sees the 
co-chairs as a stick with which to beat the Tigers and the 
Tigers see international involvement as a trap to marginalize 
them, how can the co-chairs have a positive effect? 
 
--How can the Tigers be motivated to remain in the peace 
process?  Since the Tigers have already shown little response 
to positive incentives (i.e., the promise of greater aid 
contingent on progress in the peace process), the co-chairs 
should discuss what negative incentives (i.e., sanctions, 
terrorist designations, asset freezing, cracking down on 
fundraising by affiliated organizations) could be considered. 
 
--At the same time, how do the co-chairs convey to the Tigers 
that it is their behavior that is the problem, and if that 
behavior changes, the international community could begin to 
engage with them in a positive way? 
 
--What practical steps could be taken to bolster the CFA? 
Could SLMM's mandate or membership be changed to make it a 
more effective monitor? 
 
--Should India work with the co-chairs in some capacity, even 
if not as a full member?  While we suspect that India does 
not want a full role, the possibility of an expanded Indian 
role would, at the very least, get the Tigers' attention. 
 
--------------------------------- 
ELEMENTS OF A CO-CHAIR STATEMENT 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  Periodic co-chair statements have proven of little 
recent value in affecting LTTE behavior.  Moreover, like the 
Norwegians (Ref E), we fear the GSL may be expecting the 
co-chairs to come up with a solution to complex problems, 
like how to bring the LTTE back to the table and enforce the 
CFA, rather than devising one of its own.  Both parties need 
to be reminded that the responsibility for resolving the 
conflict lies with them.  The co-chairs support a peaceful 
solution, but only the two parties can come up with and 
implement that solution.  We think that a statement that says 
less, rather than more, may be the most effective way of 
conveying this message.  Key elements of such an abbreviated 
statement would include: 
 
--Reiterating support for the peace process but noting the 
responsibility of both sides to formulate a solution; 
 
--Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating security 
situation and calling on both sides to uphold the CFA without 
suggesting a moral equivalency between the GSL and the LTTE; 
 
--Tying these concerns to co-chair consideration of possible 
punitive action against the LTTE if violations, including 
child recruitment, persist; 
 
--Commending Norway's role as facilitator (Note:  Norway's 
continuation in that role may still be up in the air at the 
time co-chairs meet); 
 
--Welcoming Indian interest/participation in the peace 
process. 
 
 
 
 
 
LUNSTEAD