This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 002059 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2015 
TAGS: PHUM PTER PGOV CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  UN RAPPORTEUR, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 
PRESS LTTE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 1656 
 
     ¶B. COLOMBO 2040 
 
Classified By: DCM. JAMES F. ENTWISTLE.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) Overlapping visits by Amnesty International (AI) 
Secretary General Irene Khan and UN Special Rapporteur on 
 
SIPDIS 
Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Killings Philip Alston 
during the first week of December focused on continuing 
political assassinations and the danger they pose to the 
increasingly fragile Ceasefire Agreement (CFA).  AI believes 
that the failure or inability of the Government to 
investigate these killings has created a dangerous vacuum in 
the ceasefire, which could easily escalate.  AI may propose 
the formation of an independent commission to investigate the 
killings, while Alston advocated an expanded human rights 
role for the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). Both AI and 
Alston in their separate meetings with Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) representatives pressed the Tigers to 
observe the CFA and halt child recruitment.  AI wants the 
international community to send a "tough message" to both 
parties not to miss the existing narrow window of opportunity 
to re-engage.  End summary. 
 
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PERVASIVE SENSE OF "GREAT DREAD" 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On December 6 Amnesty International (AI) officials 
Dr. Purna Sen, Director of the Asia-Pacific Regional Program, 
and Elizabeth Rowsell, South Asia Team member, briefed 
members of the diplomatic community on AI Secretary General 
Irene Khan's December 1-5 visit to Sri Lanka.  The purpose of 
the visit, Sen said, was ostensibly to follow up on a 
research mission on IDPs and political killings AI had 
conducted to Sri Lanka in August; the underlying purpose was 
to establish a dialogue with the new government and to exert 
pressure on both the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka 
(GSL) to prioritize human rights.  During her visit, Khan met 
with President Mahinda Rajapaksa, Foreign Minister Mangala 
Samaraweera, representatives of the opposition United 
National Party (UNP), the Norwegian Ambassador, the Indian 
High Commissioner, members of the Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission (SLMM), representatives of the Muslim Peace 
Secretariat, and NGO officials.  Khan also visited camps for 
 
SIPDIS 
internally displaced persons in Jaffna and traveled to 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) headquarters in the 
northern district of Kilinochcchi on December 3, where she 
met Tiger political wing leader Tamilchelvan. 
 
¶3.  (C)  In general, Sen said, the AI mission had perceived a 
sense of "great dread" among its non-LTTE interlocutors that 
an escalation of hostilities was imminent.  AI's discussions 
with representatives of the Muslim community and NGOs active 
in Muslim areas indicated growing feelings of "exclusion and 
marginalization" within the group which, AI cautioned, could 
have dangerous long-term repercussions.  The failure or 
inability of the GSL to investigate political killings, which 
Sen estimated had surpassed 200 in 2005, had created a 
dangerous vacuum that could lead to greater violence.  Since 
investigating killings or otherwise enforcing the Ceasefire 
Agreement (CFA) is not in SLMM's mandate, and since 
Government interlocutors complained to AI that they were 
unable to investigate political killings that occur in 
government-controlled territory because witnesses are afraid 
to come forward and/or suspects flee to LTTE territory, AI is 
considering proposing in its final report an independent 
commission to investigate the assassinations.  (Sen said the 
Government seemed to welcome the idea, while the LTTE, which 
thought the SLMM was doing just fine, was noncommittal when 
the subject was broached.) 
 
¶4.  (C)  Sen summarized AI's conclusions from the visit as 
follows: 
--Security remains the overriding concern of all parties; 
--While there is no consensus on how to improve security, all 
options should be fleshed out; 
 
--There is a narrow window of opportunity for a fresh start 
created by Rajapaksa's recent election that neither side 
should neglect; 
 
--The international community should urge both parties to 
take advantage of this opportunity. 
 
She noted that President Rajapaksa emphasized to Khan that he 
sees shortcomings in the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) that must 
be reviewed.  In addition, he indicated that he wanted the 
mandate of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) revised as 
well.  Foreign Minister Samaraweera, on the other hand, said 
in a separate meeting that implementation of the CFA--rather 
than the CFA itself--must be revised.  Sen commented that AI 
was unsure what to make of this mixed message. 
 
 
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LTTE ROLLS OUT RED CARPET FOR AI; 
INVITES "FACT-FINDING" MISSION IN FUTURE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶5.  (C)  In her meeting with Tamilchelvan in Kilinochchi on 
December 3, Khan stressed the need to curb violations of the 
CFA, including political killings and child recruitment. 
Tamilchelvan predictably responded that a) all violations 
would automatically cease if only the GSL would honor its CFA 
commitment to disarm paramilitaries (i.e., the Karuna 
faction); and b) the LTTE does not need to recruit children 
as it is "overwhelmed" with more than enough volunteers of 
legal age.  (Sen observed, however, that Tamilchelvan belied 
that claim when he reported later in the same meeting that 
the LTTE had released 55 child soldiers last month. Moreover, 
in a separate meeting, the LTTE's version of a human rights 
commission, known as the North East Secretariat of Human 
Rights (NESOHR), told the AI delegation that the greatest 
volume of complaints it received this year was from were from 
parents complaining that their children were recruited by the 
LTTE.)  When AI continued to press on the issue, Tamilchelvan 
became "rattled," Sen said, for the only time during the 
two-hour meeting. 
 
¶6. (C)  Sen summarized Tamilchelvan's pitch as follows: 
 
--repeated references to the growing sense of "frustration" 
among the Tamil populace; 
 
--despite this "frustration," the LTTE is open to talks with 
the new government and is giving it some limited time--until 
"next year"--to produce results; 
 
--the international community should press the GSL to 
implement the CFA (by disarming the Karuna faction and other 
anti-LTTE militants). 
 
Sen noted Tamilchelvan did not respond directly when the AI 
delegation tried to pinpoint what he meant by "next year," 
but speculated that his subsequent references to the upcoming 
four-year anniversary of the CFA in February could indicate 
action around that time.   She said that she perceived no 
recognition from LTTE interlocutors during AI's discussions 
that the LTTE must/should change its behavior. 
 
¶7.  (C) Sen described Tamilchelvan as "very hospitable" to 
the AI delegation and  "quite keen" on encouraging 
international involvement in the peace process.  She said he 
invited AI to send a fact-finding mission to Kilinochchi to 
interview people and determine if the LTTE were indeed guilty 
of child recruitment and human rights violations.  AI is 
warily mulling over the offer, she reported, and must 
consider several factors (would AI have genuine access to 
local people?  Would AI be endangering people by interviewing 
them?  Who sets the terms of reference--the LTTE or AI?) 
before going further. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Tamilchelvan also granted an unscripted request by 
the AI delegation to visit an LTTE prison.  Sen reported the 
delegation, accompanied by LTTE handlers and guards 
throughout the brief tour, saw 27 prisoners being held 
together in a single unlit cell but had no chance to 
interview any.  She added that the delegation also observed 
three prisoners were being held in a separate, better lit, 
cleaner cell and later learned that they were the three Sri 
Lankan policemen from the Child Protection Authority who have 
been detained by the LTTE since September (Ref A). 
 
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UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR SEES WORRISOME TREND 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) In the same time frame as the AI visit, UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Killings 
Philip Alston is wrapping up a ten-day visit to Sri Lanka 
during which he traveled in both LTTE and 
government-controlled areas.  During a December 6 briefing to 
the diplomatic corps, Alston, who had just come from a 
meeting with Foreign Minister Samaraweera, said he felt that 
human rights issues had, to a large extent, been lost in the 
understandable emphasis over the last few years on 
maintenance of the CFA.  The SLMM has no human rights 
monitoring mandate or capability and frequently, due to time 
and resource constraints, gave short shrift to CFA violations 
which involved human rights abuses, delving in only far 
enough to determine which side was at fault.  "There is 
considerable SLMM ambivalence about human rights violations," 
Alston said.  He advocated an expanded SLMM human rights role 
rather than a new monitoring body, since the SLMM was already 
active on the ground and had an administrative structure and 
presence in sensitive areas. 
 
¶10.  (C) At the same time, Alston observed, the Sri Lankan 
police make almost no effort to seriously investigate 
killings in the "ceasefire areas" in the north and east.  One 
local police chief told Alston he had 30 open murder cases 
but no serious suspect in any of them.  Too often, Alston 
said, the police fall back on the convenient excuse that the 
perpetrators flee to LTTE-controlled areas (undoubtedly true 
in some cases, Alston added, but without any police effort to 
verify it).  Alston cited the recent grenade attack on a 
crowded mosque in Akkaraipattu (Ref B) as an egregious 
example of police investigative lassitude.  He observed that 
the LTTE breakaway Karuna faction is an easy scapegoat, used 
by both sides, for various killings in the north and east. 
Alston also opined that "not unfounded" reports of GSL 
support to the Karuna forces needed to get more attention 
from the international community. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Alston said he had a blunt exchange with LTTE 
political chief Tamilchlvan on December 5 in which Alston 
described the LTTE record on killings as atrocious.  Alston 
told Tamilchelvan the LTTE needed to publicly denounce 
killings since it is not enough just to say "it wasn't us." 
Alston said he found Tamilchelvan somewhat contradictory on 
the CFA.  The LTTE political chief had said the CFA was 
perfect as is but also agreed on the need for an expanded 
SLMM human rights monitoring role, although the LTTE had no 
particular proposal on how to do that, other than to insist 
it was up to the Norwegian facilitators to "come up with a 
proposal."  Asked for his assessment of NESOHR, Alston said 
it was mixed:  NESOHR's claim to him that the LTTE had never 
abducted a child was laughable, whereas their proposals for 
judicial reform "would be well received if they were coming 
from a newly independent state." 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶12.  (C) The Tigers too often see international involvement 
in the peace process as an easy way to pressure the GSL to 
remedy its shortcomings without conceding any deficiencies of 
their own.  The stern messages from AI and the UN Rapporteur 
to their LTTE interlocutors should let the Tigers know that 
the international community is not buying their line that the 
GSL is solely responsible for the alarming increase in CFA 
and human rights violations.  An independent authority to 
investigate the killings--while it does not address the 
central problem of witness protection--could nonetheless be a 
good starting point for broader discussions on how better to 
enforce and implement the CFA. 
LUNSTEAD