This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 003879 
 
SIPDIS 
 
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
FOR FRC LAMBERT 
S/CT FOR RHONDA SHORE AND ED SALAZAR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC KCRM VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: A. 04 CARACAS 3924 
     ¶B. STATE 193439 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Post's POC is Political Officer Charles Ridley: TEL 
58-212-907-8052,  FAX 58-212-907-8033, EMAIL 
RidleyCL@state.gov.  In April 2006 POC will be Political 
Officer Adam Center, EMAIL CenterAM@state.gov 
 
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GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
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¶2. (U) Venezuelan cooperation in the international campaign 
against terrorism continued to be negligible in 2005.  Public 
recriminations against U.S. counterterrorism policies by 
President Hugo Chavez and his close supporters persist; 
indeed, President Chavez publicly champions the cause of 
Iraqi insurgents.  Such statements overshadow and detract 
from the extremely limited cooperation that exists between 
specialists and technicians of the two nations. 
 
¶3. (U) Valid Venezuelan citizenship, identity, or travel 
documents can be easily obtained, making Venezuela a 
potentially attractive destination-or way station en route to 
the United States-for terrorists.  For example, senior 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) member Rodrigo 
Granda, whose December 2004 capture in Caracas was allegedly 
orchestrated by Colombian officials, had been naturalized as 
a Venezuelan citizen and had a Venezuelan identification 
card.  Granda also attended an ideological conference in 
Venezuela in December 2004 along with Venezuelan government 
personnel, according to press reports.  A FARC communique 
claimed that Granda was in Venezuela at the request of the 
Venezuelan Government. 
 
¶4. (U) President Chavez' stated ideological affinity with 
Colombian terrorist organizations designated by the Secretary 
of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act-the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)-limits 
Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia in combating terrorism. 
The FARC and the ELN, which the Government of Venezuela does 
not recognize as terrorist organizations, often use the area 
for cross-border incursions and regard Venezuelan territory 
near the border as a safe haven.  In addition, splinter 
groups of the FARC and another designated organization, the 
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), operate in 
various parts of Venezuela and are involved in 
narcotrafficking. 
 
¶5.  (U)  It is unclear to what extent the Government of 
Venezuela condones or administers material support to 
Colombian terrorists and at what level.  An ex-ELN guerrilla 
told the press in February 2005 that a "non-aggression" pact 
existed between the ELN and Venezuelan authorities and added 
that the Venezuelan National Guard allowed the terrorist 
group to kidnap ranchers.  Weapons and ammunition-some from 
official Venezuelan stocks and facilities-continue to go from 
Venezuelan suppliers into the hands of Colombian terrorist 
organizations, although it is not clear that such diversion 
results from Venezuelan government policy.  In any case, 
Venezuela is unable and unwilling to systematically police 
the 1,400-mile Venezuela-Colombia border.  Venezuelan 
security officials appear to be aware of the location of 
terrorist encampments in Venezuela, as the press has reported 
on the general vicinities of many of these.  Efforts by 
Venezuelan security forces to interdict arms flows to these 
groups are also ineffective. 
 
¶6.  (U) Venezuela is a party to six of the 12 international 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.  Venezuela 
has signed and ratified the UN Convention on Terrorist 
Bombings of 1997, the UN Convention on Terrorism Financing of 
1999, and the OAS Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism 
of 2002.  Venezuela's organized crime bill and penal code 
reform bill, both passed in 2005, outline punishments for 
collaborating with terrorists.  The laws, however, do not 
define the terms "terrorist" or "terrorism."  If passed, an 
anti-terrorism bill proposed in 2001 would define terrorist 
activities more specifically, although the law could also 
undercut political freedoms.  In November 2004, the Supreme 
Court's Judicial Committee designated a group of judges to 
decide all terrorism cases and review decisions in terrorism 
investigations.  It remains uncertain whether the Supreme 
Court designees and the current and proposed laws are 
directed at curbing terrorism or President Chavez' opponents. 
 
¶7. (U) Unidentified groups attempting to influence the 
tenuous domestic political situation employed terrorist 
tactics throughout 2005, particularly in Caracas.  A series 
of small bombs and threats were variously blamed on President 
Chavez' supporters or on his political opponents.  The 
Venezuelan Government continued to allege in 2005 that exile 
groups, the U.S. Government, and President Bush sought to 
overthrow President Chavez and kill him, but it offered no 
proof.  As recently as late December 2005, the Venezuelan 
Government claimed such groups were trying to sabotage 
Venezuela's December 4, 2005 legislative elections. 
Venezuelan authorities claimed in May 2004 that they had 
captured some 100 Colombian paramilitaries training secretly 
near Caracas, although it is unclear whether any of the 
detained were members of the AUC.  While most were eventually 
released, 27 of the Colombians and three Venezuelan military 
officers were sentenced to varying prison terms on October 
25, 2005. 
 
¶8. (U) Within an Arab and South Asian immigrant population of 
about 250,000, there are small groups of Shia and Sunni 
radicals in Venezuela.  At a minimum, the Sunni radicals are 
sympathetic to the global jihad, especially that waged by 
Palestinian groups.  There were indications of monetary 
support for Middle Eastern terrorist groups coming from 
Islamic groups in several Venezuelan urban centers.  As the 
Venezuelan Government's budding relationship with Iran 
develops, small but well organized Venezuelan Shia groups, 
including those affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah, may 
adhere more closely to an Iranian conception of a global 
struggle against Western interests.  For its part, the 
Venezuelan Government makes little effort to cooperate with 
the United States in the Global War on Terror. 
BROWNFIELD