This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 004315 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID XH EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: DAS DICARLO AND EU DISCUSS W. BALKANS 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Vincent Carver for reasons 1.5 (b/d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) DAS Rosemary DiCarlo and Kosovo Desk Officer Black 
discussed the Western Balkans with the UK Presidency and EU 
officials at the U.S.-EU COWEB Troika meeting in Brussels 
November 29.  DAS DiCarlo highlighted the EU accession 
process as a catalyst for reform in the region but noted that 
countries, particularly SaM, had to cooperate fully with 
ICTY, including delivering Mladic to The Hague.  DAS DiCarlo 
and the EU agreed that a Montenegrin referendum on 
independence would have to be seen by all parties as 
legitimate and free and fair.  On Kosovo, the UK Presidency 
noted that Belgrade and Pristina continue to maintain hard 
lines, making it difficult to identify the parameters for 
compromise.  DAS DiCarlo pressed for U.S. participation in 
steering group discussions on the transition of the 
international civilian presence in Kosovo; the UK and the 
Council General Secretariat expressed surprise that the U.S. 
was not being included.  EU officials said that BiH had made 
"just enough progress" for Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA) negotiations to have begun November 25  and 
stressed their desire to be involved in BiH constitutional 
reform.  According to the EU, Solana may informally announce 
December 12 that Schwartz-Shilling will replace Ashdown as 
High Representative in Sarajevo.  The UK Presidency expressed 
"cautious optimism" that the European Council would approve 
EU candidate status for FYROM at the December European 
Council while noting that no date would be set to begin 
accession negotiations.  The EU and Albania may sign an SAA 
as early as January.  DAS DiCarlo noted continued U.S. 
pressure on Zagreb to deliver Gotovina to The Hague. 
Participant list para 16.  END SUMMARY 
 
THESSALONIKI AGENDA ON TRACK 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Commission Enlargement official Axel Wallden reviewed 
the Thessaloniki Agenda, noting that the Commission had 
determined the individual performances of each of the Western 
Balkan states had been at least "good enough" to receive the 
Commission's recommendation to move a step further on the 
path to accession:  opening accession negotiations with 
Croatia and Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) 
negotiations with BiH and SaM, as well as recommending 
candidate status for FYROM.  Wallden noted that fostering 
regional cooperation, including on energy, and negotiating a 
regional free trade agreement under the auspices of the 
Stability Pact, remained EU goals.  As part of the EU's 
enlargement strategy, it is providing each candidate country 
precise guidance on reforms it needs to enact and implement 
in order to move forward on accession. 
 
¶3.  (C) Austrian MFA Director for the Western Balkans Thomas 
Schnoell noted that EU FMs and their Western Balkan 
counterparts will meet on the margins of the Gymnich informal 
ministerial in Salzburg in March to identify where the EU and 
the Western Balkans can promote further reform and 
integration.  Specific topics could include visa facilitation 
for specific categories of travelers and the promotion of 
regional trade.  According to Schnoell, the "time is right" 
to sign the SAA with Albania and SAA negotiations with BiH 
and SaM could conclude in approximately one year if they 
"deliver" on pledges to reform.  Although not raising the 
bar, ensuring compliance with EU conditions, he added, is 
even more vital given the results of the Dutch and French 
referenda on the draft EU constitution. 
 
SUPPORT SAM BUT INSIST ON COOPERATION WITH ICTY 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) DAS DiCarlo reviewed U.S. efforts to support SaM but 
expressed concern over Belgrade's stalled cooperation with 
ICTY, including the fact that Mladic remains at large.  In 
addition, the U.S. is looking to DefMin Stankovic to 
implement promised personnel reform, she added.  DAS Di Carlo 
also lamented the lack of a genuinely reform-minded 
government in Belgrade.  She added that PfP would remain 
blocked to SaM as long as Mladic remains at large.  On 
Montenegro, DAS DiCarlo noted the U.S. message to Podgorica 
that ICTY commitments apply to Montenegro as well as to 
Serbia.  DAS DiCarlo underscored the need for Djukanovic to 
engage the Montenegrin opposition on this issue.  She also 
emphasized that any referendum must meet clear international 
standards and be seen by all parties as legitimate. 
 
¶5.  (C) UK FCO Director for Eastern Adriatic Affairs Karen 
Pierce noted that the EU shared a similar analysis of SaM. 
The leadership in Belgrade were introspective and not fully 
engaged.  The EU's SAA process, Pierce added, might energize 
SaM to tackle the full range of required political and 
economic reforms.  She noted that the EU likely would not 
close negotiations on an SAA with Belgrade if it failed to 
cooperate further with ICTY.  In this regard, Pierce 
underscored that the U.S. and the EU should consider an 
appropriate response should Belgrade not deliver Mladic to 
The Hague by the end of 2005 as Belgrade has pledged. 
MONTENEGRIN REFERENDUM 
--------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Pierce said that the EU had delivered a demarche to 
Podgorica noting that it would consider Serbia as the SaM's 
successor state should Montenegro declare independence.  DAS 
DiCarlo voiced support for EU efforts to ensure that 
Montenegro followed international standards in the conduct of 
a possible referendum.  The EU noted to Podgorica that the 
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) likely would 
start over for Montenegro should independence be achieved. 
Alexandros Yannis of the Council Secretariat's Western 
Balkans Office stressed that the stability of SaM was key to 
regional stability.  In this light, the EU is trying to help 
SaM as much as possible.  Schnoell echoed these sentiments 
while Wallden stressed that an independent Montenegro would 
get no "fast track" toward EU accession, particularly given 
its weak governmental structures. 
 
¶7.  (C) Pierce noted that the EU might go beyond the Venice 
Commission's proposals and present stricter conditions for a 
referendum.  DAS DiCarlo and Pierce agreed that Belgrade 
appears not to have understood how likely a Montenegrin 
referendum in 2006 is.  Both noted the twin challenges facing 
Belgrade:  (1) dealing with Montenegro and Kosovo 
simultaneously and (2) explaining the respective outcomes to 
the Serbian population. 
 
KOSOVO:  KEEP THE PROCESS MOVING 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) According to Pierce, the EU has difficulty 
identifying where the parameters for compromise between 
Belgrade and Pristina are, given that both sides are 
maintaining hard lines and offering few specifics regarding 
final status.  Pierce observed that, during or after the 
final status talks, the Serbian government could collapse, 
Kostunica could call new elections, and the Radicals could 
gain power.  Therefore, the EU and the U.S. should continue 
efforts to persuade Belgrade of the benefits of integration 
with the transatlantic community. 
 
¶9.  (C) Yannis said the EU is pursuing a double track 
regarding Kosovo -- supporting final status talks while 
simultaneously planning for an EU role in post-final status 
Kosovo.  He noted that the EU likely will assume some 
responsibilities, possibly including judicial reform and 
police support, as part of an international civilian presence 
in Kosovo following final status talks. Likewise, the EU may 
have residual functions in the economic sector, including 
monetary, fiscal and trade responsibilities.  Yannis added 
that the Council will review such planning, including how to 
move the Kosovars toward adopting EU standards, at the 
December 12-13 FMs meeting.  He said the EU may adopt a 
streamlined "European Partnership for Kosovo" document before 
the end of the year to, inter alia, help the Kosovars 
reorganize their working groups and focus on implementing 
reforms.  Yannis concluded by noting that final status must 
provide Kosovo the ability to sign and ratify treaties. 
Otherwise, he reasoned, its commitment to pursue the 
accession path would be "thin." 
 
¶10.  (C) DAS DiCarlo emphasized the need for Kosovo to 
conclude agreements with IFIs.  On a continued international 
civilian presence, DAS DiCarlo pointed to the U.S. desire to 
coordinate closely with the EU on planning, including in 
steering group set up in Kosovo.  Pierce and Yannis expressed 
surprise that the U.S. was not being included in such 
discussions and agreed on the efficacy of including the U.S. 
Pierce observed that the question of future financial 
assistance will also have to be reviewed. 
 
BiH:  AN "INTERESTING YEAR" 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) The EU participants noted that there had been "just 
enough progress" on the reform front for BiH to begin SAA 
negotiations with the EU.  The Commission noted that the EU 
saw four broad challenges for BiH in the coming year:  (1) 
police reform; (2) constitutional reform (Pierce and 
Commission officials voiced support for the U.S. Institute 
for Peace's (USIP) efforts and stressed that the EU would 
like a dialogue with the USG or the USIP to help the Bosnian 
political parties meet their self-imposed deadline on 
constitutional reform); (3) defense reform and ICTY 
compliance and (4) the transition itself with the Bosnians 
taking full responsibility for their future. 
 
¶12.  (C) All agreed that Belgrade must not be allowed to use 
Kosovo final status as a pretext to reopen issues related to 
the Republika Srpska.  Yannis emphasized that the EU will 
continue to seek the right balance among the Bosnian armed 
forces, the EU's police mission, and EUFOR.  Pierce noted 
that German candidate Schwartz-Shilling appears to be gaining 
support among member states to replace High Representative 
Ashdown.  Solana may make an informal announcement regarding 
Schwartz-Shilling at the December 12 FMs meeting.  Schnoell 
noted that a Peace Implementation Council (PIC) or a PIC 
Steering Board may want to review the situation in BiH in May 
or June 2006.  DAS DiCarlo emphasized that the EU's decision 
to begin SAA negotiations with BiH will provide impetus for 
further reforms and stressed that police reform must be 
implemented properly.  She emphasized the need to implement 
police reform under the auspices of OHR since political 
support of the EU and the United States would be necessary to 
ensure implementation.  DAS DiCarlo summarized the USIP's 
facilitation of Bosnian political leaders' discussions on 
political reform, the BiH leaders' meetings in Washington, 
and welcomed greater EU involvement to help keep the 
constitutional reform process on track. 
 
FYROM:  LIKELY EU "CANDIDATE," BUT NO ACCESSION TALKS YET 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Schnoell characterized EU and U.S. efforts to 
support stability and reform in Macedonia as a good example 
of transatlantic cooperation.  Schnoell and Commission reps 
said FYROM has made much progress and has implemented the 
Ohrid Agreement.  Council Secretariat official Hove noted 
that Solana had publicly endorsed FYROM for candidate status. 
 Given this, Pierce noted that she is "cautiously optimistic" 
that the European Council will support the Commission's 
recommendation that FYROM receive candidate status, although 
accession negotiations would not begin soon.  DAS DiCarlo 
said the U.S. viewed granting candidate status for Macedonia 
as a strong signal to reformers in Skopje and noted its need 
to make more progress on economic and judicial reform. DAS 
DiCarlo also emphasized the positive signal that granting 
candidate status to Macedonia would send to the entire region. 
 
ALBANIA:  SAA TO BE CONCLUDED SOON 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Commission officials observed that, given the 
"largely free and fair" elections and "enough progress" on 
the reform front, the EU likely would conclude SAA 
negotiations with Albania soon, possibly as early as January. 
 While the SAA was in the ratification process, the EU would 
establish an interim agreement to outline continued reform 
requirements for Tirana.  The Commission noted that PM 
Berisha, meeting with Commission President Barroso that same 
day, would receive encouragement for continued reform and 
messages that reform must take place in a legal framework. 
Tirana would also be encouraged to support final status talks 
for Kosovo but cautioned against getting overly involved in 
the process, given the ethnic Albanian angle.  DAS DiCarlo 
supported the EU SAA process with Tirana, emphasizing that it 
helps strengthen democratic trends and electoral reforms. 
 
OTHER BUSINESS:  CROATIA; RHETORIC FROM BOSNIA 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) DAS DiCarlo emphasized continued U.S. pressure on 
Zagreb to comply with its ICTY obligations and deliver 
Gotovina to The Hague.  EU officials noted that the EU 
continues to monitor Croatian compliance.  Yannis said 
rhetoric coming out of Bosnia practically accusing the entire 
population of the Republika Srpska of war crimes are 
unhelpful and the international community should seek to 
dampen such talk. 
 
 
¶16.  (U) PARTICIPANTS 
----------------- 
 
U.S. 
 
DAS Rosemary DiCarlo 
Kosovo Desk Officer Joshua Black 
USAID Advisor for Southeastern Europe Patricia Manso 
USEU Poloff Vincent Carver 
 
UK Presidency 
 
FCO Director for the Western Adriatic Karen Pierce 
UKEU Officer Rachel Goddard 
 
Austria 
 
MFA Director for Western Balkans Thomas Schnoell 
Austrian EU Officer Gernot Pfandler 
 
Commission 
 
Enlargement Officer Therese Sobieski 
Enlargement Officer Dirk Lange 
Enlargement Officer Axel Wallden 
 
General Secretariat 
Western Balkans Officer (Kosovo) Alexandros Yannis 
Western Balkans Deputy Director Lene Hove 
 
¶17.  (U) DAS DiCarlo has cleared this message. 
MCKINLEY 
.