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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 012031 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2015 
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER RECAPS YEAR-END STATUS WITH 
ELN, FARC, AND AUC 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 11926 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) On December 28, the Ambassador reviewed all peace 
processes with Colombian Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos 
Restrepo.  Regarding the ELN, Restrepo told the Ambassador 
that he had successfully resisted ELN pressure -- abetted by 
the French and especially the Norwegian facilitators -- to 
move the talks from Cuba to Europe.  With regard to the FARC, 
Restrepo said Raul Reyes was not interested in the 
international commission's proposal to get the humanitarian 
accord discussion underway, was unhappy that the GOC had 
united the French and the Swiss into a commission so that he 
can no longer play one against the other, and was also 
unhappy that the commission was not pushing for the GOC to 
cede territory to the FARC in a new "despeje."  He said that 
Reyes had tried to engineer a private meeting with the Swiss 
representative in order to "punish" the French for their 
cooperation with the government.  Regarding the 
paramilitaries, Restrepo said there was no clear timetable 
for demobilization of all remaining groups, but he was 
optimistic that the majority would demobilize before February 
¶15.  Restrepo expressed frustration over GOC failure to name 
a senior official to manage implementation of reinsertion and 
the Justice and Peace law, and agreed that bringing the ELN 
to accept the Justice and Peace law would be difficult.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
GOC-ELN TALKS TO REMAIN IN THE REGION 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo said GOC 
December 17-22 talks with the Army of National Liberation 
(ELN) in Cuba were positive.  In Restrepo's view, the ELN had 
one primary goal for this round: to get agreement to move the 
discussions to Europe, with appropriate guarantees against 
arrest, a step they could play as a weakening of the European 
designation of the ELN as a terror organization.  Restrepo 
expressed the belief that the ELN did not want to continue 
talks in Cuba because of Castro's "control" over them, and 
because the Cuban venue would not afford them the 
"legitimacy" they sought from the talks.   The Norwegian, and 
to a lesser degree the Swiss facilitator, were prepared to 
concede the transfer immediately.  Restrepo described a very 
difficult session with the Swiss and especially with the 
Norwegian; he said the Spaniard was a secondary but helpful 
player.  But, in the end, GOC refusal to consent to the 
transfer absent substantive concessions from the ELN carried 
the day. 
 
¶3.  (C) Restrepo expressed frustration with the lack of 
substantive points raised by ELN leader Antonio Garcia and 
the ELN side; in his view their comments were general and 
vague.  Restrepo found Garcia to be out of touch with 
Colombian reality and with his own organization.  But Garcia 
was able to control his "explosive" personality and remained 
cordial throughout the talks.  It seemed to Restrepo that 
Garcia has become more pragmatic through time and his ideas, 
as well as those of the other ELN interlocutors, seemed less 
fundamentalist than in the past.  In Restrepo's view, the ELN 
wants to escape the "terrorist trademark" but is not willing 
to accept the conditions of the Justice and Peace law, which 
will be a problem in the future, both in the talks with the 
ELN themselves, and in their side-effects on the paramilitary 
peace process.  Restrepo said he sees only the alternatives 
 
of forcing the ELN to accept the Justice and Peace law or 
amending it.  He speculated that the GOC might be able to 
negotiate with the ELN about prison conditions and locations 
-- for example, in the case of Garcia, there might be an 
agreement for him to serve his time in Venezuela. 
 
¶4. (C) Restrepo described the current ELN membership as the 
"diverted sons of the Catholic Church."  They are "justice 
fundamentalists" who, compared to the FARC or AUC, care less 
about money and more about ideology.  For example, the ELN 
ideology asserts that the suffering of kidnap victims is a 
response to GOC "injustice" and, amazingly, makes the victims 
"better persons."  Restrepo confessed that if it were not for 
the many lives that could be saved with an agreement with the 
ELN, he would not waste his time in talks with the group. 
(The Ambassador noted that a peace process with the ELN would 
also serve to isolate the FARC as the lone hold-out from 
peace talks and would allow the government to concentrate its 
forces against them, as well give added legitimacy to the 
peace process with the rightist paramilitaries.) 
 
--------------------- 
IS THE FARC CORNERED? 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Restrepo said that Raul Reyes, international 
coordinator and principal spokesperson of the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), has argued for years against 
FARC leaders like Alfonso Cano that there should be no 
movement on hostages or other negotiable topics.  Reyes 
argued he could get the best deal by going around the GOC and 
negotiating with the French and the Swiss, trying to play 
them off against each other.  Restrepo said that the French 
and Swiss representatives had never met until he introduced 
them during his latest trip to Paris, following authorization 
from French Foreign Minister Douste-Balzy, with whom he had a 
"tough but very constructive" discussion.  Restrepo again 
characterized the Spanish as a helpful but secondary player. 
In that meeting, he invited them to come to Colombia to view 
the El Retiro site where the government already had said that 
humanitarian accord talks might take place. 
 
¶6.  (C) Upon arrival at the site, facilitated by the ICRC, 
the French and Swiss representatives quickly concluded, 
according to Restrepo, that a detailed proposal for security 
arrangements could be elaborated that would form the basis 
for a meeting between the GOC and FARC representatives on a 
"humanitarian" exchange of prisoners.  Their proposal emerged 
shortly thereafter and was accepted by the GOC that same day 
(reftel); there is still no word from the FARC. 
 
¶7.  (C) Restrepo noted that, as the Spanish, French and Swiss 
representatives were departing from their survey of El 
Retiro, an urgent call from Raul Reyes was passed to the 
Swiss representative; Reyes wanted to meet with him alone, 
without the Frenchman.  Only with difficulty did Restrepo and 
the French representative dissuade him from accepting. 
Restrepo characterized Reyes' call as an effort to "punish" 
the French for its cooperation with the GOC and the Swiss. 
 
¶8. (C) Restrepo said that he has heard through several 
sources that Reyes was upset by the GOC's acceptance of the 
commission's proposal and that it had put Reyes in an 
uncomfortable position within the FARC leadership.  Restrepo 
commented that Reyes's failed strategy has hurt him 
politically within the organization and is likely to 
stimulate further disagreement within the FARC leadership. 
It is unclear whether the FARC will accept the commission's 
proposal, but Restrepo views the GOC as having the upper hand 
this time around.  The key is to avoid any further 
negotiation of the French-Swiss proposal; the FARC must take 
it or leave it. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATION CONCERNS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) Restrepo said that, despite efforts by United-Self 
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) leaders to recreate a 
unified negotiating table after the two-month demobilization 
suspension, the AUC has been unable to restore unity; he is 
able to discuss demobilization dates, procedures, and details 
bloc-by-bloc.  The Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB) decision to 
demobilize was critical to unfreezing the process.  There is 
still no demobilization timetable for all groups, but he was 
optimistic that the majority of the remaining blocs would 
demobilize before February 15.  The Mineros Bloc, with 1,000 
members, plans to demobilize in early January.  The 
symbolically important Self-Defense Mid-Magdalena Bloc of 
historical AUC leader Ramon Isaza, with 650 troops, is likely 
to demobilize before the end of January.  Discussions with 
the Elmer Cardenas bloc are going well.  But Restrepo is less 
confident about demobilization of the AUC "North Bloc" with 
3,000 members under leader "Jorge 40," because regional 
pressures and a genuine FARC security threat could hamper the 
demobilization before February 15. 
 
¶10. (C) Restrepo expressed frustration that President Uribe 
has failed to accept the recommendation from him and several 
others in the government for appointment of a senior 
official, with a track record for good public administration 
and his own political base, to manage reinsertion and 
implementation of the Justice and Peace law.  Restrepo agreed 
with the Ambassador's comment that Minister of Justice and 
Interior Pretelt sees creation of such a position as a 
weakening of his own authority and expressed puzzlement 
because he believes Pretelt will leave the government anyway 
after elections.  Restrepo 
said the lack of clear action on these critical processes as 
a serious problem, which is why he had publicly criticized 
GOC management in testimony to Congress the previous month. 
The Ambassador noted that he already had praised Restrepo's 
testimony to other GOC officials and expressed concern about 
the slow pace of implementation of the Justice and Peace law. 
 
WOOD