This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 011611 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER CO FARC
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT URIBE ACCEPTS "INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION" 
SECURITY ZONE PROPOSAL FOR FARC TALKS; FARC RESPONSE PENDING 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 11461 
     ¶B. BOGOTA 11435 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
Reason; 1.4 (b,d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C) President Uribe announced late on December 13 that 
the GOC has accepted an "international commission" 
(representatives from France, Switzerland, and Spain) 
suggestion to establish a 65 square mile "security zone" in 
the Valle del Cauca to conduct hostage exchange talks with 
the FARC.  The international commission handed the proposal 
to the GOC and the FARC on December 13.  Some 30 families 
live in the proposed security zone, a rural area that 
contains several small governmental facilities and a church. 
Uribe said the proposal contemplates 40 international 
observers in the security zone to verify that no armed actors 
are present, either GOC forces or guerrillas.  The security 
zone would exist for seven days prior to any GOC-FARC meeting 
(to allow the FARC to get to the zone) and for seven days 
following the conclusion of the talks (to allow the FARC to 
leave).  The International Committee of the Red Cross would 
observe the process, along with a committee representing the 
European facilitators.  In a meeting with the Ambassador 
shortly before the public announcement, Uribe said his 
acceptance of the security zone was a concession, taken to 
demonstrate the GOC's good faith approach to FARC talks. 
Uribe said the security zone would be significantly different 
from former President Pastrana's demilitarized zone 
("despeje") because Colombian sovereignty and law would 
remain in effect and there would be no armed guerrilla 
presence allowed.  The GOC's principal concession would be to 
withdraw the armed forces from the area for the duration of 
the talks.  If talks get underway, Uribe said he would not 
accept any FARC hostage exchange offer that excluded the 
three U.S. citizen hostages.  The FARC has not yet replied to 
the European proposal. 
 
¶2.  (C) With regard to the GOC-ELN peace process, Uribe told 
the Ambassador that ELN military commander Antonio Garcia had 
not yet arrived in Cuba to head the ELN delegation.  Uribe 
said he would be careful not to say anything in the coming 
days (including during his December 15 trip to New York) that 
would give Garcia an excuse not to attend the Havana talks. 
Uribe said Garcia was apparently traveling to Cuba from 
Venezuela so that he could arrive "in a dignified manner." 
(Press accounts December 14 report that Garcia has now 
arrived in Havana.)  The GOC's initial objective during the 
Havana talks would be to keep the ELN at the table.  Turning 
to the paramilitary peace process, Uribe said negotiations on 
extradition was not and would not be on the table.  U.S. 
pressure on extraditions had helped him deal with the 
paramilitary leaders.  The December 12 demobilization of 
almost 2,000 members of the Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB) was 
important; BCB leader Macaco was now like "a bird whose wings 
had been cut off."  Demobilized paramilitaries are easier to 
deal with than those who retain command structures and 
military equipment, he said.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Uribe Accepts Facilitators' Proposal 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) President Uribe announced during a press conference 
at 8PM on December 13 that he had accepted a proposal by 
three European facilitators (representatives from France, 
Switzerland, and Spain) to establish a 65 square mile 
"security zone" in a rural area in south east Valle del 
Cauca, bordering Tolima Department, to conduct hostage 
exchange talks with the FARC (see septel for full text of 
Uribe's remarks and full text of the facilitators' proposal). 
 The "international commission" was formed recently to 
explore mechanisms to facilitate such talks.  According to 
the GOC, about 30 families currently live in the security 
zone, which also contains some governmental facilities (a 
school, clinic, community center, and soccer field) and a 
church.  Uribe said the GOC had agreed to withdraw security 
forces from the security zone during any talks with the FARC, 
and for a period of seven days prior and subsequent to the 
meeting.  The proposal states that the FARC are not permitted 
to have armed guerrillas in the security zone.  Instead, some 
40 international observers would be present to monitor 
developments and verify compliance.  (It is unclear how the 
international observers would be selected.)  Other than GOC 
and FARC negotiators and the international observers, the 
only people authorized to be in the security zone during the 
negotiation period would be the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, which is providing logistical support, and a 
committee representing the facilitators. 
 
¶4.  (C) Uribe told Ambassador Wood and Carl Meacham of SFRC 
staff shortly before making his public announcement that he 
was accepting the proposed security zone to demonstrate he 
was acting in good faith.  Uribe hoped the FARC would accept 
the European proposal; if they did not, "we will have to be 
very firm with them," he said.  In any event, he expressed 
the belief that the proposal would put the FARC on the 
defensive.  Uribe emphasized that the security zone was 
significantly different from the demilitarized zone 
("despeje") that former President Pastrana established. 
Uribe said in the security zone, unlike in Pastrana's 
despeje, Colombian sovereignty and law would continue to 
apply and no armed FARC guerrillas would be permitted.  (The 
Pastrana despeje allowed the FARC to assume control of a 
territory the size of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode 
Island combined.)  Uribe described his acceptance of the 
European proposal as a "concession," that contradicted his 
previous statements on the issue, but that was required to 
move the process forward.  Uribe underscored to the 
Ambassador that he would not accept any FARC hostage exchange 
offer that omitted the three U.S. citizen hostages.  The 
FARC, which also apparently received the European proposal on 
December 13, has not yet replied. 
 
¶5.  (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo briefed 
ambassadors on FARC, ELN, and paramilitary peace process 
developments at an emergency G24 meeting December 12.  With 
respect to the FARC, Restrepo said representatives of the 
international commission had been in Colombia scouting for 
venues for talks.  So far, the FARC is accepting the 
Commission's role, which the GOC prefers because it cuts off 
other channels, such as the Church or ex-presidents that the 
FARC could turn to for a better deal or to neutralize GOC 
efforts.  (The French MFA released a statement last weekend 
to the effect that the commission's work was independent, 
apparently designed to reassure the FARC that the commission 
was not a tool of the GOC.  Restrepo, in contrast, told a 
group of ambassadors that the facilitators had agreed to 
follow the GOC lead.)  Restrepo appears convinced that unless 
there is some sort of FARC process in place, the ELN 
initiative will eventually fail because the "big brother" 
will prevent the "little brother" from closing on any deal. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
France, Betancourt Allies Welcome GOC Acceptance 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6.  (U) A French Foreign Ministry spokesperson said December 
14 that France "received with interest the Colombian 
Government's positive response" to the facilitators' 
proposal, and confirmed that France "is waiting on the FARC's 
response, which we hope will be positive."  Spokespersons for 
supporters of hostage and dual French-Colombian citizen 
Ingrid Betancourt (held since February 2002) praised the GOC 
decision to accept the proposal and urged the FARC to accept 
the same terms. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
The GOC's Strategy at the ELN Talks in Cuba 
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¶7.  (C) Uribe told the Ambassador that the GOC aimed to "keep 
the ELN talking at the negotiating table" during the upcoming 
Havana talks (refs A, B).  He said he understood that ELN 
military commander Antonio Garcia had not yet arrived in Cuba 
from Venezuela.  Garcia wanted to arrive "with dignity," 
Uribe said, but his apparent non-arrival gave Uribe pause. 
Uribe would be very cautious in the coming days (including 
during his December 15 private trip to New York) not to say 
anything that would give Garcia an excuse not to show up in 
Havana.  (Press accounts December 14 show photographs of 
Garcia in Havana.) 
 
¶8.  (C) The Ambassador underlined to Uribe his December 9 
comments to the ELN "Peace House" facilitators (ref A): the 
ELN should not get a deal that went beyond Justice and Peace 
law provisions.  If they did, they would essentially be 
negotiating on behalf of the paramilitaries, because the GOC 
would then be obliged to offer the paramilitaries the same 
deal.  Uribe agreed, saying that Colombian law requires 
similarly situated people to be treated the same way; one 
group of illegal armed actors could not get a better deal 
than the others.  He said many had criticized the Justice and 
Peace law as bland and as lacking real sanctions.  Now, 
however, the paramilitaries are complaining it is too tough 
and some say the ELN and FARC will never accept its tough 
terms. 
 
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Paramilitary Peace Process 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Referring to the December 12 demobilization of almost 
2,000 members of the paramilitary Central Bolivar Bloc, 
including its leader Macaco, Uribe told the Ambassador and 
Meacham it was easier to confront the paramilitaries after 
they had demobilized than when they still had a command 
structure and significant weapons.  (Macaco's group turned in 
two helicopters in working order, both fitted with 50mm 
machine guns, as well as over 1,200 rifles, over 500 
grenades, 13 rockets, and a large quantity of assorted 
caliber ammunition; Uribe said Macaco was now "like a bird 
whose wings had been cut off.")  In response to Meacham's 
question, Uribe said he had not and would not negotiate 
extradition with paramilitaries; the subject was not and 
would not be on the table.  Uribe would decide at a later 
date whether to extradite Don Berna to the U.S.  He would 
base his decision in part on Don Berna's complete compliance 
with Justice and Peace law requirements, including full 
disclosure of crimes and handing over of assets.  If Don 
Berna failed to comply, Colombian public opinion would 
support Uribe's decision to extradite him ("si no cumple, se 
va").  Uribe emphasized that he had created 384 enemies with 
extradition decisions, referring to the families of those he 
has extradited from Colombia, most to the U.S.  Uribe said 
U.S. pressure on extraditions had helped him to deal with the 
paramilitaries. 
 
WOOD