This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 007644 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL TH BURMA
SUBJECT: MATERIAL SUPPORT ISSUE COULD CRIPPLE U.S. 
RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM FROM THAILAND AND REVERSE PROGRESS ON 
 
REFUGEE ASSISTANCE 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Several positive changes have marked 
recent Thai policy toward the approximately 140,000 Burmese 
refugees located in nine camps along the Thai-Burma border. 
The Thai have agreed to the U.S. proposal to offer 
resettlement to the entire, 9,000-person camp of Tham Hin 
after rejecting such large-scale resettlement for many years 
because of a fear that it would pull more Burmese into 
Thailand.  The Thai for the first time are officially 
encouraging NGOs to provide enhanced schooling and vocational 
training opportunities for camp refugees.  The Thai are 
considering official sanction for Burmese refugees to work. 
These developments, described as unprecedented by senior NGO 
officials along the border, are occurring for several 
reasons.  One of the most important, since it shows the 
international community,s commitment to sharing the Burmese 
refugee burden, is the willingness of third countries, 
particularly the United States, to resettle large numbers of 
Burmese camp refugees.  The emerging Thai vision of the 
future thus combines improvement of the lives of the camp 
refugees with third country resettlement. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Unfortunately, the material support issue, currently 
under USG consideration, could stop significant U.S. refugee 
resettlement from Thailand in its tracks if it causes the 
denial of U.S. resettlement to large numbers of Burmese 
refugees because they at some point provided even minimal 
support to a group opposed to the Burmese government that 
could be defined as a terrorist organization under U.S. law. 
This issue could halt and even reverse the positive trend in 
Thai refugee policy because it would remove a key lynchpin of 
that policy.  Also at stake is U.S. credibility as a partner 
in addressing the Burmese refugee issue in Thailand.  End 
summary. 
 
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Thai Agree to Resettlement of Burmese Camp Refugees 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) There are increasing indications that positive 
changes in Thai policy toward the approximately 140,000 Karen 
and Karenni refugees in the nine camps along the Thai-Burma 
border are broadening and becoming institutionalized.  The 
first indication that significant change was occurring was 
Thai openness last year to the idea of U.S. resettlement for 
the approximately 9,000 refugees in Tham Hin camp.  The 
resettlement option for many years had been off the table 
because of a Thai concern that it would pull more refugees 
across the border and a Thai hope that refugee repatriation 
to Burma might become possible. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Last summer the Thai formally agreed to a U.S. 
proposal for a Tham Hin program and the start-up of that 
program is now imminent.  Other countries have already begun 
significant resettlement out of other border camps, albeit at 
numbers much lower than those planned by the USG.  The Thai 
position toward those efforts remains positive and barring 
some unforeseen development, is likely to remain so. 
 
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Forward Movement on Improving Refugee Livelihoods 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Early this year, another significant positive Thai 
policy change occurred.  The Thai Ministry of Interior issued 
a letter to NGOs operating in the Burma border camps that 
formally encouraged them to offer enhanced educational and 
vocational training opportunities to camp refugees. 
Previously, some of these activities had existed, but they 
were ad hoc, small in number, and never formally sanctioned 
by the Thai government.  Subsequently, UNHCR and the NGOs, 
including the USG-funded International Rescue Committee and 
the American Refugee Committee have been developing programs 
to take advantage of this new opening.  Importantly, the Thai 
government is also taking an active role.  In July the 
Cabinet approved a budget for the Ministry of Education (MOE) 
to open learning centers in the refugee camps to provide 
Thai-language training to the refugees.  MOE is also studying 
the possibility of permitting camp refugees to apply to Thai 
universities. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Since the Thai opened the door to enhanced 
educational and vocational opportunities, UNHCR, NGOs, and 
Refcoord have encouraged the RTG to consider favorably the 
logical next step of officially permitting camp refugee to 
work.  The arguments that have been used are that the RTG has 
already issued temporary work permits to approximately 
960,000 Burmese outside the refugee camps, the Thai Ministry 
of Labor has determined that there is demand for another 
500,000 workers, and the number of working age refugees in 
the camps is small compared to the number of work permits 
already issued.  During a visit to the border camp region 
earlier this year, Prime Minister Thaksin directed that Thai 
Ministries study the possibility of refugees working.  Thai 
National Security Council and Ministry of Interior officials 
recently told UNHCR and Refcoord that this issue is under 
active consideration. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The most recent positive development links refugee 
resettlement and refugee protection.  Senior Thai National 
Security Council and Ministry of Interior officials have told 
UNHCR and Refcoord that the RTG is beginning to consider what 
to do with the refugees who would remain behind in Tham Hin 
refugee camp, likely because they did not choose the 
resettlement option, after the completion of the U.S. 
resettlement program.  Thai thinking is still in very early 
stages, but these officials have said that one option would 
be relocation to a new site that would offer employment 
opportunities to the refugees. 
 
--------------------------- 
Why Thai Policy Has Shifted 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) There are several reasons for these Thai policy 
shifts.  SPDC military ascendancy and diminished conflict in 
eastern Burma, together with enormous flows of Burmese 
economic migrants have led the Thai to realize that the major 
cause of cross-border movement is no longer fighting in 
Burma, though this push factor and generalized oppression 
continues to exist.  Instead, Burma,s declining economy and 
work opportunities in Thailand are driving the flows.  The 
number of persons in the refugee camps is now a small 
percentage of the estimated 1.5 million Burmese in Thailand. 
A second factor is Thai sensitivity that the conditions in 
the refugee camps, while satisfactory in terms of meeting the 
refugees' basic needs, provide them no future.  This casts 
Thailand in a bad light, particularly given the recent 
worldwide focus on resolving protracted refugee situations 
and preventing "refugee warehousing." 
 
¶9. (SBU) Third, there is a growing Thai realization that the 
camp refugees may never be able to return to Burma.  As a 
result, it is in Thailand's own interest to think more in 
terms of integrating them into Thai society, particularly 
given the demand for imported labor.  Finally, the success of 
the U.S. resettlement programs for the Hmong and the urban 
Burmese has helped convince the Thai that new approaches to 
long-standing refugee problems that involve resettlement can 
succeed. 
 
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Institutionalization of Policy Change 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) We believe that these policy shifts are beginning 
to become institutionalized and therefore more likely to be 
sustained over time.  When indications of positive Thai 
refugee policy shifts began, they were largely voiced by 
General Winai, the head of the Thai National Security 
Council.  Compared to other Thai officials, Winai is more 
open-minded and sympathetic to refugees.  This raised the 
question of whether the changes were linked to one man and 
therefore reversible when Winai departed from the scene. 
However, the activities of the Ministry of Education, 
approved by the Cabinet, and the positive statements 
mentioned above from senior MOI officials indicate that this 
is indeeda policy shift, and not just the views of one 
progressive individual. 
 
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3rd Country Resettlement is Key Element of New Thai Approach 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) From UNHCR and Refcoord discussions with the RTG, 
third country resettlement clearly plays a central role in 
the emerging Thai vision of the future.  The Thai hope that 
resettlement will gradually reduce the Burmese camp refugee 
population and thereby permit the closure and/or 
consolidation of the refugee camps over time.  The Thai also 
view resettlement as concrete evidence of the international 
community,s commitment to help address the protracted 
Burmese refugee situation.  This makes it easier for the Thai 
in turn to do their part by considering ways to improve the 
livelihood of the refugees who will remain in Thailand.  The 
imminent start-up of the Tham Hin resettlement program and 
the expectation that most of the Tham Hin population will 
choose the resettlement option has now spurred the Thai to 
start thinking in concrete terms, as mentioned above, about 
ways to mesh resettlement with enhanced opportunities for the 
refugees who will remain behind. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Material Support Issue Threatens Progress 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The material support issue has arisen in the 
context described above.  Under the Patriot and Real ID Acts, 
refugees could be denied resettlement if at some time in the 
past they gave support, even minimal support such as a bowl 
of rice, to an organization that could be defined as a 
terrorist organization under U.S. law, whether or not it is 
on an official list of terrorist organizations.  Many Burmese 
refugees are from ethnic groups which have organizations that 
are opposed to the Burmese government and could be caught by 
the U.S. legal definition of a terrorist organization.  The 
USG has been considering the material support issue for well 
over one year but has yet to find a workable solution. 
 
¶13. (SBU) In the meantime, many Burmese refugee cases have 
been placed on hold.  About 60 percent of ethnic Chin refugee 
cases referred to the U.S. program in Malaysia (affecting 
about 350 persons including some minors who are particularly 
vulnerable) are now on hold pending a decision on material 
support inadmissibility.  Of almost 100 Karenni refugees 
interviewed in Thailand in November, two-thirds have been 
placed on hold because of material support.  These numbers 
continue to grow as more cases are interviewed by DHS and 
deferred.  Thousands of Tham Hin refugees will face a similar 
situation if the material support issue is not resolved by 
March 2006, when DHS adjudications are expected to begin. 
This would cripple the Tham Hin program just as it is getting 
off the ground. 
 
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Comment 
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¶14. (SBU) The positive changes in Thai policy towards the 
conditions of Burmese refugees in the border camps are in a 
nascent stage and will likely unfold in an incremental manner 
over at least several years.  However, it is not unreasonable 
now to envision a future in which the camps gradually 
disappear through a combination of third country resettlement 
and local integration of the remaining refugees within 
Thailand.  This would be an extremely positive humanitarian 
development for the refugees, who in some cases have been 
languishing in camps for twenty years. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Comment (cont.) The United States can legitimately 
claim some credit for the positive evolution of Thai policy. 
The Hmong and urban Burmese resettlement programs, which have 
moved about 17,000 refugees to the United States in less than 
two years, have shown the Thai that the international 
community is willing to help share the refugee burden and 
that new approaches can lead to the resolution of 
long-standing refugee problems.  Third country resettlement 
is a key element in the new Thai policy toward Burmese 
refugees.  If the material support issue is not resolved soon 
and in a manner which permits U.S. resettlement approval for 
a substantial percentage of Tham Hin refugee applicants, the 
RTG would likely reconsider and possibly reverse the positive 
movement forward in its overall Burmese refugee policy.  In 
addition, since the United States proposed the Tham Hin 
resettlement effort in the first place, the U.S. role and 
credibility as a partner in addressing the Burmese refugee 
problem in Thailand would be seriously undermined.  Finally, 
our ability to encourage the Thai to provide asylum to 
Burmese refugees would be undercut if the USG makes a 
determination that thousands of those refugees are not 
qualified for admission to the United States. 
BOYCE