This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 005081 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: IECI SCRUTINIZES COMPLAINT PROCESS AMIDST 
HEIGHTENED SUNNI ARAB CLAIMS OF ELECTION FRAUD 
 
 
Classified By: Robert Political Counselor S. Ford 
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (U) See paragraph 12 for recommended press 
guidance. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Summary:  On December 21 there were more 
denunciations of election fraud while the election 
commission investigated specific charges and complete 
the vote count.  UN election team leader Jenness told 
us December 21 that the number of complaints had 
reached 1,100 but only two dozen appeared serious. 
None of those was likely to change the results of even 
a single seat in the 275 member future parliament, he 
said.  He added he would work with the Iraqi election 
commissioners to try to get ahead of the media 
coverage of fraud allegations.  Poloffs talked with a 
series of Sunni Arab political leaders, urging that 
they drop their call for a rerun of the Baghdad 
election and that they tone down their rhetoric in the 
media while the election commission does its work.  We 
can expect even more Sunni Arab unhappiness when they 
see how the parliamentary seat numbers are shaping up 
that will give the Shia 555 list a wide margin over 
the Sunni Arabs.  Over the longer term, we have to 
focus Sunni Arab attention on how to join the 
government and protect their interests from inside the 
cabinet.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
IECI AND UNAMI ADDRESS SUNNI ARAB CONCERNS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) 
UN Commissioner Craig Jenness told PolCouns on 
December 21 that the IECI complaint review process is 
moving forward amidst public dissatisfaction from 
Sunni Arab political parties.  Jenness stated that 
earlier in the day SRSG Ashraf Qazi met with Tariq al- 
Hashimi from the Iraqi Consensus Front (Tawafuq List 
618) where al-Hashimi called the electoral process 
into question, disputed the preliminary results for 
Baghdad, and demanded a rerun of the election in 
Baghdad.  Qazi countered these claims and told al- 
Hashimi that the IECI took all election-related 
allegations seriously.  According to Jenness, Qazi 
urged al-Hashimi to tone down the rhetoric and not 
over-politicize the process while the IECI continued 
with its administrative investigations. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
A Technician's View:  Still a Clean Election 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Jenness emphasized to PolCouns that the IECI 
was acting on all complaints that were sent to the 
IECI, which currently number over 1,100.  (The number 
is still growing, but more slowly, as the voting 
materials are processed at the Tally Center.)  Jenness 
pointed out that given nearly 32,000 polling stations, 
the over 350,000 registered observers and monitors for 
these elections, and the wide-reaching public outreach 
campaign on the complaint process, the actual number 
of complaints is not surprising and represents an 
average of one complaint for every thirty polling 
stations.  Jenness doubted that the 25 "red" 
complaints to date would do more than change some 
ballot boxes or at most a few polling stations 
nationwide.  He admitted, however, that the IECI 
lacked a credible public relations campaign regarding 
their response to the complaints, and promised to beef 
up their PR programs starting with the press 
conference scheduled for later in the day. 
 
¶5. (C) Jenness pointed out that pre-election complaint 
investigations resulted in fines of 5 million Iraqi 
Dinar (about USD $3500) levied against nine political 
parties.  While that amount is not very large, it 
still demonstrated the IECI's resolved to see 
administrative investigations through to their proper 
completion.  Post-election investigations, he pointed 
out, could result in sanctions that include voiding 
ballots for a specific ballot box, polling station, or 
even a polling center, depending on the severity and 
extent of the violation.  This type of sanction 
represents a potential loss of thousands of votes. 
 
------------------------------- 
The Sunni Arabs Make their Case 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) In separate telephone conversations with Poloff 
on December 21 Tawafuq Front leaders Adnan al-Duleimi 
and Tariq al-Hashimi both stood by their protest of 
the election results. Duleimi demanded a re-vote in 
Baghdad.  Poloff warned him to let the electoral 
commission have a chance to study complaints and play 
its role.  Taking this dispute to the media right away 
would only make the issue harder to solve, not easier, 
Poloff said. There are many intermediate steps that 
can be taken to address complaints short of a full-out 
re-vote.  Most seriously, Sunni leaders like Salah al- 
Mutlak were using the complaints to threaten violence, 
a step that could undo the progress made on December 
¶15.  Duleimi denounced Mutlak out of hand, insisting 
that he does not represent the Sunni Arab community 
and would not have won any seats in the election at 
all without "outside" support.  He insisted that he 
opposed violence in any form and wanted a peaceful 
resolution of the issue. 
 
¶7. (C) Tareq al-Hashimi said he had held a positive 
meeting on the subject with UN SRSG Ashraf Qazi that 
morning and then reviewed the details of his 
complaint.  Hashemi said that there was no way to 
properly evaluate the number of votes lost because of 
fraud throughout Iraq.  He said ballots had been 
invalidated in Diyala, monitors turned away in Kirkuk, 
and Basra Sunni Arabs had been mysteriously 
disenfranchised.  Some 63,000 people voted for his 
list in Basra even though the Sunni Arabs there 
represent some 25 percent of the population or some 
200,000 voters.  (Others put the Sunni Arab population 
in Basra at about 5 percent, making the results about 
as expected). 
 
¶8. (C) Most seriously, Hashemi said, his observers had 
found a major discrepancy in Baghdad between their 
vote count observations and those ultimately announced 
by the IECI.  The Tawafuq observers counted 1,120,000 
votes for the UIA and 660,000 for Tawafuq.  The 
ultimate announcement was off by several hundred 
thousand, he said, bringing it to 1.4 million for UIA 
and 440,000 for Tawafuq.  He insisted that the Sunni 
Arab community would not remain silent if its concerns 
were not addressed.  However, he stopped short of 
calling for a re-vote.  He also changed the subject 
when Poloff asked for a copy of his internal tally 
documents supporting his count. 
 
¶9.  (C) Abid Mutlak al-Jaburi, who headed the Sunni 
Arab Tawaffuq List 618 in Kirkuk province, warned 
PolCouns December 21 that the Baghdad numbers 
announcement had changed the mood of the Sunni Arab 
community dramatically.  Now the Sunni Arabs felt the 
Shia had cheated and the Sunni Arabs again were in a 
corner.  He said people had started asking him why 
they should trust the Americans who appeared to be "in 
league with Iran" against the Sunni Arabs.  He urged 
that there be new elections in Baghdad, as well as 
Kirkuk and Basrah. 
 
¶10. (C)  PolCouns cautioned that a new election in 
Baghdad was hard to imagine.  He urged al-Jaburi to 
remember the most important goal for the Sunni Arabs 
was to share in the government and to maximize gains by 
looking at alliances with the Kurds and the Allawi 
list.  PolCouns urged Jaburi to (a) keep Sunni threats 
out of the media as compromises likely will be 
necessary later; (b) weigh in with the Ulema Council - 
with whom Jaburi speaks - to stay out of the media and 
(c) let the election commission do its work.  Jaburi 
did not argue but complained that the Sunni Arabs had 
to receive a gesture or the political momentum from 
the election would be lost.  (He thought reducing the 
Shia 555 list down to 100 seats would be face-saving 
enough.  PolCouns reminded him that counting votes is 
one thing and making political deals is another.) 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Separately, members of the Allawi List 731 
hosted a meeting with the Tawaffuq List 618 and Sunni 
Arab hard-liner Salih Mutlak's 667 list during which 
they denounced alleged massive election fraud and 
promised to pursue redress.  The three lists, joined 
by several smaller lists, announced they would form a 
follow-up committee and, notably, a media and 
communications committee as well.  PolFSN at the 
meeting reported that Abdel Nasser al-Janabi from the 
Tawaffuq list bitterly criticized the U.S. for not 
ensuring a clean election process.  However, there was 
no threat to stir up violence or boycott the next 
assembly. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
¶12.  (C)  So far, the announcement of the Baghdad 
results seems to have caused the greatest heartburn to 
the Sunni Arab community.  Much of what we are hearing 
is Sunni Arab angst at seeing that Baghdad may well 
have a Shia Arab majority; this is an emotional as 
well as political shock to many.  We can anticipate 
even more complaints when the Sunni Arab leaders 
realize how many parliamentary seats the Shia 
Islamists will capture compared to their own seats 
(septel).  We will be working in the days ahead to 
keep the Sunni Arab politicos from taking such a hard- 
line stand in the media about the election results 
that they cannot retreat later.  On one side we will 
work with the UN and the IECI to try to make the 
investigation process as serious as possible without 
giving anyone the sense that the investigations will 
dramatically change the results (they won't).  On the 
other side, we will also seek to focus Sunni Arabs on 
setting themselves up with the Kurds and the Allawi 
list to negotiate entry into the government from a 
position of relative strength. 
 
 
-------------- 
Press Guidance 
-------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Post recommends following press guidance: 
 
-- The IECI estimates voter turnout at about 70 
percent, with over 10.8 million votes cast.  This 
represents an increase of about 2.5 million voters 
from the January 2005 elections. 
 
--  It is important that the Iraqi election be deemed 
credible by the Iraqi public, and the IECI should 
investigate allegations of fraud thoroughly. 
 
--  The 1,100 complaints filed with the IECI to date 
demonstrates the extent of observer coverage as well 
as Iraqis' freedom to address potential cases of 
fraud. 
 
--  There were over 30,000 polling stations, and it is 
important to keep the number of complaints in context. 
 
--  The IECI has complaints from all political parties 
and must treat all complaints fairly. 
 
KHALILZAD