This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 005066 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: IECI DISPATCHES AUDIT TEAMS TO TRADITIONAL 
ELECTION HOTSPOTS WHILE IECI BOARD PONDERS NEXT MOVES 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford 
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary.  As part of a previously planned 
initiative to enhance the credibility of the election 
process, the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq 
(IECI) will conduct post-election audits in five 
cities throughout Iraq.  These audits follow the pre- 
election audits conducted that established the 
baseline for election operations.  These audits are 
being conducted in the midst of the board's heated 
debates concerning which actions, if any, should be 
taken regarding an audit of the Out-of-Country Voting 
(OCV) process.  Meanwhile, the IECI board intends to 
conduct a board-level review of the 20 category red 
complaints filed to date that, if substantiated, could 
possibly impact the outcome of the elections.  The 
IECI's reaction to allegations of fraud is already 
becoming a bell weather issue for the Sunni Arab 
political leadership, and we are urging the UN 
election team and the IECI leadership to address fraud 
allegations seriously.  End Summary. 
 
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AUDIT TEAMS DISPATCHED TO FIVE IRAQI CITIES 
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¶2. (C) UN Commissioner to the IECI Craig Jenness told 
PolOff on December 19 that the previously planned IECI 
audit teams would begin deployment on December 20 to 
conduct post-election audits.  The five sites are 
Mosul, Irbil, Hillah, Kirkuk, and Baqubah.  The intent 
of the two-day audits is to review the credibility of 
the overall election process in those areas and to 
conduct spot checks on selected polling station ballot 
boxes and counting forms.  Jenness explained that 
these audit locations were previously selected based 
on the most likely areas for election-related 
complaints.  He also said that the IECI wanted a 
representative sample of locations in order to 
minimize claims of bias against any particular group 
or sect.  He stated that although Basra was on their 
original list post-election audit list, this location 
was dropped primarily due to logistics difficulties 
and the lack of available personnel to staff the 
Basrah audit team. 
 
¶3. (C) Jenness stated that these audit teams follow 
the pre-election audit process that was conducted, 
with little fanfare, prior to the elections.  Those 
audits were conducted in Kut, Baqubah, Kirkuk, Mosul, 
and Irbil, and provided a baseline for the follow-on 
audits.  Despite their low profile, the pre-election 
audit visits did attract the attention of the 
political parties, Jenness added, and served notice 
that the IECI would be actively engaged in election 
process oversight before, during, and after December 
¶15. 
 
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ELECTION DAY EXAMINERS ADD TO ENFORCEMENT TOOLKIT 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (C) Jenness stated that on the actual Election Day, 
teams of IECI examiners were assigned to polling 
centers throughout Iraq to independently review the 
election work of the IECI at the field level as well 
as to act as another set of eyes and ears to witness 
the overall electoral process.  IECI International 
Elections Assistance Team (IEAT) staff told PolOff on 
December 18 that approximately 30 to 50 examiners were 
employed in about 15 governorates, and worked in pairs 
at selected polling centers to conduct their 
observations.  The recently completed report is 
currently being translated from Arabic to English and 
should be available within days, Jenness said. 
 
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AT LEAST 20 CATEGORY RED COMPLAINTS TO DATE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Jenness confirmed that at least 20 category red 
complaints have been submitted to the IECI.  He stated 
that the IEAT and IECI complaints staff planned to 
brief the IECI Board of Directors on December 20 on 
the details of these complaints and the planned course 
of action for each one.  Jenness stated that he 
understood the majority of the complaints pertained to 
ballot box stuffing, reported periods of time when the 
observers and monitors were not allowed inside the 
polling stations, and periods of time when the ballots 
were allegedly in the sole control of Iraqi security 
forces and not the IECI. 
 
¶6. (C) Since category red complaints, if proven, could 
impact the results of the elections, Jenness 
emphasized that the IECI wanted to carefully review 
them to ensure they were properly acted upon.  The 
timing of this IECI Board review coincides with the 
deployment of the audit teams, allowing the board to 
take advantage of these teams in order to conduct on- 
location timely follow-up as needed. 
 
¶7. (C) Jenness stated that on the night of December 19 
the Board reviewed a total of 150 complaints out of 
the 900 already submitted.  He pointed out that they 
also discussed the volumes of complaints submitted by 
Ayad Allawi whose coalition did not use the prescribed 
complaint form but instead submitted narrative 
reports.  Unfortunately, Jenness pointed out, these 
reports did not identify the witness who saw the 
irregularity nor did the reports provide enough 
detailed information to accurately determine the 
appropriate polling center, polling station, or other 
intended location.  Although these reports by and 
large do not meet the proscribed reporting criteria, 
Jenness indicated that the IECI will apply leniency 
and consider the reports as valid complaints. 
 
¶8. (C) Possible IECI action the IECI can take in the 
case of category red violations, Jenness explained, 
include invalidating votes at the polling station and 
center level, excluding the entire ballot box results 
if necessary.  If the action appears criminal in 
nature, Jenness indicated that the IECI would not 
conduct that type of investigation, and that the 
disposition of any such investigation would not impact 
on the certification of the elections. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
IECI BOARD REMAINS IN STATE OF INTERNAL TURMOIL 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶9. (C) Due partially to external and internal 
complaints lodged against the Out of Country Voting 
(OCV) process as well as personal sniping, the IECI 
Board of Directors have been embroiled in a continuous 
internal struggle over OCV, with board meetings often 
resulting in prolonged shouting matches.  Jenness told 
PolOff that these arguments have been going on for 
several days, and are now impacting on the ability of 
the board to focus on other business at hand.  He 
singled out Commissioner Farid as the loudest voice 
calling for full audits of the OCV process, claiming 
widespread internal corruption as well as cases of 
voting fraud.  As an interim measure, Jenness 
indicated that the IECI will conduct audits in London 
(neutral location) and Turkey (reports of possible 
voter fraud). 
 
¶10. (C) To counter Farid, other commissioners have 
taken the position that international observers have 
largely regarded OCV a success, and that the IECI 
internal checks were sufficient to detect incidents of 
corruption on the part of any commissioner or staff. 
Jenness opined that this prolonged event was based 
largely on personal motives by Farid against 
Commissioner Hamdia who took the lead on OCV.  While 
other commissioners may have had concerns over the way 
OCV was conducted, they resented the virulent attacks 
by Farid. 
 
¶11. (C) The IECI suffered one casualty possibly 
related to this matter.  After another lengthy session 
between Farid and IECI Chairman Izaddin where each 
firmly held their own ground, Izaddin suddenly took 
ill, displaying symptoms of a heart attack.  Swift 
medical response brought him to the MNF-I Casualty 
Support Hospital in the International Zone where he 
was pronounced to be in satisfactory condition. 
Doctors later revealed he likely did not suffer a 
heart attack, but he did demonstrate symptoms often 
associated with extreme stress.  Due largely to a 
prior heart condition, doctors kept Izaddin in the 
hospital overnight for observations and more tests. 
 
¶12. (C) Jenness later revealed to PolOff that the 
commissioners all but blamed Farid for contributing 
to, if not being the direct cause, of Izaddin's sudden 
change of health.  He added that he expressed his own 
disappointment, as the UN Commissioner to the IECI, 
for Farid's conduct during board meetings that 
contributed directly to the inability of the IECI to 
move forward with its agenda.  Jenness stated that the 
commissioners planned to urge Farid to take a 
vacation.  With Commissioner Hamdia expected to return 
to Amman on December 20, and with Commissioner Izaddin 
out of action for an undetermined amount of time, 
Jenness stated that the IECI board needed to pull 
together if they expected to overcome these latest 
adversities as well as other looming challenges soon 
to be faced by the Board. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶13. (C) The IECI's internal bickering has led them to 
a major crossroads in IECI board management.  Whether 
the UN commissioner or one of the remaining 
commissioners steps up to instill order remains to be 
seen.  In the interim, the audit teams are on their 
way and the board can now focus on the issue of the 
red complaints, among other agenda items.  These teams 
have significantly, albeit temporarily, depleted the 
ranks of the IECI and IEAT staff.  However, this has 
not had an impact on other operations such as the 
Tally Center which continues pressing ahead with 
processing the last of the count sheets that have 
finally arrived from the last remaining governorates. 
 
¶14. (C) As more preliminary results are released by 
the IECI, the trend will likely reveal increasing 
strength by the Shi'a and Kurdish coalitions, steady 
strength from the Sunni Arab community, with waning 
strength from Allawi.  If that trend continues, the 
Allawi Coalition will certainly step up in both volume 
and frequency their complaints against the process. 
Such a reaction is not unexpected, especially from an 
aggrieved party first seeking remedy through the 
electoral process.  The IECI's reaction to allegations 
of fraud is already becoming a bell weather issue for 
the Sunni Arab political leadership as well.  In our 
conversations with the election commission and UN 
election advisors we have underlined that the 
credibility of the IECI as an institution, and the 
credibility of the election process depends in part on 
the commission's response to allegations of fraud now 
coming forward. 
KHALILZAD