This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 005002 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PNAT PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN TONE GETS SHARPER, MORE INTENSE 
 
REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 4960 
     ¶B. B. BAGHDAD 4924 
     ¶C. C. BAGHDAD 4906 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for 
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 ¶1.  (U) With just one day before the elections, 
campaigning for the December 15 elections has been intense, 
incredibly more personal, organized and criminal than the 
campaign in January. This has included inter-sectarian 
conflicts: the destruction of Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) 
offices by forces allegedly aligned with the large Kurdish 
parties and United Islamic Alliance (555) verbal assaults 
on their secular and liberal Shias.   Press reports and 
conversations reveal targeted attacks on parties, using 
sophisticated, pre-meditated methods that include threats, 
kidnappings, and assassinations.  In January, the fear was 
related more to the insurgency and its ability to disrupt 
the election of a transitional government.  This time, with 
the Sunnis guaranteed to participate in significantly more 
numbers, the fear has turned to what will happen when one 
or a few parties gain power, particularly since these 
elections are for a 4-year permanent government. In all, in 
comparison to the January 2005 contest, the stakes are 
higher, the incidents of violence nastier and the rhetoric 
has been ratcheted up to match.  Iraqis know they have real 
choices on December 15, and they can make their votes 
count.  It will be important for the parties and observers 
who allege voting fraud to document their allegations 
carefully and for the election commission to address them 
seriously.  The commission's disqualification of several 
hundred thousand fraudulent votes in Irbil in January 2005 
is an example of the kind of resolve the commission may 
well need again.  End Summary 
 
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Allawi and Sunni Parties Come Out Swinging 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (U) Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's campaign has 
stepped up its criticisms on the record of Prime Minister 
Jafari's government, criticizing the current Shia Islamist 
government for its failure to develop the economy and 
restore security, and his latest poster does the same.  He 
also has underlines in his public remarks the risk of Iraq 
falling into civil war if sectarian politics continue as 
they are.  Meanwhile, Sunni Arabs are accusing the 
transitional government of helping the occupation; a 
Tawafuq (618) TV ad bitterly condemns the "occupation" for 
marginalizing people and then attacks the transitional 
government for helping.  List 618 campaign events also 
condemn the government for violating human rights and 
running secret prisons, playing off the news of the 
Jadriyah investigation.  National Dialogue Front slate 
(List 667) leader Saleh Mutlak has TV ads stressing the 
alleged sectarian tone of the Jafari government.  Bordering 
on the hysterical, Allawist Saad al-Janabi is using his own 
al-Rasheed radio station to repeat the allegations 
frequently heard from Sunni politicians that vigorously 
accuse the Jafari government of arranging for one million 
Iranians with fake identification and registration to vote 
in the elections. On December 13, al-Rasheed radio issued 
news reports about the discovery of a 6,000 man secret 
prison operated by Iranian intelligence officers. 
 
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Shia Islamists Firing Back 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) The Jafari government defended its record 
releasing a 50-page document full of ITG achievements. 
Meanwhile, United Islamic Alliance leader Abdel Aziz al- 
Hakim lashed broadsides of his own not so subtly aimed at 
Allawi and the Sunni Arabs. Al Furat TV, controlled by 
SCIRI, reported that SCIRI head Abdul Aziz al Hakim offered 
200,000 Badr Corps members to help ISF and IP provide 
election security.  In the same press conference, Badr 
Corps head Hadi al-Amari said, "We used weapons against 
Saddam, and are not afraid to use them if Baathists are 
part of the government again." (A veiled threat to Allawi, 
whom they consider as Baathist.)  Prominent Da'wa political 
leader Jwad Maliki, meanwhile, was on Al Furat December 13 
evening warning viewers of the return of a "new Baath" 
party through the election. 
 
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Assassinations on the Rise 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U) On December 7, election monitoring NGO IFES 
(International Federation of Election Systems) released a 
statement confirming that since November 10, there have 
been 17 assassinations of political party members, sitting 
officials, and religious figures with links to political 
parties.  Base on preliminary data, IFES suggested that 
this number is expected to rise.  (Prominent Sunni Arab 
political figure and TV commentator Mizhar al-Dulaimi was 
murdered while campaigning in Ramadi on December 13.) 
-------------------------------------- 
Unified Islamic Alliance Real Campaign 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) During January, IECI workers, candidates, and 
party workers worried more about attacks by insurgents and 
not by their fellow competitors.  Now, campaign attacks are 
perpetrated by other parties.  Several Shia Islamist 
campaign workers were murdered in Baghdad, according to 
Iraqi press reports on December 10.  In addition, this 
campaign has seen the murder of campaign workers for 
Allawi's list and a Christian list, the destruction of KIU 
offices (ref B) and attacks on Allawi offices in the south. 
(We received a call from the Allawi headquarters shortly 
before dispatch of this cable that the Allawi list 
headquarters in Nasiriyah was attacked midday December 14.) 
Other parties have alleged that the Unified Islamisc 
Alliance (555) has waged a war of dirty campaign tactics 
that include murder and kidnapping (ref C), character 
assassination, disinformation, bribes, house raids and de- 
Ba'athification. Conclusive evidence is lacking, but most 
allegations center on suspicion that the attacks in Baghdad 
and the South benefit the UIA and that the attacks in 
Kirkuk, Ninewa, and the North, benefit the Kurdish 
alliance. 
 
¶6.  In addition, the campaign battle has extended to: 
 
- (U) A POSTER WAR: Posters are an important means of 
campaigning in Iraq.  (Posters, unlike TV, are not 
susceptible to electricity blackouts.) This is the most 
frequent complaints by non-Shia Alliance parties.  As an 
example, negative campaigning in the form of anti-Ayad 
Allawi posters and flyers have appeared, comparing Allawi 
with Saddam Hussein and associating him with the Ba'athist 
regime.  One of these posters shows half of Saddam 
Hussein's face and half of Ayad Allawi's face and asks, 
"Who does this man remind you of?" Allawi's campaign and 
Ali al-Dabbagh's campaigns have had their posters 
systematically torn down, according to supporters of these 
candidates. 
 
- (C) HOUSE RAIDS AND ARRESTS:  The Justice and Future 
Coalition reported that several of their supporters have 
been harassed by Badr Corps (555) policemen who raided 
their homes under the guise of illegal weapons search. 
Abdulrahim Nasrullah, leader of the Justice and Future 
Coalition, added that many of the protective details have 
yet to receive weapon permits from the police despite 
repeated application.  The police, aware of those awaiting 
permits, come to their homes and arrest them. Allawi 
officials have alleged similar intimidation in the southern 
provinces. 
 
- (U) CANDIDATE DEFECTIONS: SCIRI television station al- 
Furat started advertising on December 8 that political 
candidates from 5 parties had quit the political race in 
order to support the Shia Alliance: Free Iraq Forum (503), 
First Democratic National Party (617), Iraq Intifada 
Gathering (671), Loyalty to Najaf (696), Imam Ali Society 
(753). 
 
- (C) PARTY DEFECTIONS:  Al-Furat television also claims 
that the Rise and Reform (707), Council of Misan Marshes 
(655) and the Peace Organization for Shiite Kurds (810) 
have dissolved their parties to vote for the Shia Alliance. 
Several political contacts alleged that the Shia Alliance 
registered these parties as shell parties in order to 
defect with days before the elections. 
 
- (C) DE-BA'ATHIFICATION:  Answering the most serious 
charges by Shia parties is that secular and Sunni parties 
will bring back the Baathists if Iraqis vote for them.  In 
the Iraqi context, this is am explosive charge.  Charges of 
de-Baathification are a part of this.  National De- 
Ba'athification Commission board members who are UIA 555 
politicians insisted the IECI remove candidates they 
identified as Baathists.  They went so far as to threaten 
the IECI Board of Directors by saying that they would 
publicly denounce the IECI for failing to comply with the 
applicable De-Ba'athification laws. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Over-the-top rhetoric is part of the rough and 
tumble of emerging democracy, but in Iraq, this is part of 
a larger pattern in which parties with militias have at 
times operated more roughly.  Solid evidence of who is 
behind the assassinations, intimidation, and campaign dirty 
tricks is, not surprisingly, hard to come by, but the 
Iraqis who are complaining are rivals to the UIA (555) and 
the Kurdish Alliance (730).  Those complaining are the 
weaker parties, and their complaints also could aim to 
generate American pressure to even the playing field 
somewhat.  In any case, acts of violence and intimidation 
will not foster democratic development in Iraq.  The 
Embassy and the United Nations have made public and private 
statements against intimidation and fraud, including at the 
Ambassador's December 13 press conference. 
 
¶8.  (C) Of particular concern are SCIRI's election-eve 
charges of election fraud by the IECI, which has absolutely 
no basis in fact of which we are aware.  Even charges that 
Ba'athists are trying to steal the election seem curious in 
light of the limited influence that any Ba'athist elements 
could possibly have on security procedures in Anbar and 
elsewhere.  This rhetoric could simply be a way of 
motivating UIA (555) supporters to vote in the election. 
However, this could be a prelude to justifying more serious 
electoral fraud, in favor of, if notably the UIA, on 
election day.  The IECI has taken steps to counter election 
fraud from any quarter, but the IECI has not shown itself 
able to enforce rules against the use of religious symbols. 
Our sense is that Iraqis know they have real choices and 
they can make their votes count.  It will be important on 
December 15 for the parties complaining to document their 
allegations carefully and for the election commission to 
address the allegations seriously.  The commission's 
disqualification of several hundred thousand fraudulent 
votes in Irbil in January 2005 is an example of the kind of 
resolve the commission may well need again. 
 
KHALILZAD