This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004830 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2015 
TAGS: PNAT PGOV PTER KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI OUTREACH:  IECI COMMISSIONER  VISITS RAMADI 
 
Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR MICHAEL J. ADLER 
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  IECI Commissioner and Chief Electoral 
Officer Adel al-Ami visited Ramadi December 1 to discuss 
preparations for the upcoming elections.  In a joint 
meeting with coalition forces (CF), the governor, local 
leaders, and representatives from IFES and the NGO Iraqi 
Institute for Peace, the following operational topics were 
addressed:  number and location of polling centers; origin 
and training of electoral staff; the roles of CF, Iraqi 
security forces (ISF) and tribes in providing security for 
polling sites; and how to facilitate voting by persons 
internally displaced by fighting.  Following Al-Ami's 
departure, CF returned to the topic of security with the 
local leaders and governor (see ref A and septel).  CF, 
IECI Commissioner Craig Jeness, IFES, and State met 
December 2 to review the outcome of the Ramadi discussion; 
a follow-up meeting in Baghdad on election logistics 
between 2nd Marine Division's Assistant Division Commander 
General Williams and the IECI al-Ami is scheduled for 
December 4.  All parties are committed to increasing Sunni 
engagement in the political process, but the challenging 
security environment has handicapped planning for the 
elections.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  As part of IECI's MNF-I and Embassy-supported 
Sunni Arab outreach campaign, Commissioner and Chief 
Electoral Officer Adel al-Ami traveled to Ramadi December 
1, via milair and accompanied by representatives from IFES, 
State, and USAID.  The party joined Anbar CF and SET 
officer in the offices of Governor Ma'moon Sami Rasheed. 
Local leaders, who attended the meeting to discuss security 
matters with CF, joined the elections discussion, as did a 
Baghdad-based representative of the Iraqi Institute for 
Peace (or IIP, which is assisting IECI in hiring 
provincially-based staff to administer the elections). 
 
Sites and Staffing 
 
¶3. (C)  The governor forcefully lobbied al-Ami for a larger 
number of polling centers (or, sites) in residential 
neighborhoods and the employment of Anbaris to staff the 
polling sites.  The local leaders supported these points. 
In response to a proposed CF plan for election day that 
involved limited movement of vehicles, the Iraqis said they 
preferred a ban on traffic on December 15, arguing it would 
be safer and reasoning that the importance of the election 
justified the inconvenience.  There was a fruitful exchange 
on desired locations of polling sites in Ramadi, and a 
commitment to address finalizing the site locations for the 
rest of al-Anbar province in a follow-up meeting in Baghdad 
December 4. 
 
¶4. (C)  The question of local staff proved more 
problematic.  While all agreed it was preferable to hire 
local staff, in part as a means of increasing Sunni 
participation in the elections, the group was unable to 
agree on the mechanics of identifying, hiring, and training 
the staff -- given the short time frame and security 
concerns.  The governor's resistance to the proposed IIP 
role in recruiting local staff, and his apparent mistrust 
of an unfamiliar organization represented by an outsider, 
was echoed by senior sheikh Anwar al-Kharbit, who grilled 
the NGO representative:  "Who is the founder of your 
organization?  Where are you from?  We know nothing about 
you."  (Note:  IFES subsequently informed us that IIP had 
briefed the governor's aides on its plans, which included a 
list of 6,750 local names.)  In a December 2 meeting in 
Baghdad, IECI Craig Jeness and IFES Jeff Fischer 
acknowledged IIP shortcomings to CF and State, but said 
that they believe this NGO is the only organization that 
can organize the hiring of impartial local staff.  It was 
agreed to revisit this issue with Anbar leadership. 
 
Sunni Concerns 
 
¶5. (C)  The governor and local leaders pressed for a lead 
role by Iraqi security forces in providing security on 
election day.  Commander of Second Marine Division's 2BCT, 
Colonel Gronski, explained that the ISF would be the 
security face at polling sites, and that CF would provide 
perimeter, QRF and other support.  The governor insisted 
that the election be a "test" of ISF capability.  General 
Williams urged local leaders to encourage the men in their 
community to respond to recruiting efforts and join the ISF 
to increase its force size in Anbar.  Colonel Gronski asked 
if the tribes were willing to provide security for polling 
sites in Ramadi; several of the tribal leaders said it was 
absolutely not possible.  When pressed by PolOff, they 
demurred, arguing they wanted to avoid potential intra- 
tribal feuds and association with CF.  (Note:  Some tribes 
in western Anbar, however, have offered to provide sole 
security for polling sites in their area.)  PolOff 
explained that the election was a critical step in 
addressing Sunni concerns; the Sunni voice from Anbar must 
become part of the new national government in order to play 
a role in determining Iraq's security policy; therefore, 
the tribal leaders should urge their communities to vote 
and act responsibly on December 15.  The local leaders 
urged CF to decrease military operations in the run-up to 
the elections, and complained to PolOff about the traffic 
of armoured vehicles in Ramadi. 
 
¶6. (C)  The governor raised the issue of internally 
displaced persons, claiming that a large number of Anbar 
residents who had been displaced by military operations 
feared they would not be permitted to vote.  (Note:  The 
IECI, which informally permitted Anbaris to vote at any 
location during the October referendum, is considering 
issuing a statement to that effect in Anbar province with 
regards to the December 15 election, although weighing the 
fact that such a gesture to the Sunni Arab community in 
Anbar could open the IECI up to charges of fraud.)  He also 
asked about the right of detainees to vote.   The local 
leaders complained that the number of representatives from 
Anbar to the new assembly had been decreased from Saddam's 
time, and blamed this fact on the "American project" to 
disenfranchise the Sunni community.  Al-Ami explained how 
the TNA had developed and adopted the electoral law.  He 
also provided a robust defense of the independence of the 
IECI, and stressed to the local leaders the importance of a 
large Sunni turnout at the election. 
KHALILZAD