VZCZCXRO9052
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #4234/01 3631413
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291413Z DEC 05
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8462
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0711
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEPGBA/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 6811

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 004234 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA AND EUR/RPM. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR:  AU TELLS SACEUR NATO ASSISTANCE 
EXCELLENT; FRANK DISCUSSION NEEDED ON AMIS 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (B) 
 AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The African Union (AU) Commission views its 
collaboration with NATO on Darfur as "excellent" and welcomes 
discussion on how to expand NATO assistance in areas such as 
training, Commissioner for Peace and Security Amb. Said 
Djinnit told SACEUR Gen. Jones December 16.  Amb. Djinnit 
would welcome the opportunity to visit NATO.  He noted that, 
based on positive Darfur experience, the AU has invited NATO 
to work with it on the African Standby Force effort (ASF). 
On the future of AMIS, Amb. Djinnit said that the AU would 
likely prefer to retain the military mission if AU 
organizational capacity and partner funding prerequisites are 
in place.  AMIS is a test of the AU's new policy of 
"non-indifference", putting AU credibility and institutional 
relevance at risk if it fails.  While AU leadership remains 
undecided, Amb. Djinnit seeks a frank discussion with 
partners on the way forward.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Also present at the meeting were Amb. Huddleston, 
EUCOM J5 MG Gration, EUCOM Polad Amb. Yates, NATO J5 BG 
Porter, NATO SMLO Col. Hirata, NATO Military Assistant Col. 
Mirr, other members of the SACEUR's delegation, NATO Civilian 
Liaison Officer Rye and Poloff (notetaker).  In addition to 
Amb. Djinnit, the AU was represented by members of the Darfur 
Integrated Task Force (DITF), members of the Peace Support 
Operations Division (PSOD), and various conflict "focal 
points." 
 
------------------------------------ 
EXCELLENT START TO AU-NATO RELATIONS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Gen. Jones expressed hope that NATO assistance to the 
AU for Darfur has added value.  He said that NATO is changing 
its culture and capacities to be a more proactivie 
institution and that there is political support among NATO 
member states to do more.  Amb. Djinnit responded that the AU 
Commission views its collaboration with NATO as "excellent." 
Despite initial doubts due to the unprecedented nature of 
cooperation with NATO, Djinnit said that the AU was pleased 
with the level of cooperation with NATO. 
 
¶3. (C) Amb. Djinnit said that NATO coordination with the EU 
to provide strategic lift for Darfur is an example of the 
spirit of AMIS partnership.  He characterized NATO training 
assistance as "promising" and said that NATO should 
strengthen and deepen its training partnership with the AU. 
NATO SMLO Col. Hirata informed Amb. Djinnit of the NATO staff 
capacity-building training schedule and said DITF Head Amb. 
Ki Doulaye had informally requested NATO assistance in "force 
multiplier" training related to the Canadian-provided APCs. 
Djinnit placed importance on discussing how to expand the 
scope of NATO training for Darfur.  He said that NATO's 
contribution to AMIS has been modest in comparison to NATO's 
capabilities, but nevertheless important. 
 
¶4. (C) Because NATO-AU relations got off to such a positive 
start for Darfur, Djinnit said, the AU has invited NATO to 
work with it on the African Standby Force (ASF) effort. 
(Note:  NATO has not yet officially responded to the AU's 
informal invitation to contribute to ASF workshops scheduled 
to begin in early 2006.  End note). 
 
¶5. (C) Gen. Jones said that NATO is committed to developing 
its relationship with the AU.  He reassured Djinnit that NATO 
is attuned to AU sensitivities, which is why NATO requires AU 
requests to provide assistance.  He encouraged Djinnit to be 
forthcoming in letting NATO know what types of support the AU 
requires.  Amb. Djinnit agreed that the request method is the 
best means of building a solid relationship.  He stated his 
willingness to travel to NATO to engage in further 
discussions (Note: Djinnit said he had been the first AU 
official to travel to NATO.  He visited NATO in 1999, when he 
was OAU ASG for Political Affairs.  End note). 
 
¶6. (C) Comment:  SACEUR's visit was constructive in 
strengthening NATO-AU relations, and NATO SMLO presence in 
Addis is vital.  Post notes, though, the difficulties local 
NATO representation faces in engaging the AU on specific ways 
NATO could expand its assistance for Darfur, not to mention 
the African Standby Force.  The AU needs a "menu" of NATO 
competencies from which it can request areas of support, but 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00004234  002 OF 002 
 
 
local NATO representatives do not have the mandate to 
actively engage the AU on that point.  AU interest in 
visiting NATO and taking NATO School courses is a positive 
first step in expanding AU knowledge of NATO value-added. 
Post looks forward to working with Washington and USNATO in 
crossing the hurdle of ensuring the AU understands what NATO 
has to offer so that the AU can generate practical requests 
for assistance. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
AMIS FUTURE -- A QUESTION OF CAPABILITY AND FUNDING 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5. (C) NATO BG Porter noted that NATO wants to concentrate on 
a value-added role in AMIS support and asked Amb. Djinnit for 
information on AMIS' future and how that may impact NATO 
support requirements. Amb. Djinnit stated that the AU intends 
to pursue its role in Darfur "as far as possible."  AMIS 
represented a strategic objective for the AU in showing that 
it is no longer the "indifferent" institution the OAU was, 
and instead is serious about addressing continental peace and 
security challenges.  AU credibility and institutional 
relevance will suffer if AMIS is seen to have failed, he 
noted. 
 
¶6. (C) Amb. Djinnit did concede that realities on the ground 
do not necessarily match the AU's ambition, and that a 
"courageous decision" may be needed.  The AU took on Darfur 
as an ad-hoc mission and AU institutional transformation is 
still in progress.  The AU is building its institutional 
capacity through Darfur, Djinnit said.  Djinnit noted that 
the AU is willing to accept partner assistance provided that 
assistance also allows for African capacity-building. 
 
¶7. (C) While the AU has its own work to do to improve 
operations on the ground and at AU headquarters, Djinnit 
said, the AU also needs partners to commit to more reliable 
funding.  "The AU cannot engage in a mission of long duration 
without resource security", he lamented. 
 
¶8. (C) Djinnit said that AU leadership is still undecided 
regarding the future of AMIS and whether it is fair to 
continue AMIS as an ad-hoc arrangement.  Djinnit stated his 
own inclination of asking the PSC to approve a one-year 
extension of AMIS when it meets on Darfur in early January. 
He noted that any eventual transition will be to a UN 
mission, but indicated the AU is undecided on timing.  He 
called for a frank discussion with partners. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment:  If the AU really does intend to remain in 
Darfur another year, now is the time for frank discussion on 
concrete steps needed to improve mission effectiveness and 
sustainability.  An AU green light to the UN to begin 
contingency planning and perhaps provide logistical support 
should not be seen as contradictory to the AU's steps to 
improve its mission - but the AU may need convincing.  The AU 
will also need to be forthcoming in requesting and utilizing 
partner expertise, especially in the field of command and 
control.  Finally, the AU will need to be encouraged to reach 
out more to its member states and other possible sources of 
funding, such as the Middle East.  End comment. 
 
¶10. (U) This cable was cleared by SACEUR. 
 
 
HUDDLESTON