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Diana T Fritz  08/27/2006 04:49:27 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

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S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 05243

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: AMB
    INFO:   PAO P/M MEPI DCM ECON POL RSO

DISSEMINATION: AMB
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:MRQUINN
DRAFTED: POL:BTHOMSON
CLEARED: POL:RFORD

VZCZCADI177
PP RUEHC RUCNRAQ RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #5243/01 3641023
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301023Z DEC 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2975
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 5670

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 005243 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/I, AND NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL PINR PTER IR IZ AE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD VISIT TO ABU DHABI: ACHIEVING 
A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT IN IRAQ 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Martin R. Quinn, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (S) Summary: On December 27, Ambassador Khalilzad met with 
Deputy Prime Minister/MinState for Foreign Affairs Sheikh 
Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan(HbZ).  Discussion centered on 
recent elections in Iraq and the need for a unification 
government to bring peace and stability to the country. 
Ambassador Khalilzad outlined a strategy to forge a Sunni, 
Kurdish and Allawi's bloc to negotiate with the Shia parties 
to build a national unity government, requesting UAEG help in 
reinforcing the message with Sunnis.  HbZ promised to do what 
he could, urging the USG to press the same message with the 
Kurds.  End Summary. 
 
GOALS 
-----/ 
 
¶2. (S) Ambassador Khalilzad opened by addressing complaints 
of election irregularities, stating that even as the U.S. 
pursues international cooperation in examining reports, he 
saw nothing that would change or invalidate the results. He 
emphasized that all parties must turn their attention to 
forming a national unity government based on accepted 
election results.  Ambassador outlined immediate goals in the 
formation of the new Iraqi government. First, a true 
unification government should be the result, since a 
Shia/Kurdish coalition with only token Sunni participation 
would exacerbate ethnic and sectarian tensions. Second, there 
should be significant movement towards achieving a 
meritocracy with ministers chosen on the basis of competence. 
 He noted that Iran is pushing strongly for a Shia/Kurdish 
alliance. 
 
PREVENTING A BREAK IN THE RANKS 
-------------------------------/ 
 
¶3. (S) Ambassador Khalilzad explained that if Iyad Allawi's 
list, Tawaffuq, and the Kurds can hold together as a 
coalition, they will constitute a power equal to the Shia and 
command a position to negotiate a government and select 
Iraq's leadership.  However, if either Allawi, the Sunnis or 
the Kurds cut from the rest to make separate deals in 
exchange for a ministry here or there, the Shia would achieve 
dominance.  Khalilzad asked HbZ to use UAEG influence to 
persuade Allawi not to leave Iraq, and the Sunnis not to 
attempt to cut a separate deal with the Shia.  HbZ stated 
that he had the same discussion with Sheikh Mohammed bin 
Zayed al Nahyan (MbZ), Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, earlier in the day, 
and that their analysis of the situation is similar.  HbZ 
added that the most important point is preventing the Kurds 
from breaking ranks; he observed that the USG is in a better 
position to reinforce this message with the Kurds.  Khalilzad 
added that the goal of achieving a national unity government 
in Iraq should become a regional strategy and asked HbZ to 
present it to fellow concerned states and to encourage them 
to embrace the goal. 
 
CURBING VIOLENCE; ELIMINATING IRANIAN INFLUENCE 
--------------------------------------------- --/ 
 
¶4. (S) Khalilzad turned to another key element: curbing the 
violence in Iraq.  He told HbZ that during the election 
period the U.S. had suspended large-scale military 
operations, limiting itself to targeted counter-terrorist 
actions only, and that many insurgents reciprocated, allowing 
elections to proceed in relative calm.  Khalilzad said the US 
would continue to focus operations against Al Qaeda and other 
terror groups.  He asked HbZ to use UAE influence with Sunni 
leaders to renew their call for restraint.  He explained that 
once a national unity government is formed, the insurgency 
itself will lose legitimacy -- and violence will decline over 
time.  The aim, Khalilzad stressed, is to make armed 
resistance against the new government itself illegitimate. 
HbZ remarked that the U.S. understands Iraq far better now 
than in the past and that the Ambassador's analysis provided 
the UAEG "relief from many of our concerns."  He stated that 
Iraq still has a long way to go, and that although the 
Ambassador had identified two important steps, forming a 
legitimate government and stopping the violence, there was 
one more vital step: eliminating Iranian influence in the 
South.  Ambassador pressed HbZ again to lean on influential 
expatriate Iraqis like Dubai-based Ahmad Al Kubaysi to issue 
statements calling for cessation of violence and 
participation in the political process. 
 
GCC ROLE: REGIONAL STRATEGY 
---------------------------/ 
 
¶5. (S) HbZ promised to report the conversation to UAE 
President, Sheikh Khalifa, and to MbZ, and said he would do 
what he could with the GCC and others with the qualification 
that although the UAE would be on board he "doubted the GCC's 
resolve."  Khalilzad responded: "If we can get the government 
right, everything else will fall into place."  He added that 
the mindset that participants in the post-election process 
are somehow doing the U.S. a favor must be changed. Agreeing, 
HbZ added that the Sunnis will not make the mistake of not 
participating again.  Ambassador noted that in his earlier 
meeting in Riyadh, the Saudi Foreign Minister expressed 
concerns that the Sunnis could be easily provoked, 
recommending that positive encouragement from other Arab 
states could be very helpful.  Expressing concurrence, HbZ 
promised to do what he could. 
IRAQIS IN ABU DHABI 
-------------------/ 
¶6. (C) Comment:  Ambassador Khalizad's meeting with HbZ was 
directly preceded by the Al Nahyan sheikh's brief reception 
of Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffak Al Rubaie and 
other Iraqis visiting Abu Dhabi for a conference on the Iraqi 
Constitution sponsored by the quasi-official, UAEG-funded 
Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. 
 
¶7. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador Khalilzad. 
QUINN