This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 002973 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR DASD WHELAN 
STATE FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND S/CRS 
STATE ALSO FOR EUR/UBI/REITER 
USEU FOR LERNER AND BRENNER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL MCAP NL XA MASS MARR PGOV
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFRICA:  DASD WHELAN'S VISIT TO THE 
HAGUE 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 02756 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4(b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY. On October 14, DASD for African Affairs 
Theresa Whelan met with several representatives of the Dutch 
MFA and MOD.  Discussion during the two meetings included 
GONL and USG involvement in SSR and DDR initiatives in South 
Africa, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, as well as 
mutual commitment to combating HIV/AIDS and violence against 
women.  Participants shared interest in approaching 
post-conflict situations holistically, perspectives on the 
future roles of NATO and the EU in Africa, and concerns about 
weapons destruction initiatives.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SOUTH AFRICA: FIRST WORLD INFRASTRUCTURE, THIRD WORLD TALENT 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Dutch interlocutors agreed with DASD Whelan's 
assessment that the South African military is the sole force 
on the continent that has the potential to operate on the 
brigade level and is thus the most likely candidate to play a 
significant role in African peace and security. 
Consequently, the Dutch share the USG's view that building 
the capacity of the rapidly crumbling South African military 
forces is crucial.  Peter de Gooijer (Deputy Director 
General, Political Affairs, MFA) pointed to FM Bot's Oct. 
10-11 visit to Johannesburg as evidence of Dutch interest in 
building a strategic partnership with the South Africans. 
During his visit, Bot signed an agreement giving the South 
Africans 5 million euros for SSR/DDR activities in the DRC 
and another allowing the South Africans to make more use of 
Dutch military training capabilities and exercise 
opportunities. 
 
¶3. (C) The Dutch share the USG's opinion that South Africa 
can play a key role in counter-terrorism initiatives.  DASD 
Whelan suggested that joint Dutch - U.S. action to combat 
bogus South African passports, which are relatively easy to 
counterfeit and have considerable clout on the continent, 
would make a significant contribution to the war against 
terror in Africa. 
 
¶4. (U) Dutch interlocutors agreed that the GONL and the USG 
should continue to explore avenues of cooperation in building 
the capacity of the South African military.  DASD Whelan 
agreed to lay the groundwork for a joint project during 
working-level meetings with the South Africans on November 7 
and 8.  Dutch counterparts agreed to continue the momentum 
during meetings planned in South Africa in December and 
January. 
 
¶5. (C) Both the Dutch and the U.S. have advocated a more 
aggressive South African posture vis-a-vis Zimbabwe, and both 
have been rebuffed by President Mbeki. De Gooijer speculated 
that the South Africans will, as a matter of principle, 
prioritize regional solidarity over political pragmatism in 
dealing with Harare.  Though DASD Whelan and De Gooijer 
agreed that waiting for Mugabe to die was an imperfect 
solution, DASD Whelan explained that the USG is shifting its 
position regarding the South African Development Community 
(SADC) in terms of Zimbabwe.  The USG will work with the SADC 
as an element of the AU concept and with Zimbabwe as a member 
of the SADC, but will not/not engage Harare bilaterally. 
 
¶6. (U) The South Africans have approached both the U.S. and 
the Dutch with a proposal to build a facility to destroy 
small weapons not only from South Africa but also from 
conflict regions such as the DRC.  De Gooijer explained that 
the Dutch find the proposal illogical, since small weapons 
can be destroyed easily enough in conflict zones without a 
dedicated facility to do so.  De Gooijer also pointed to the 
logistical hurdles in moving arms confiscated in the DRC, for 
instance, to South Africa for destruction.  DASD Whelan 
responded that the Swedes committed to financing in part the 
construction of a small weapons confiscation center for the 
South Africans as an offset of the South Africans' purchase 
of 28 Gripen fighters.  The South Africans have appealed to 
the USG to pay their share of the construction costs. 
 
SUDAN: DUTCH DO NOT SUPPORT BLUEHATTING AMIS TROOPS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶7. (U) Dutch counterparts agreed that the recent kidnapping 
of military observers by a faction of the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) seriously undermined AMIS's 
credibility.  Given shared interest in building the capacity 
of the AU to address security problems in Africa, USG and 
GONL participants agreed that delegating AMIS authority to 
UNMIS in the short term may be a blow from which the AU could 
not recover.  DASD Whelan expressed conviction that handing 
over control to UNMIS in the long term is nevertheless 
inevitable.  The Dutch, however, do not support bluehatting 
AMIS troops.  Hans Docter (Deputy Head of the Sudan Task 
Force, MFA) explained that the GONL will continue efforts to 
build the capacity of AMIS troops with the expectation that 
AMIS will be able to sustain supervision of SSR/DDR 
activities in Darfur. 
¶8. (U) The Dutch do not fully understand USG prioritization 
of SPLA integration over the creation of the Joint Integrated 
Units (JIUs) pursuant to the IMAT paradigm.  Dutch officials 
were stunned by DASD Whelan's assertion that the SPLA intends 
to hedge its bets on the success of the Government of 
National Unity (GNU) by maintaining a separate standing army 
of approximately 60-140 thousand troops subsidized by the 
SPLM's share of projected oil revenues. 
 
¶9. (U) The Dutch made a strong pitch to DASD Whelan for U.S. 
cooperation on initiatives to combat violence against women, 
particularly in Sudan, where the Dutch have expressed 
interest in joint initiatives and have a one million euro 
fund dedicated to such initiatives. 
 
RWANDA 
------ 
 
¶10. (C) The U.S. and the Dutch share an interest in using 
Rwandan military forces in external peacekeeping missions and 
agree that a necessary first step toward realizing this 
objective is intensive troop training.  DM Kamp recently 
signed an MOU in Kigali on bilateral military cooperation 
that will assist Rwandan military forces in carrying out 
crisis management operations in Africa.  Dutch peace and 
stability projects could serve as excellent complements to 
USG training efforts in the region.  USG Just In Time 
Training (JITT) for Rwandan troops destined for AMIS service 
faces resistance from Congress; DASD Whelan encouraged Dutch 
interlocutors to continue the program or present a 
sustainable troop-training alternative. 
 
BURUNDI 
------- 
 
¶11. (U) The Dutch see Burundi as an important priority; they 
have contributed 103 million euros for SSR/DDR initiatives 
and to the United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB). DASD 
Whelan suggested the Dutch collaborate with the USG on a 
language lab project, explaining that perhaps the Dutch could 
construct the lab facility and the USG could provide the 
necessary materials (computers, language books). 
 
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC): A LONG WAY TO GO 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶12. (C) The USG is prepared to provide brigade-level support 
for SSR/DDR initiatives in the DRC.  DASD Whelan lamented 
that it will nonetheless be at least a decade before the 
FARDC is more than an army in name only.  The USG is 
interested in making a substantive contribution to the 
multilateral effort in the DRC, but has yet to identify where 
in particular;  DASD Whelan suggested that perhaps the USG 
would do so at the level of the Ministry of Defense. 
 
¶13. (U) The Dutch are considering projects to improve the 
intelligence capability of MONUC.  DASD Whelan explained that 
the impediments to intelligence sharing in the DRC are 
fundamental, largely consisting of tactical challenges to 
collecting information at the human level. DASD Whelan put 
forth the DOD's tripartite intelligence fusion cell 
initiative as a method of facilitating the flow of 
information from the field to MONUC.  Dutch interlocutors 
agreed to continue exchanging views and expertise with regard 
to building the capacity of the intelligence regime in the 
DRC. 
EU AND NATO: WORKING TOGETHER IN THE FUTURE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (U) While reactions were not unanimous in the subject, 
most interlocutors enthusiastically greeted DASD Whelan's 
suggestion that the EU and NATO work complementarily in 
Africa.  Robert de Groot, (Director of Security Initiatives, 
MFA) and Major General Cobelens (Director of Operations, MOD) 
embraced DASD Whelan's suggestion that NATO's expertise in 
SSR/DDR and capacity-building could buttress the AU's 
operational efforts in Sudan and elsewhere.  DASD Whelan 
underscored the vital role NATO could play in realizing the 
concept of an African Standby Force.  Col. Langdorf added 
that the NATO Partnership for Peace initiative could be 
adapted to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
¶15. (U) Hans Horbach (Deputy Director of Security 
Initiatives, MFA) praised NATO's SSR/DDR capabilities and 
lamented a tension between NATO and the EU that he saw as 
more perceived than real, pointing to the press as the 
instigator of the perception.  Whether real or perceived, 
DASD Whelan argued that the working relationship between the 
two entities was flawed, as evidenced by the disappointing 
results of the MAPEX activities in Sudan in September. 
Docter and De Groot, acknowledging the EU-NATO relationship 
in Sudan is dysfunctional, suggested that the EU assume more 
responsibility for logistics, management, and policing and 
leave SSR/DDR activities to NATO. 
 
¶16. (U) De Groot expressed enthusiasm for the prospect of 
Dutch involvement in NATO capacity-building initiatives on 
the regional level, suggesting that the GONL and USG take a 
year to come up with a joint "blueprint" of NATO 
capacity-building initiatives in Africa.  Though USG efforts 
in capacity-building on the regional level have been focused 
in the West, DASD Whelan was enthusiastic about other 
regional opportunities, despite logistical hurdles.  She 
explained that prior USG cooperation with the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was largely a 
result of the fact that ECOWAS has a system that facilitates 
direct engagement, unlike SADC.  Dutch interlocutors shared 
DASD Whelan's interest in engaging SADC through NATO. 
 
THINKING HOLISTICALLY 
--------------------- 
 
¶17. (U) The Dutch are keenly interested in taking a holistic 
approach to post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization in 
Africa.  DASD Whelan explained that the DOD Strategy 
Department is working on a pilot project that approaches 
"ungoverned space" holistically in an effort to avoid 
stovepiping.  She suggested that perhaps the Dutch could 
inform the DOD's analysis of the way forward in synthesizing 
the tripartite command structure -- CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM 
-- currently in force in Africa.  Joint Dutch - U.S 
initiatives in holistic thinking may be particularly 
pertinent to Africa's troubled maritime space, rife with 
fishing conflicts, smuggling, and piracy.  Major General 
Cobelens was enthusiastic about the prospect of combating 
Somalian pirates with CENTCOM.  Dutch counterparts agreed 
with DASD Whelan's suggestion that the South African Navy be 
included in joint GONL-USG maritime security initiatives in 
Africa and in Task Force 150 operations, provided the scope 
of the Task Force could be expanded. 
 
¶18. (U) While conceptual common ground was found on myriad 
topics, DASD Whelan and De Gooijer were especially engaged in 
sharing their views on the sequencing of point-conflict 
reconstruction.  Whelan and de Gooijer agreed that security 
is a necessary element of development and that development 
therefore cannot commence until security has been 
established.  De Gooijer added that the South African's 
shared opinions on this subject figured prominently in the 
Dutch decision to identify South Africa as a key ally on the 
continent. 
 
HIV/AIDS 
-------- 
 
¶19. (U) Dutch interlocutors shared their interest in 
combating HIV/AIDS in Africa and urged the U.S. to consider 
joint initiatives. Dutch Parliament, they said, is always 
interested in HIV/AIDS projects in Africa.  DASD Whelan 
explained that implementation of all USG HIV/AIDS initiatives 
involving the military comes from the Naval Health Research 
Center (NHRC) in San Diego.  She invited Dutch counterparts 
to the NHRC for an information exchange and consultations. 
In the alternative, NHRC officials perhaps could come to the 
Netherlands.  DASD Whelan further suggested that the Dutch 
and the U.S. explore possibilities of working as implementing 
partners on AIDS initiatives in Africa, particularly in South 
Africa, where estimates of HIV infection in the military run 
as high as 45 per cent. 
SCHOFER