This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 006628 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PGOV PINS PREF PTER ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS COUNTERTERRORISM
SUBJECT: ISRAELI NSA EILAND ON HAMAS IN ELECTIONS, PEACE 
WITH THE PALESTINIANS 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Norm Olsen.  Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) Israeli National Security Adviser Giora Eiland told 
NEA DAS Robert Danin November 18 that Hamas will continue to 
honor the tadiyah ("calm") as long as it believes it serves 
its interests.  Eiland said the calm could be extended 
through Israeli general elections scheduled for March 2006, 
or could be disregarded after Palestinian elections in 
January.  Eiland assessed the Labor Party's new leader, Amir 
Peretz, as representing the very left of his party, and 
suggested that Peretz might push for a final settlement with 
the Palestinians.  He suggested that another "unilateral 
disengagement" is unlikely due to the short time before 
Israel's general elections, but admitted that the current or 
future GOI could make some bold moves if it calculated that 
Israel would get a better deal for being cooperative from the 
current U.S. administration in comparison to a future one. 
Eiland suggested that the Palestinians could be encouraged to 
take more moderate, constructive positions on peace if 
neighboring Arab countries were pulled into the process and 
forced to take positions on issues.  Eiland said that Israel 
is not overly concerned about the power of Hamas as a result 
of its participation in January 2006 Palestinian general 
elections because it believes that the Palestinian Authority 
cannot accomplish anything of importance, regardless of 
whether it is strengthened or weakened by Hamas's 
performance.  Eiland suggested that PA President Abbas has no 
interest in taking on Hamas and other terrorist 
organizations, attributing this to weakness in his character. 
 End Summary. 
 
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ELECTIONS CERTAIN TO INFLUENCE ATTITUDES TOWARDS PEACE 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2. (C)  Asked by Danin about the tadiyah, Eiland mused that 
it might be extended until the Palestinian elections 
scheduled for January, and the Israeli elections scheduled 
for March.  He suggested that Hamas has good reason to 
maintain the tadiyah until the results of the elections and 
their consequences are known.  After that, he supposed 
Hamas's approach might change.  In this respect, Eiland 
thought the current situation might last for the next two 
months.  If Hamas decides that the tadiyah serves their 
interest, then the "relative calm" will continue.  Eiland 
stressed that the current calm is relative because Israel 
does not count every time the Palestinians launch a Qassam 
rocket or mortar shell into Israel from the Gaza Strip.  "We 
ignore them now, even though there have been dozens of 
launches since disengagement." 
 
¶3. (C) Eiland suggested that the Labor Party's new leader, 
Amir Peretz, might try to push for jumping ahead to final 
status negotiations with the Palestinians.  He noted that in 
recent public statements, Peretz has said that, in contrast 
to Sharon, the time had come to resume a political dialogue 
with the Palestinians with a view towards reaching a final 
settlement.  In this respect, Eiland said that Peretz is not 
very different from Yossi Bielin and his Meretz party:  "He's 
very left-wing, to the left of the left wing, while Ehud 
Barak would, in comparison, be characterized as representing 
the right of the left wing." 
 
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EILAND: HAMAS PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS OF LITTLE CONCERN 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Eiland said that he is "not really concerned" about 
Hamas's participation in the January Palestinian elections. 
Eiland explained that Israel's policy on this issue is very 
simple -- Israel is not concerned about Hamas increasing its 
power, because Israel does not believe that there is a 
"legitimate, accountable and practical" Palestinian Authority 
that may be either strengthened or weakened as a result of 
elections in the first place.  Eiland stressed, "We don't 
believe that this existing Palestinian Authority is capable 
of doing important things.  Whether Hamas is strong or not is 
not important in this situation."  Eiland continued:  "If 
Hamas takes control of Gaza, I am not sure that it will be so 
terrible for Israel.  We cannot see change in the performance 
of the Palestinian Authority even if Hamas is not 
strengthened." 
 
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EILAND ON ABBAS AND TERRORIST GROUPS, PEACE PROCESS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5. (C) Making it clear that he could not know for sure, 
Eiland suggested that Abbas's inability to deal with Hamas 
reflects his desire not to take on the terrorist 
organization.  Eiland observed:  "When I was in the military, 
our platoon leader used to tell us, 'I can't' is the cousin 
of 'I don't want to.'  In other words, when people say they 
cannot do something, it is usually because they do not want 
to do something."  Eiland said that the Palestinians need to 
make an important strategic decision to give up terrorism for 
political gain.  He said he does not believe this will happen 
for the foreseeable future, and attributed this to something 
lacking in Abbas's character, or his "lack of understanding 
of the Palestinian people and what they need." 
 
¶6. (C) Eiland admitted that Abbas has spoken out against 
terrorism, but stressed that he has not followed through with 
action.  He said the Israeli and Palestinian positions on the 
way ahead do not differ much on substance, but diverge on 
process.  He explained that the GOI position is that the 
Palestinians first have to dismantle the terrorist 
organizations before the two sides can discuss political 
issues, while the Palestinians need to see a clear political 
solution with a timetable for implementation and 
international guarantees before they will disband Hamas and 
other terrorist groups.  Eiland said, "They do not say this 
to you, but this is what they mean.  I do not blame them, and 
can understand them.  They do not see it as a smart move to 
confront Hamas and other militant groups before a guaranteed 
political outcome.  We will not be able to change our 
position so long as they retain theirs as it is." 
 
¶7. (C) Eiland said that if Abbas is given the choice to make 
the "correct, strategic decision" or to maneuver for 
advantage between groups, he will choose the latter option, 
regardless of the results from the upcoming elections. 
Eiland mused that this is probably because Abbas is a 
tactician.  He observed that there are some Palestinians who 
believe that time serves their interests, and suggested that 
Abbas may be one of them. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
ELECTION ISSUES: "WHOSE INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY WAITING? 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶8. (C) Eiland said he believes that the question of whose 
interests time serves will become a controversial issue in 
upcoming Israeli general elections.  He wondered aloud: 
"Will Israelis insist on security provisions before political 
dialogue?  Or should we change our policy and try to reach an 
agreement now, keeping in mind that the current U.S. 
administration may be more friendly to Israel than future 
administrations?"  Eiland suggested that there are two 
reasons for trying to reach a deal with the Palestinians now: 
 
¶A. Even if Israel jumps to a final settlement based on 
President Bush's letter to PM Sharon -- including on 
substantive issues like territory and defensible borders -- 
some Israelis suggest that it will be easier for Israel to 
obtain what it wants with the help of the current U.S. 
administration; and 
 
¶B. The current strategic environment is good for Israel: 
"Iran does not yet possess nuclear weapons.  Syria is weak. 
There is more support in Arab states for the peace process 
than there used to be.  All of this equates to less external 
pressure on Israel's borders." 
 
¶9. (C) Eiland stressed that since Israel realizes that 90 
percent of the final settlement is known to everyone, 
including provisions on Israel's borders, the status of 
Jerusalem, and security provisions, it raises the question, 
"Why wait ten years to reach an agreement that can be reached 
now?"  Eiland predicted that the issue will be a defining one 
for the political Left, based on Labor's principles and 
Peretz's leadership. 
 
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EILAND ON POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER, UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Eiland said that the notion of another unilateral 
disengagement could be eclipsed by new elections.  He 
explained that if the elections were to take place in 
November 2006, PM Sharon would be forced to reveal his 
political plan for carrying disengagement to the next step: 
"In such a situation, saying that Israel will wait on the 
Palestinians would not be enough."  With elections on the 
near horizon, however, Eiland said it is hard to imagine that 
the PM will be able to come up with another initiative before 
elections.  Eiland suggested that if Sharon leaves Likud, 
(NOTE: Which he has since done.  END NOTE.), he may need a 
new agenda, feeling that he needs to differentiate himself 
from Netanyahu and the other Likud "rebels."  Eiland observed 
that PM adviser Dov Weisglass and others are thinking about 
unilateral withdrawal, but Eiland said he does not believe 
they will persuade Sharon.  Eiland said that thoughts about 
another unilateral withdrawal are based on the assumption 
that Israel will get something more substantial from the 
international community in return -- especially from the U.S. 
 
¶11. (C) Eiland laid out three possible next steps, stressing 
that the decision would depend on the response from the U.S.: 
 
¶A. some sort of symbolic withdrawal from the West Bank; 
¶B. a more significant withdrawal from the West Bank; 
¶C. revert to the fence/barrier (an option Eiland said would 
be the "most courageous")  Eiland said that if it chose this 
option, then Israel could claim that according to UN 
Resolution 242, the land remaining on the Israeli side of the 
security fence would remain Israeli.  He said such an option 
might be smart if one thinks far into the future.  It would 
not be worth it, he said, if one were thinking only about 
reducing tensions with the Palestinians. 
 
¶12. (C) Eiland said that until recently, Ehud Barak said 
Israel should withdraw to the fenceline and then reach an 
agreement with the U.S. and the international community that 
this solves the problems of occupation until a final 
settlement is found.  Israel would then insist that until a 
final settlement is reached, no further requirements could be 
levied on Israel.  Eiland characterized this line of thinking 
as very far from the way PM Sharon thinks.  He said that he 
cannot imagine that Sharon would decide to execute an 
additional withdrawal for nothing. 
 
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EILAND SUGGESTS AN ARAB ROLE IS NEEDED IN THE PEACE PROCESS 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Eiland said that if one recalls Aqaba, Sharm-el-Sheik 
and Camp David, there needs to be an Arab role in supporting 
Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts.  He suggested that Israel 
had not done a good job translating this view into policy, 
mainly because it would "open up a can of worms."  On the 
other hand, he observed, Israel has already invited the Arabs 
in by involving Egypt in disengagement.  He wondered aloud 
that there may be a role for Jordan or Saudi Arabia. 
 
¶14. (C) Eiland observed that there are two different levels 
of assistance that Israel's Arab neighbors could provide. 
 
¶A. tactical assistance:  Saudi Arabia has decreased funding 
to Hamas, but has not completely stopped it, and could do 
more.  Egypt could do more to regulate the Egypt-Gaza border. 
 
¶B. strategic assistance:  Eiland said that if the parties 
stay with a two-state solution, Israel and the Palestinians 
will have to make concessions.  Eiland maintained that it 
will be easier for the Palestinians to make concessions on 
issues like the final status of Jerusalem and refugees if 
they are supported by the Arabs on these issues.  Eiland said 
that what is needed is for the Arabs to support the 
Palestinians on other concessions, especially on religious 
issues.  He admitted that it may be premature to discuss such 
issues now, but also suggested that the final status of 
Jerusalem will not be as difficult to resolve as people 
think.  He said that you can divide Jerusalem into two parts: 
 1) all the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem; and 2) the Old 
City (one kilometer squared), the mountain, and all the 
important religious sites.  The latter, he said, would be the 
real problem.  Eiland said that Abbas probably understands 
well that the refugee problem cannot be solved with Israel. 
Eiland said that Abbas needs partners to realize a solution 
to the refugee problem.  If the Lebanese government gives 
full residence rights to the Palestinians living in Lebanon, 
this would help Abbas to be more moderate.  If the Saudis 
recognize the two-state solution as meaning a Palestinian 
state and a Jewish state, then this would be significant. 
Eiland explained that the current problem is that there are 
differing interpretations as to what the two-state solution 
means. 
 
¶15. (U) DAS Danin cleared on this cable. 
 
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