This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 006578 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2015 
TAGS: KPAL KWBG PGOV PREL PTER IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS COUNTERTERRORISM GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: ISRAELI NSC CHIEF:  GOI "ALONE" IN CONFRONTING 
HAMAS; WILL NEITHER HINDER NOR HELP PLC ELECTIONS 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz for Reasons 1.4 (b 
) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  National Security Council (NSC) Chairman 
Giora Eiland told Congressman Robert Wexler (D-FL) on 
November 14 that the GOI feels "alone" in opposing any Hamas 
participation in the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative 
Council (PLC) elections.  The GOI felt obliged to state 
publicly that it will neither help nor hinder the PLC 
elections.  The GOI, for example, will not work with the PA 
on easing the movement of candidates and voters as it had 
during the January 2005 presidential election.  Eiland, 
however, said no extraordinary measures will be imposed to 
prevent the movement of Hamas candidates not suspected of 
involvement in terrorist activity.  Eiland said that PA 
President Mahmud Abbas's refusal to move against Hamas and 
other militant groups had actually set back the roadmap.  He 
said he doubted that Abbas is fully committed to a two-state 
solution.  Eiland said he has little hope of any progress 
toward a final settlement as long as the PA continues to 
tolerate the existence of Palestinian militant groups and 
terror networks.  Eiland recommended that the international 
community take a tougher stance against militant groups and 
insist on the disarming of militant groups as a condition for 
further assistance to both the PA and the Lebanese 
government.  He suggested that the GOI may demonstrate 
greater flexibility on some peace process issues as the Likud 
reacts to the recent Labor Party leadership change.  End 
summary. 
 
----------------- 
Hamas on the Rise 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Eiland began his meeting with Congressman Wexler by 
recounting the events leading up to PA President Abbas (Abu 
Mazen) securing an agreement with Hamas on a period of "calm" 
(tahdi'a) in the security sphere.  In exchange for that calm, 
according to Eiland, Abbas agreed to fully integrate Hamas 
into the political process, including membership in the PLO. 
Eiland asserted that the GOI initially refrained from raising 
its objections to this arrangement directly with Abbas. 
Since that time, however, Hamas has increased its political 
activities and gained in stature among Palestinians.  Eiland 
said that, in contrast to Western concepts of opposition 
groups, Hamas sees itself as equal to the PA and capable of 
independently determining what is in the Palestinians' 
national interest regardless of the PA's position. 
 
¶3.  (C) Eiland asserted that Hamas is part of a larger 
movement -- the Muslim Brothers -- and as such is committed 
to an agenda broader than Palestinian aspirations. 
Compromise is not in the spirit of this movement.  The 
existence of Hamas itself, Eiland continued, is based on two 
principles:  First, the rejection of the State of Israel and 
any political system allowing Jews to govern Muslims; and 
second, the only acceptable government for Palestinians is 
one based on Islamic rule.  Eiland suggested that Hamas may 
see fit to compromise on minor issues in the short-term, but 
will not change its strategic goals.  As a result, the GOI 
"can't live with a reality" where Hamas operates 
simultaneously as a legitimate political organization and as 
an armed movement. 
 
--------------------- 
No Help, No Hindrance 
--------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Eiland advised that, given Hamas's ascendency, its 
continued militancy and the PA's inability to disarm it, the 
GOI announced that it would neither help nor hinder the 
January 2006 PLC elections.  He explained that the GOI will 
do nothing to undermine the elections and will not undertake 
any actions that could be construed as GOI meddling.  By the 
same token, unlike in January 2005 when the GOI and PA worked 
together to facilitate movement of candidates and voters, 
this time the GOI will not be proactive in helping the 
process.  The GOI will treat the election day as any other 
ordinary day.  In response to Wexler's question on how the 
GOI would deal with Hamas candidates, Eiland said that Hamas 
candidates with no known ties to terrorist activity would be 
subject to the same regulations applied to other Palestinians. 
 
¶5.  (C) Eiland suggested that the GOI would be inclined to 
adopt a more helpful policy towards the elections provided 
that the PA agreed in advance to certain conditions.  For 
example, the PA could commit to implementing an election law 
under which parties seeking to participate would have to 
uphold the constitution.  Also, a new political party law 
should require the disbanding of military wings and a 
commitment to a two-state solution.  Eiland likened these 
requirements to what had been put in place for elections in 
Afghanistan.  He said that international criteria as applied 
elsewhere could prompt the GOI to develop an alternative 
policy to the PLC elections. 
 
-------------- 
Hollow Victory 
-------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) In response to Wexler's question about whether Abbas 
needed to secure a working majority in the PLC as a result of 
the upcoming elections, Eiland replied that Abbas will have 
the numbers but not a true majority.  He explained that Fatah 
is not a unified party, but is fractured by disparate 
interests and alliances, including some governed by a 
generational divide.  Abbas, therefore, has difficulties 
controlling his own party, let alone Hamas. 
 
¶7.  (C) Eiland said that, in the wake of PLC election gains, 
Hamas would likely demand much more practical participation 
in the PA.  Eiland noted that all GOI agreements on 
Palestinian issues are with the PLO.  If Hamas should join 
the ranks of the PLO, he questioned whether the PLO would 
remain a viable partner in final status negotiations. 
 
------------------------- 
GOI "Alone" Against Hamas 
------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Eiland asserted that there had been a marked silence 
from the international community on the issue of Hamas 
participation in the PLC elections.  He added that recent USG 
statements indicated a change in the U.S. position on the 
subject.  The GOI, according to Eiland, would have preferred 
a discussion between the international community and the 
Palestinians leading to an electoral process less favorable 
to militant groups like Hamas.  Wexler replied that the USG 
clearly would prefer not to have Hamas involved in the 
elections.  The GOI, however, may have made a strategic error 
in not having done more to encourage a broader based approach 
prior to announcing its own position.  Wexler suggested, for 
example, that a coordinated Quartet position on Hamas 
participation would have carried greater weight. 
 
¶9.  (C) The general lack of interest in fully implementing 
UNSCR 1559 offered the GOI little encouragement regarding the 
formulation of an international policy on Hamas, according to 
Eiland.  He asserted that the GOI was alone in caring about 
Hizballah, despite the resolution's requirement that militias 
in Lebanon be disarmed.  As it was now up to the GOL to 
complete the task, Eiland continued, the international 
community, particularly the donor community, should make 
disarming the militias a prerequisite to any economic and 
military assistance.  He suggested that a donor conference 
scheduled to be held in Beirut in December would offer an 
appropriate venue to establish conditionality in assistance 
to the GOL.  Eiland said that, until now, "no other voice" 
has been raising this issue. 
 
---------------------- 
Peace Process Politics 
---------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Eiland said that until a week ago the main political 
threat to PM Sharon was from more conservative elements 
within his own Likud party.  As a consequence, the PM could 
not afford to make compromises.  Now, Eiland continued, with 
the change in the Labor party leadership, the main political 
threat is from the left.  As a consequence, a Likud-led 
government may be more open to compromise on some peace 
process issues. 
 
¶11.  (C) Eiland said that, "in a very ironic way," the 
differences between the GOI and Palestinians on a final 
settlement are not great, with about 90 percent of the 
details agreed.  There is, however, "total dispute" over the 
remaining issues.  Eiland asserted that PM Sharon fully 
supports a two-state solution and a revival of the roadmap 
process but will not repeat the mistakes of previous 
governments by engaging in political discussions with the 
Palestinian leadership "while under fire" from militant 
groups operating in areas under PA control.  According to the 
GOI's interpretation of the Road Map, the security problem 
must be solved first.  The Palestinians, however, continue to 
believe that immediate talks on a final settlement will 
significantly mitigate the security threat.  Abbas insists on 
having a clear timetable towards reaching a final resolution. 
 Eiland said he found it hard to see any formula that would 
bridge this "gap" in respective GOI and PA views of the 
roadmap. 
 
¶12.  (C) Wexler, referencing a recent meeting he had with 
former Irish Prime Minister John Bruton, mentioned that some 
observers believe that it is unrealistic to demand the 
disarming of Palestinian militants in the absence of 
political dialogue.  It took decades of negotiations before 
the IRA finally laid down its arms.  Eiland's deputy, Eran 
Etzion, replied that this argument used the wrong analogy 
because, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it 
was the PLO that filled the same role as the IRA, and had 
already negotiated with the GOI and agreed to abandon the 
armed struggle.  The burden of responsibility for suppressing 
Palestinian violence, therefore, now rests with the PLO as it 
operates within the structure of the PA, according to Etzion. 
 
 
------------------------------ 
Pessimistic on Peace Prospects 
------------------------------ 
 
¶13.  (C) Eiland said he doubted that the PA or even Abbas 
believes in a two-state solution.  The establishment of a 
Palestinian state within the confines of the West Bank and 
Gaza is viewed as a near term result and not a long-term 
response to Palestinian aspirations.  Until 1967, the Arab 
world and the Palestinians did not even mention the 
possibility of an Israeli state, according to Eiland.  He 
said he was not confident that Palestinians had given up the 
vision of a Palestinian State stretching from the 
Mediterranean to the Iraqi-Jordanian border.  Politicians may 
conclude agreements, but the average Palestinian holds to 
this dream. 
 
¶14.  (C) Wexler suggested that, in the face of international, 
PA and, eventually, Arab-state recognition of a two-state 
settlement, the Palestinian populace would, by necessity, 
have to accept a negotiated agreement.  Eiland asserted that 
this was a "false premise," particularly given the current 
level of support for militant groups.  Eiland, however, 
volunteered that he probably had a much more pessimistic view 
of Hamas and even some of the secular Palestinian movements 
than most Israelis.  Nevertheless, he said he doubted that 
these groups would ever accept Israel and focus their 
energies on building their own state. 
 
¶15.  (U) Congressman Wexler did not clear this message prior 
to his departure. 
 
 
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