This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 006516 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EU IS KPAL KWBG PREL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL GOI INTERNAL GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: ISRAEL/WBG:  EU ENVOY ADVOCATES "SOFT" OPENING FOR 
RAFAH CROSSING WITH WELL-DEFINED EU THIRD-PARTY ROLE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard Jones for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1.  (C) Summary:  During a November 9 meeting with the 
Ambassador, EU Special Representative for the Middle East 
Peace Process Mark Otte advised that the GOI and PA were 
close to a final agreement on re-opening the Rafah crossing. 
The only major obstacle remaining was the lack of agreement 
on how quickly PA border personnel will provide video feed to 
the GOI for review.  Otte advised that the GOI and PA had 
moved closer on what the EU third party role at Rafah would 
be, but added that the EU would require greater specificity. 
Otte said he was impressed by the preparations made at Rafah, 
including high quality USG-funded equipment and training.  He 
hoped that a phased opening could begin by the end of 
November.  He agreed with the Ambassador that there is an 
urgent need to expand the flow of goods through other 
crossings, particularly Karni.  Otte's EU colleague Christian 
Leffler voiced skepticism about the need to construct a 
seaport and asserted that re-opening Gaza's airport was a 
greater priority and could be done to GOI satisfaction. 
Lastly, Otte advised that an expanded EU police program for 
the Palestinians should be underway by January 2006.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Rafah Almost Ready for "Soft" Opening 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Otte, in a November 9 meeting with the Ambassador and 
also attended by Christian Leffler, Director of the European 
Commission's Middle East Department, asserted that the GOI 
and PA were close to agreement on re-opening the Rafah 
crossing.  Palestinian ID holders would be able to travel in 
both directions; goods from Gaza could be exported to Egypt 
through Rafah; and imports would be handled by the 
GOI-controlled Kerem Shalom border crossing with Egypt.  The 
GOI, however, was still demanding that the PA provide 
"real-time" video of individuals seeking passage through 
Rafah, The PA, asserting that real-time transmission of 
passport picture and data should be sufficient, have 
committed to providing video feed only after twenty-four 
hours.  Otte noted that a USAID contractor at Rafah had 
advised that, due to technical constraints, "real-time" video 
would still take fifteen minutes to be transmitted to GOI 
authorities in Kerem Shalom.  Otte said he expected a 
compromise would be reached as he believed both sides 
remained convinced that Rafah had to be opened soon and a 
third-party presence would go far in easing many concerns. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Otte advocated a "soft" opening in which Rafah would 
gradually expand its operations over time.  He described his 
November 8 tour of Rafah in the company of Minister of Civil 
Affairs Mohammed Dahlan and noted that a great deal had been 
done in preparing the crossing, including the purchase of 
high-quality security equipment.  (Note:  USAID has funded 
new equipment and training for personnel at Rafah.)  Leffler 
said that a technical expert had told him that Rafah was now 
better equipped then it had been when under IDF control. 
Otte, however, said the GOI was still not satisfied and 
doubted that Rafah would be ready by November 15.  In 
response to a question from the Ambassador, he suggested that 
a limited opening could occur by late November.  As GOI 
confidence in the process and PA personnel capabilities grew, 
Rafah could begin processing travelers who do not hold 
Palestinian IDs and possibly private vehicles.  Otte added 
that it would be necessary to lower the Palestinian public's 
expectations about what could be done in the near term. 
 
------------------- 
EU Third-Party Role 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Otte advised that, while an EU monitoring role had 
been approved in principle (see reftel), he was seeking 
clarification from both the GOI and PA on what the 
responsibilities would be.  He said the GOI had "backed off" 
insisting on "active monitoring" whereby EU personnel would 
perform certain functions that should normally be assigned to 
Palestinians.  Otte said he stressed to both sides that 
ninety-nine percent of the cases would go smoothly but the 
remaining one percent would require a trusted and true 
"incident mechanism."  No end-date for an EU presence has 
been determined, but Leffler described a "successful mission" 
as one in which the third party leaves the Palestinians in 
control of Rafah operations with the full confidence of and 
coordination with the GOI. 
 
5  (C) Otte suggested that the threat of an abrupt EU 
third-party withdrawal from Rafah would serve as a huge 
deterrent to any deviation from a final agreement.  Otte said 
that although Dahlan had assured him that the Palestinians 
"won't let you down," he remained concerned that upcoming 
election in the Gaza and the West Bank, in preparation for 
which candidates would have to resign their PA positions, 
might make it difficult to determine who is in charge.  The 
Ambassador noted that Dahlan would certainly maintain his 
influence over something as important as Rafah.  Otte replied 
that during his tour of the area, it was clear that Dahlan 
was in control and his people were in charge of the terminal. 
 
--------------- 
Goods Must Move 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador said that, in the past, efforts to 
defeat terrorism had often lacked an economic component, but 
this could no longer be the case.  For example, expanding the 
movement of people and goods to and from the West Bank and 
Gaza would help revitalize the Palestinian economy and render 
extremist views less attractive to the general public.  The 
Ambassador mentioned to Otte that a senior GOI MOD official 
had recently told him that the Karni crossing with Gaza must 
be kept open so that soon-to-be harvested agricultural 
produce can be exported.  Leffler added that the EU message 
on the subject was similar to that of Special Envoy 
Wolfensohn:  passages must not only be kept open, but 
throughput capacity must be significantly increased, as well. 
 The Ambassador advised that the USG is working with the GOI 
on the purchase of scanners with USG funds for Karni and 
other crossings. 
 
¶7.  (C) Otte said the "Israeli mentality has changed" and now 
the importance of a vibrant Palestinian economy was better 
appreciated.  He said he expected progress on improving the 
passages.  The Ambassador interjected that the Palestinians 
also need to understand that it is in their best interest to 
maintain tight control over the crossings.  In reply, Otte 
said that bulk of the problem remained elsewhere in the form 
of about 50 tunnels running into Gaza.  The Ambassador noted 
that long-standing restrictions at the crossings had driven 
even legitimate trade through the tunnels and onto the black 
market.  Increasing capacity at the crossings will allow more 
goods in legally, crowding out the black market and freeing 
up PA resources to concentrate on intercepting the most 
dangerous contraband. 
 
¶8.  (C) Leffler suggested that construction of a Gaza seaport 
did not make economic sense because several other ports can 
unload Gaza-bound goods.  He said that current port talks 
give a sense of movement but a port will take 3-5 years to 
build.  Re-opening the airport in as little as six months, on 
the other hand, should be a priority as it would provide a 
strong and immediate positive impact.  Leffler said that 
Israeli growers in the Negev could also use the airport to 
export their goods.  Otte suggested that the PA, in 
coordination with the GOI, could sign a contract with a 
reputable foreign cargo carrier as an initial step.  Leffler 
asserted that, if required, the PA would accept security 
standards more rigorous than those at Israel's Ben Gurion 
airport. 
 
¶9.  (C)  On a cautionary note, Leffler suggested that from a 
West Bank perspective, things were not that encouraging. 
Palestinians in the West Bank are watching what is happening 
in Gaza and hearing about initiatives to improve life there. 
In the West Bank, however, they see more GOI infrastructure 
projects, walls, settlement expansion, and wonder about what 
is happening to them, according to Leffler. 
 
----------------- 
EU Police Mission 
----------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Otte advised the Ambassador that his current visit 
also concerned the EU's program to provide training and other 
assistance to the Palestinian police.  The program should 
commence by January 1, 2006 and be running at full capacity 
by April 2006.  He said the number of EU police advisors had 
increased from seven to thirty, with a goal of placing one in 
each district.  The EU program would also send Palestinian 
policemen abroad for training, according to Otte.  He said 
one goal was to re-open the Jericho police training center. 
He emphasized that the program would link policies with rule 
of law.  Lastly, Otte said the GOI should understand and be 
prepared to accept that at some point the Palestinian police 
would need to be better equipped. 
 
 
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JONES