This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 003378 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHITE HOUSE FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND 
SECURITY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND 
DEPARTMENT FOR PM A/S HILLEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER IZ SY YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SALEH TELLS GEN ABIZAID HE ACCEPTS WEAPONS 
INVENTORY SYSTEM; OFFERS MEDIATION WITH SYRIA AND IRAQI 
BAATHISTS 
 
REF: SANAA 3349 
 
Classified By: CDA NABEEL KHOURY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (S)  SUMMARY:  In a November 26 meeting with visiting 
CENTCOM Commander GEN John Abizaid, President Saleh accepted 
long-standing U.S. offers to create a weapons inventory 
system for the Yemeni Armed Forces.  He claimed that Syrian 
President Bashar al-Asad had expressed willingness to 
cooperate with the USG on stopping the infiltration of 
fighters into Iraq, but needed more assistance from the 
United States.  Saleh said he proposed direct contacts with 
the USG to Bashar, urging specifically a visit by GEN Abizaid 
to Damascus.  On the subject of political reconciliation in 
Iraq, Saleh said only a "full dialogue" with all of Iraq's 
political actors, particularly "ordinary Baath party 
members," would help move the process forward.  He offered to 
gather Baathists in Sanaa as a first step in that dialogue. 
The President asked GEN Abizaid for information on Yemeni 
detainees in Iraq, and lauded the new energy in Yemeni-Saudi 
counter-terrorism cooperation.  He also urged the USG to 
support the new government in Somalia and requested financial 
assistance to retain Yemen's liaison officers in Tampa and 
Djibouti.   END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (C)  In a cordial atmosphere punctuated by an unexpected 
invitation to lunch, President Saleh informed GEN Abizaid 
that he had decided to accept U.S. offers of assistance in 
creating a system to keep track of weapons procured for the 
Yemeni Armed Forces.  Referring to previous conversations 
between Embassy's Office of Military Cooperation and the 
Minister of Defense, Saleh said that the system should cover 
"not one, but many units" (reftel).  He emphasized, however, 
that the ROYG would look to the USG to provide funding for 
it.  GEN Abizaid replied that keeping control of small 
arms/light weapons was important to improving the security 
not only of Yemen, but of the region, and that the USG would 
look for ways to support that common goal. 
 
¶3. (S)  Saleh told the General that he had sent a message to 
President Bashar "four or five days ago" recommending that 
Bashar support a visit by the CENTCOM Commander.  Saleh 
claimed that Bashar was now ready to cooperate with the USG 
with regard to stopping the flow of fighters into Iraq, and 
had even begun building a barrier along the border, but would 
need more U.S. assistance to enhance his efforts.  "We do not 
want to see a point of tension with Syria like in Iraq," 
Saleh advised.  GEN Abizaid promised that he and Ambassador 
would convey to their superiors in Washington Saleh's 
concerns and his recommendation for a visit to Damascus by 
the General. 
 
¶4. (C)  The President praised CENTCOM's efforts to train, 
equip and enable Iraqi units to take the lead on more 
security operations, with support from coalition forces. 
Coalition forces, he said, should remain on their bases in 
Iraq and Iraqis should be responsible for providing security 
and taking the risks inherent in doing so.  Saleh also hailed 
the news that all former Iraqi armed forces members below the 
rank of major would soon be allowed to re-join the military. 
GEN Abizaid said that was a decision that the Iraqi Minister 
of Defense had recently announced, and that the USG supports, 
but that would not be implemented until after the December 15 
elections and the formation of a new government. 
 
¶5. (C)  Saleh advised the General that only a "full dialogue" 
with all of Iraq's political forces, particularly "ordinary 
members" of the Baath party, would help bring peace to the 
country.  He offered to "use our ties" with the Baathists to 
bring a number of them to Sanaa for the first step in this 
dialogue.  Saleh named former Prime Minister Ayad Alawi as a 
natural leader to conduct the dialogue, but cautioned that 
Alawi will not do it unless he has permission from 
Washington.  "Power in Iraq is not with Zarqawi," Saleh 
advised, "but with the Baathists." 
 
¶6. (C)  GEN Abizaid agreed that the terrorists were rapidly 
losing support from the Iraqi population, and said the USG 
was interested in maintaining a dialogue with anyone except 
for al-Qaida and its associates.  It was somewhat difficult, 
however, to find political leaders willing to participate in 
a dialogue.  He said that "many things that were not possible 
before will be possible" after the December elections, and 
added that a national dialogue of the type Saleh was 
suggesting would be in the best interests of all Iraqis at 
that time. 
 
¶7. (S)  Turning to other issues, Saleh asked the General to 
provide as much information as possible on Yemeni detainees 
in Iraq, but declined the General's offer for ROYG security 
officials to visit the detainees.  With more information -- 
particularly the detainees' names -- he said, ROYG 
authorities would be able to obtain more information from 
their families on the detainees and their associates still in 
Yemen.  Saleh said the ROYG collected what information it 
could from telephone monitoring, for example on the recent 
killing of six Yemenis in Iraq, but information gathered 
through these methods came all too often after an incident 
had occurred.  GEN Abizaid promised to provide what 
information he could on the detainees as soon as possible. 
 
¶8. (C)  Asked about Yemen's cooperation with Saudi Arabia on 
counter-terrorism, Saleh said it was "excellent now."  He 
said the ROYG had passed information recently to the Saudis 
that was critical in foiling planned attacks in Mecca and 
Medina.  Such cooperation is good "not only for the Saudis' 
sake," he said, "but for regional security."  He said he was 
particularly impressed with the level of cooperation his 
officials were receiving from Saudi Assistant Minister of 
Interior Mohammed bin Naif.  Saleh said he had also met with 
the newly named Ambassador to the United States, Turki 
al-Faisal, and was "impressed."  Saleh asked for the USG to 
use its influence with Saudi Arabia, and indeed with other 
Gulf countries, to invest in Yemen and help alleviate the 
poverty that drives youth to extremism. 
 
¶9. (C)  Saleh also said increased regional cooperation with 
the United States and Ethiopia was critical to bringing 
stability to Somalia.  The three countries should do all they 
can to support the Yusufi government so that it can take 
action against terrorist elements.  He said that Eritrean 
President Isaias Afwerki did not like the Yusufi government, 
and was "supporting any elements against it, including 
terrorists and insane people."  GEN Abizaid agreed that the 
United States and Yemen needed to increase their cooperation 
to deny terrorists a safehaven anywhere, whether in Somalia, 
Yemen or Iraq. 
 
¶10. (C)  Reiterating points made in an earlier meeting with 
the Minister of Defense, Saleh asked GEN Abizaid for support 
in providing health insurance and billeting to Yemen's 
liaison officers at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa and at the 
CJTF-HOA headquarters in Djibouti.  The General said he would 
ask his staff to research what support CENTCOM could provide 
to Yemen, because it is important to maintain Yemen's laision 
officers at these locations. 
 
¶11. (S)  COMMENT:  Saleh's report of improved CT cooperation 
with the Saudis confirms what we have heard elsewhere and 
provides a useful foundation for exploring opportunities for 
the USG to help in that regard.  His offers to mediate with 
Bashar and Iraqi Baathists are well-meaning, but probably not 
particularly useful right now in light of the pressure the 
international community is exerting on Bashar to cooperate 
with the UN investigation, and the internal political 
dynamics in Iraq.  We are very encouraged by the fact that 
Saleh has at last given the political green light needed to 
begin the implementation of a nationwide weapons inventory 
system.  As the President made clear, however, he is 
expecting the USG's financial and technical support for the 
creation of a system that we have been strongly advocating 
for some time. 
 
¶12. (U)  GEN Abizaid has cleared this cable. 
KHOURY